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ABSTRACT

The 13 papers in this volume discuss issues relating to Caribbeans who have migrated to the United States and then returned to their home countries. The last three papers focus on remittances, migrants' ongoing remitting of cash and other economic resources to the home society. Paper titles (and authors) are the following: (1) "Introductory Essay: The Dynamics of Caribbean Return Migration" (William F. Stinner and Klaus de Albuquerque); (2) "Return Migration to the English-Speaking Caribbean: Review and Commentary" (Hymie Rubenstein); (3) "The Origins and Continuity of Return Migration in the Leeward Caribbean" (Bonham Richardson); (4) "'In Sick Longing for the Further Shore': Return Migration by Caribbean East Indians During the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries" (Brinsley Samaroo); (5) "International Return Migration: Socio-Demographic Determinant of Return Migration to the Dominican Republic" (Antonio Ugalde and Thomas C. Langham); (6) "Return Migration from the United States to Costa Rica and El Salvador" (Guy Potiras); (7) "The Newyorican Comes Home to Puerto Rico: Description and Consequences" (Roberta Ann Johnson); (8) "The Puerto Rican Circuit and the Success of Return Migrants" (Barry B. Levine); (9) "Why Returnees Generally Do Not Turn Out to Be 'Agents of Change': The Case of Surinam" (Frank Bovenkerk); (10) "The Impact of Remittances in the Rural English-Speaking Caribbean: Notes on the Literature" (Hymie Rubenstein); (11) "The Magnitude and Impact of Remittances in the Eastern Caribbean: A Research Note" (Rosemary Brana-Shute and Gary Brana-Shute); (12) "Migration Remittances and Development: Preliminary Results of a Study of Caribbean Cane Cutters in Florida" (Charles H. Wood). Also included are bibliographies on return migration and remittances, and notes on contributors and editors. (KH)

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Return Migration and Remittances: Developing A Caribbean Perspective

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RIIES Occasional Papers No. 3
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The Research Institute on Immigration and Ethnic Studies founded in 1973, is part of the Smithsonian's Department of Anthropology. The Research Institute focuses on immigration flows which have been affected by legislation since 1965. It also explicitly includes American extraterritorial jurisdictions among its scholarly concerns.

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Return Migration and Remittances: Developing a Caribbean Perspective

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Dedication

The Research Institute on Immigration and Ethnic Studies makes a gift to the membership of the Caribbean Studies Association, now in its eighth year of existence, by dedicating this volume to the memory of our beloved colleague, Dr. Vera Green, a member of long standing who departed this life on January 16, 1982. We, the three editors of this volume, recall her unselfish spirit and steadfast commitment to the Caribbean region, its people and its study; her perkiness, pleasant presence, and participation in CSA meetings; and her encouragement and assistance to us in connection with this project. She was truly appreciated; she will be sadly missed.

Further, the Research Institute on Immigration and Ethnic Studies of the Smithsonian Institution wishes to dedicate the collection to Dr. Basil Ince, Past President of CSA and at present Minister of Foreign Relations of Trinidad and Tobago; Dr. Orville Goodin, at present Minister of Treasury, Republic of Panama; and Dr. Vaughn Lewis, Past President of CSA and now Director-General of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (in St. Lucia). By their examples, they and other colleagues of our generation continue a tradition established by an older group of outstanding Caribbean scholars and reinforce the hope of the continued *return migration* of younger, promising Caribbean scholars to perform high, public services for their peoples and the countries or region of their birth and early education.

PREFACE

By the time of the release of this volume, the Research Institute will have entered its tenth year of official establishment within the Smithsonian Institution. With this volume, RIIES will have produced its eleventh publication on the subjects of new and Caribbean immigrations. Conceived of at a time when the Smithsonian decided to extend its efforts beyond traditional concerns for artifacts and events of antiquity to include the study of ongoing human sociocultural activities, RIIES was granted membership in the Institution's family in 1972. (This was one year before it was to make its appearance as a formal organization with a director.) As of this earliest association, the Research Institute was to become committed to share with its larger parent body its rather well-known responsibilities, "to increase and diffuse knowledge to all [Men]," charged to it by benefactor James Smithson. Restated, the formulation of the specific objectives of RIIES reads as follows:

> To stimulate, facilitate, diffuse and conduct scholarly research on post-1960 immigration into the United States and its overseas territories.[1]

The year 1972, apart from being the occasion when RIIES was conceived, is important insofar as it marked a period in which the latest wave of incoming foreigners into this country had become an established reality, with clear patterns of composition, origin and places of settlement. Ironically, it was also a period of continued public unawareness and scholarly inattention to this new presence. It also marked the emergence of a campaign of anti-immigration forces who were bent on creating a sense of panic and promoting a negative, one-sided and isolationist view of the new immigrants and what their presence as new ethnics as well as added population would mean to the American society.

Seeking to carry out a higher mission, RIIES committed itself, instead, to instill serious scholarly input into the debate and study of new immigration. Its hopes were (1) to bring about a broader way of viewing immigration to the American public, and (2) to generate the details, data and dynamics which could yield a more accurate picture of the complexity of new immigration as both a transnational process and a human experience. From RIIES's own perspective, American immigration is a process not only of peopling the United States but of continuing to shape its history, enrich its culture, and extend its linkages with other countries of the continent and the world. Hence, it was quite fitting that it was RIIES which would sponsor the nation's first major academic conference on the new immigration. It was in keeping with its purpose and style that a unit of the Smithsonian Institution would exercise leadership in an international, public and intellectual endeavor.

Even before its establishment as a nation, the history of the United States has been one of successive waves of immigrants not only from the Old World but from among New World societies as well. Each such wave has had its particular impact on the shaping of this country's internal composition and external relations. By 1960, the United States was again to experience a "new" wave of immigrants. Massive numbers of Cuban refugees and later other peoples from Haiti and the Dominican Republic entered the United States in flight from dangerous, incompatible political situations in their respective countries.

By 1965, the United States Congress passed its most comprehensive immigration legislation. The Act facilitated entry and change of status for the Cuban refugees; for others it increased the opportunities for admission, abolished national quotas and regional or racial restrictions in favor of near parity in hemispheric ceilings, and introduced a first-come, first-served arrangement modulated by priorities based on family reunification and U.S. labor needs. The 1965 Act also eliminated the Western and Northern European biases which prevailed in previous immigration legislation and policies of the United States. The consequences of these policies and legislative actions, coupled with new national and international economic imbalances began to take effect about the same time. The results have registered in the form of 80,524,843 nonimmigrants, 3,241,844 legal immigrants and 628,912 parolees, and the estimated two to twelve million illegal immigrants alleged from the Caribbean, Latin America and Asia, which are said to inhabit this country today.[2] According to the 1980 census estimates, the foreign-born population of the United States has increased to 6 percent of the country's total population, consisting of fourteen million people; as compared to ten million in 1970. Today, 10 percent of the country's population speak a foreign language, 48 percent of those speak Spanish; and, there are now twenty seven million non-whites (23 percent in the total United States population). It is safe to assume that the new immigration has contributed in some way to these patterns of change.[3]

Unfortunately, these developments reached their peaks at the very moment that the current serious economic crises have begun to confront the United States. These crises are being felt with special gravity by its cities, colonies, common working-class people and minorities who also share disproportionately space or resources with incoming immigrants, (themselves emigrating from new, unstable and even more economically depressed or overpopulated countries.)

The news media moving from a stance of inaction to one of sporadic sensationalism more often reinforce the fears raised by anti-immigrationist forces. The news produce another level of one-sidedness in the nation's conception of immigration: wild estimates, repeated police raids of undocumented workers, numerous refugees coming, none of them leaving! They are being turned back on the high seas, detained in camps, forced to depart or are deported! Only the occasional terrorists, misfits or maniacs would kidnap planes to return to Havana! Nobody leaves the United States voluntarily; they only come! Of course, this is not true. Even true-blooded Americans emigrate from the United States for "greener pastures." And, as Van B. Shaw has stated, "Just as many naturalized Americans become expatriates to return to their original homelands, many American expatriates are later repatriated to the United States." He points out that between 1950 and 1968 almost 15,000 cases of repatriation were reported by the I.N.S. service.[4] But, based on the news one would conclude differently; that immigration is just that -- no emigration, no return migration. And, as the new immigrants or new ethnics enter the population soars; resources and employment are strained; and comfort and culture are spoiled! Few consider that a good many will be themselves or will bear new *Americans*;

many perhaps fear that they will bring about a *new* America.

Under such conditions and influences, it is understandable that "national" and "local" dimensions of the immigration problem have been exaggerated in the minds of the American people, even among native-born minorities and older established elements of the new immigrant populations. Most people are unsophisticated about the more complex international interests and therefore about the risks and responsibilities this nation must take as the leading claimant of wealth, advancement, opportunities and power in the world, a position which it still finds necessary and worthy to compete for, maintain and expand.

Too many segments of the American public may have lost sight or concern with the "international" nature of the immigration problem, that is where and how it fits into the United States' roles and aspirations in world affairs. So many people in the United States today do not see why they should remember, care or know what immigration means to new immigrants or to the peoples and societies they leave behind. They certainly do not understand beyond chauvinistic romanticism and gross misperceptions why so many foreign people clamor to enter the United States. They are not aware of this country's contributions to these so-called "invasions" because they do not understand the relationship between immigration and international relations, world economy, persuasive politics and big business in which the United States is so aggressively involved.

This narrow attitude has been reflected even on the highest levels of U.S. government where for sometime policies of immigration have been developed and executed without explicit, rational relations to policies of development assistance, international relations and trade (or for that purpose with policies of local services and domestic governance) and vice-versa. In fact, even today, there is still no comprehensive body of knowledge or guidelines for coordinating contemporary immigration/emigration dynamics between recipient and donor societies (or for anticipating local versus national needs arising out of such movements). Even more telling is the almost universal absence of reliable data on emigration, brain drain, return migration, remittances, remigration and other phenomena reflecting the situation of *source* rather than recipient countries.

Ever since its inception, the Research Institute has been proposing a just, balanced, comprehensive and *inter*national approach to immigration studies and policies among governments and levels of governments concerned. Its pleas seemingly ignored and sometimes misunderstood, perhaps have been too difficult to absorb or acknowledge in the adversary atmospheres and competitive circles in existence now. Perhaps we, at RIIES, are too impatient, but we are chagrined that so many of the needs we have been articulating for almost a decade continue to exist; that governments have been so slow in responding to them. Convinced with the validity of our messages and the relevance of our challenges, conscious of the criticism and ostracism we have drawn because of our position, we feel compelled to cooperate and now to celebrate with those colleagues and supporters who have come to share with us the broader conception of immigration and how it should be dealt with. It is for these reasons that the themes and contents of this volume and the context in which it emerged are so pleasing to us at RIIES.

This collection focuses on two themes -- return migration and remittances -- conceptually different but not convincingly unrelated aspects of the phenomenon of immigration, especially as it applies to developing societies or regions and their emigrants. The notions of return migration and remittances should bring to the minds of the readers immediately that immigration is indeed a complex, multi-level phenomenon with potential for endurable historical and transnational linkage; it can also be an infinite human experience. They remind us that immigration is just one part of an equation; emigration is another. To have come to a new place of residence is to have left some place else; but having adopted a new place need not mean abandoning the old one. Hence, to have emigrated does not mean *never* to return or have the desire of returning nor does it mean *never* to remit *materiel* (that is ideological, symbolic, structural or tangible goods) and service of worth to the place of one's origin, belonging and early upbringing. Accordingly, immigration does not begin or end automatically with the initial movement and relocation from one country to another of new residence. It has macro-structural as well as individualistic dimensions which are registered throughout the process and which may not be congruent or compatible with each other (or at least not so easily recognizable as such without profound or projected study.)

Why do people leave? How much is their leaving beneficial to them or their country? When and in what conditions do they desire or actually return? When or what do they remit in the absence of their physical or permanent return? To what extent or in what manner are these beneficial to them or their country or region? And in what ways and on what levels should these tendencies become parts of the planning and policies of the related governments? Obviously, the answers to these questions will be relative and varied. At this time, however, they are unknown. There is no body of data or theory on return migration or remittances. Even the relations between these two forms of behavior are not clear at this point. These are important issues in understanding immigration and immigrants, the behavior of immigrants in their host and source countries, the relations between two or more countries because of immigrants, and eventually the role of immigration in the problems of mobility and internal distribution of opportunities or resources as well as those of international inequality, disequilibrium and conflict in the world order.

Points such as the above are discussed in the papers and notes of this collection. That they are done with a Caribbean focus and from a Caribbeanist perspective is both proper and necessary. After all, seen historically, the region has experienced both periods of intense immigration and intense emigration. In fact, some current states within the region even experience high circular migration both in the repetitive seasonal sense of the word as well as persons who re-emigrate after a period of stay as expatriates in the old country. Caribbean links through immigration/emigration extend to many other countries beyond the United States, but the region's proximity to that country and its Caribbean holdings, i.e., Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, the demand of prearranged bonds,contracts and round-trip tickets to ensure repatriation at the end of temporary stays and, of course, deportation and related activities make for heightening the probability of return migration. The sending of remittances back home can be enhanced by fluctuations in local market situations and also by discrepancies in economic needs and potentials between immigrant recipient and sending countries. Moreover, among the Caribbean people expectations of return and remittances are part of their immigrant ethos and tradition. But, to date very little has been published on these subjects as aspects of Caribbean immigration, and they are not yet parts of their governments' policies and planning.

Impressed that the issues of emigration, return migration and remittances are as important from a contemporary Caribbean perspective as immigration is today from an American vantage point, RIIES has never hesitated to include them as part of its concerns. Hence, note may be taken of the prominence given these subjects in its programs and publications. For example, it has published *verbatim* the articulation for clarity, coordination and compatibility between the emigration policies of Jamaica and the immigration policies of the United States by a diplomat who participated in the Institute's first planning seminar in 1975.[5] Dedicated to Caribbean immigration, the Institute's first publication of occasional papers, contain two specific articles on barriers to returning for West Indian professionals and one on brain drain by transplanted West Indian scholars, plus several related comments by the editors and other contributors.[6] In a number of RIIES publications pertinent commentaries and methodological critiques are offered about both return migration and remittances;[7] in others, especially its volume on female immigrants, these two specific aspects of international migration are treated on the personal level as well.[8]

In my own case, leaving my family behind, I came to the United States as a foreign student with serious intentions of returning to my native Panama or other countries in the larger circum-Caribbean region where I can trace my ancestral background and follow my extended kinship. However, I was disposed to extend my stay and change my status, if necessary, if extraordinary opportunities arose which could render greater security or development for me and my family or to improve my skills, status and saleability or strategic re-entry into my country or region of origin. Not having returned nor having had an opportunity for such a re-entry, I (as a black, alien scholar) do suffer what may be termed the underside or psychological anxieties of the brain drain. These are feelings of alienation and ambivalence of identity, despite my relative success in the United States. Consequently, as an apparent compensatory readjustment to the ever-compelling sense of indebtedness and commitment to those left behind, the causes of small developing countries, minorities and immigrants (especially those with circum-Caribbean affiliations) have become the objects of my service and of my United States-acquired scholarship. I suppose these efforts constitute personal forms of remittances in lieu, or in anticipation, of returning.[9]

Hence, going back to my early writing, it is possible to find many points which may still be relevant for consideration as minimal objectives for realizing such plans and policies; for example:

> 1. Balanced, integrated and well-planned bilateral and regional programs in economic development, population control, and international migration (including the consideration of new targets or arrangements for Caribbean migration).
>
> 2. Equitable international and internal redistribution of wealth and industries as long-term projects ... instead of massive movements of people to the United States as permanent immigrants you [may] have massive movements of them to the United States as non-immigrants, largely as tourists and students.
>
> 3. Coordinated evaluation of data, research and policies, particularly on demographic and economic strategies, with the intention of enabling the pan-Caribbean community to monitor migration and trade within the region and also to operate as a single economic community when dealing with countries outside the region, or with other regions of international economic cooperation and international consortia.
>
> 4. ... If emigration becomes an explicit policy of these islands, aid in cosmopolitanizing and upgrading educational systems is necessary to prepare prospective immigrants and to develop skills and scientific methods to increase and improve their own economic development therefore reducing the need for massive unqualified outmigration in the long run.
>
> 5. Protection of welfare and rights of migrants, tourists, and investors; also the discontinuation of exploitation of recent immigrants in terms of low-paying jobs and poor living and working conditions.

6. Redefinition and extension of the concepts of nation, nationality, citizenship, and so forth, so as to project over boundaries of time and space and allow source-countries to share the benefits of immigrants leaving their shores and locating in other countries their offspring and repatriates. Among other things, this means a serious look at the institutionalization of remittances and repatriation as part of an additional or indirect source of revenue, investment capital, manpower and intellectual resources which the region and source-countries may begin to anticipate in their long-term developmental planning.[10]

Thus, I make a case for my long-held concern that Caribbean countries should pursue a careful formulation of developmental plans and policies which capitalize on the Caribbean emigration tendency, the presence of large numbers of Caribbean immigrants and offsprings as workers and professionals in advanced industrial societies, their tenacious identification with the home region and consequently their disposition to return or to send remittances back home. Indeed, since these ideas were published some Caribbean countries and organizations, e.g., Cuba, Guyana, Grenada, U.S. Virgin Islands and UNICA (Universities of the Caribbean Association) have sought to pursue innovative methods for re-establishing instrumental linkages and instituting recruitment and research programs directed to West Indian expatriates and their offspring to consider returning or rendering service to the region or their respective countries of origin. For this and other reasons, hitherto scattered as minor items within larger works or other discussions, the topics of Caribbean return migration and remittances now deserve treatment in an exclusive and prominent manner.[11]

In that sense, this volume fills a critical void in the state of the literature. Perhaps it also represents the beginning of a thrust toward serious discussion of the topic and the larger matter of Caribbean immigration from an instrumental but strictly Caribbean perspective. It is important to note here that unlike other RIIES publications this volume did not originate from the Institute's initiative but was created from panels of two important regional studies associations -- Caribbean Studies Association and the Latin American Studies Association. In reality the papers were drawn from proceedings of three different panels. Originally intended as a volume on the CSA panel on return migration, organized by my two colleagues and held in Curacao, Netherlands Antilles, in 1980, the principal papers constitute the first section of the collection. Critical statements on the less attended notion but closely related item of remittances comprise a second section. These papers were drawn from the panels of a LASA meeting held in Washington, D.C. in 1982 and the CSA meetings held in Kingston, Jamaica, in the same year.

The order of presentation of the contents is intended to carry the reader from general to specific treatments of each subject -- return migration and remittances. In the process neither chronology nor the analysis of sub-cultural variants will be observed in a strict manner, though some degree of clustering will be attempted. As a pioneer collection and also because the entries still comprise part of an incipient literature, theoretical gaps and data limitations are to be expected in their contents. Similarly, crosscutting themes rather than thematic coherence prevail helped along by the inclusion of two useful composite bibliographies, each presented at the end of the appropriate section of the book.

To help set the stage my colleagues, co-editors Stinner and Albuquerque, present an introductory essay which discusses levels, attributes and dynamics of return migration. Their framework guides the readers to the location and importance of crosscutting commentaries on the same, and raises a set of questions which not only prepare the readers for the readings which follow but leaves them impressed by the many outstanding challenges which still remain to be researched by those of us who wish to understand or act upon the Caribbean tendency of return migration. Rubenstein's review commentary on return migration in the English-speaking Caribbean and Richardson's historical specifications on Leeward Islanders add depth and insight about the return migration pattern of the creole population whose initial outward movements have been somewhat familiar to students of the history of the region. But, Samaroo goes beyond specification and introduces novelty and comparison by bringing to our attention East Indian immigrants who left the Caribbean to go back to the Indian peninsula.

Imbalances in our knowledge and distortions of our stereotypes of Caribbean return migration are even sharper in the case of Hispanic variant countries. With the exception of Puerto Rico we have mistakenly assumed emigration to the United States to be low from the Hispanic Caribbean countries when not politically stimulated. We often forget that even prior to Castro, Cuba was the leading source of immigration to the United States among the sovereign countries of the region.[12] By their articles Ugalde, Langham and Poitras share with us characteristics of repatriates from "new" source countries such as the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica or El Salvador whereas Johnson and Levine provide us in-depth views of the experiences and aftermaths of Puerto Ricans, a people with a long, extensive history of immigration and return. Epics on return immigrants are part of the lore and literature of many of the Caribbean islands; excellence, sometimes excesses, in leadership among repatriated statesmen and politicians has characterized much of contemporary Caribbean history. Probable consequences of return migration as this translates into mobility, success, and status acquisition among returning Surinamese are discussed by Bovenkerk. His conclusions, like those of the studies of remittances which follow, suggest the need for caution and specification rather than gross, overly optimistic generalizations about the impact of return migration; the same we shall see is true of remittances.

The second section begins with a useful transition provided by Rubenstein which shows the connection between return migration and remittances as parts of the return expectation syndrome which characterizes Caribbean immigrants. The two research notes which follow testify to the yet unheralded status of the subject. The survey of the literature on remittances to the Eastern Caribbean by the Brana-Shutes and the empirical observations of Wood on English-speaking West Indian canecutters in Florida are, in their own rights, reports on works-in-progress which will begin to fill an unfortunate void. All three of these works represent, as well, encouraging strides in our attempts to deal with the impact of remittances on both macro- and micro-levels. For, the subjects of return migration and remittances, as we have said before, are not only essential for acquiring a knowledge of Caribbean history, society and culture but for arriving at adequate development plans and appropriate policies for the mobility of *people* as well as the development of *countries* in the region. Their varied and limited impact at this time may as well be the function of their low use as variables and low priority as targets in more comprehensive development planning.

Pulling these two themes -- return migration and remittances -- under one cover necessarily has delayed the publication. But in the long run it will have enriched the conceptualization of their individual and interconnecting importance to the Caribbean in the interests of regional development. As for us at RIIES, the publication of this particular volume rendered us the manifold encouragement to have witnessed the diffusion of our concerns among other Caribbeanist scholars and their associations, and to have participated in the production of a pioneering effort in the discussion of Caribbean immigration from a Caribbean perspective. The interdisciplinary, interinstitutional, international collaboration it represents augers well for the future of the kinds of insiders-outsiders dialogues and deliberations which RIIES has sought to promote in the study of international immigration and shaping of related policies. The balance in such determinations demands active participation and therefore various levels of input from scholars and experts not only from recipient but *source* countries as well.

We hope that the readers will therefore appreciate this work not simply for what it says or what it asks, but we hope that they would appreciate it as well for what it means. It is a statement of a growing sense of purpose, priority and perspective among scholars committed to encouraging more Caribbeanist studies of Caribbean immigration. It may be a signal that we are at the threshold of conscientious, competent collaboration between Caribbean scholars, officials, experts and their counterparts in the United States and other target countries toward more comprehensive and complementary policies in international migration and development. Its contents point to specific kinds of transnational/transregional interactions, bonds, structures and processes which emerge from significant or sustained movements of people, resources, technology and ideas across international borders in a world of unequal development and which deserve continued expert attention.

Hence, in terminating, it seems useful to restate what I think comprise some imperatives for scholars of international migration, especially those in the developed recipient societies, particularly as their works should relate to the subject matters of this volume -- return migration and remittances to less developed, *source* societies:

> Immigration of any sort has not rendered any emergent country (or colonized state for that matter) free of the influence of its emigrants .....*
>
> Scholars (word inserted by author) must attend to the yet unheralded, in some cases unrecog-

> nized, linkages and organizations which migration represents and the trajectories of those various structural forms which emerge in the process of migration. They must begin to contribute their specific expertise and information into channels directed to the formation of comprehensive, multilateral views of development ... and (word introduced by author) must demonstrate their sensitivity by offering appropriate opportunities for truly equal coparticipation with their 'ethnic' colleagues in *source countries and various points along the migrant stream* (italicized by author).[13]

If and when such considerations begin to be the regular practices among Caribbeanists, then the perspective promised by this volume will become an heralded reality in itself.

Roy S. Bryce-Laporte

NOTES

[1] See brochure defining functions of Research Institute on Immigration and Ethnic Studies.

[2] *INS Reports, 1965-1979*.

[3] *Census Report 1980*; "The Numbers on America," *Washington Post*, 20 April 1982, p. A-1; "American Society A Changing Mosaic, Census Ancestry Study Shows," Press Release CB82-66 U.S. Census Bureau, 11 May 1982, p. 2; and "Table 1. Reported Single and Multiple Ancestries: November 1979," *Ancestry and Language in the United States: November 1979*, Current Population Reports, Special Studies Series P-23, No. 116 (Washington, D.C.: U..S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census), p. 7.

[4] Van B. Shaw, "Greener Pastures: American Expatriation and Expatriates," in *Quantitative Data and Immigration Research*, eds. Stephen R. Couch and Roy Simon Bryce-Laporte (Washington, D.C.: RIIES, Smithsonian Institution, 1979), p. 185.

[5] "Appendix A. Preliminary Planning Conference, *Sourcebook on the New Immigration: Supplement*, Vol. II, ed. Roy S. Bryce-Laporte with Delores M. Mortimer and Stephen R. Couch (Washington, D.C.: RIIES, Smithsonian Institution, 1979), pp. 220-243.

[6] *Carribean Immigration to the United States*, eds. Roy S. Bryce-Laporte and Delores M. Mortimer, RIIES Occasional Papers No. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1976), see particularly Theodore A. Bremner, "The Caribbean Expatriate: Barriers to Returning -- Perspectives of the Natural Scientist," pp. 149-157; Edwin H. Daniel, "Perspectives on the Total Utilization of Manpower and the Caribbean Expatriate: Barriers to Returning," pp. 158-168; Rawle Farley, "Professional Migration: The Brain Drain from the West Indies and Africa -- Abbreviated Remarks," pp. 169-181.

[7] See list of RIIES publications in Appendix.

[8] *Female Immigrants to the United States: Caribbean, Latin American, and African Experiences*, eds. Delores M. Mortimer and Roy S. Bryce-Laporte, RIIES Occasional Papers No. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1981), see particularly Dorothy Payne Bryan, "Nigerian Women and Child-Bearing Practices in Washington, D.C.: A Summary of Research Findings and Implications," pp. 157-170; Donna Grey, "Caribbean Women and the Brain Drain" (Quotation), p. 171;

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[9] Roy S. Bryce-Laporte, "The New Immigration: A Challenge to Our Sociological Imagination," in *Sourcebook on the New Immigration: Implications for the United States and the International Community*, Vol. I, ed. Roy S. Bryce-Laporte assisted by Delores M. Mortimer and Stephen R. Couch (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, Inc., 1979), pp. 459-472.

[10] Roy S. Bryce-Laporte, "Black Immigrants: The Experience of Invisibility and Inequality," *Journal of Black Studies* 3:1(September 1972): 29-56; "Options for Consideration in Caribbean Education," in *Caribbean American Scholars Exchange Program* (New York: Phelps-Stokes Fund, 1973), pp. 67-74; "Black Immigrants" in *Through Different Eyes*, eds. P.I. Rose, S. Rothman and W.J. Wilson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); "Migration and Ethnicity: A Commentary on Inequality, Power and Development," in *Migration and Development: Implications for Ethnic Identity and Political Conflict*, eds. Helen Safa and Brian Du Toit (Paris: The Hague, Mouton Publishers, 1975), pp. 311-318; "Redefining the Role of the United States in Caribbean Migration and Development," in *The Caribbean Yearbook of International Relations, 1976*, ed. Leslie F. Manigat (Leyden, Netherlands: A. W. Sijthoff, 1977), pp. 287-310; "Caribbean Migration to the United States: Some Tentative Conclusions," in *The Brain Drain from the West Indies and Africa*, eds. Norma A. Niles and Trevor G. Gardner (East Lansing: West Indian Student Association, Michigan State University, 1977), pp. 137-143; "Migration to the United States: Some Implications for Caribbean Governments and Their Educators," in *Caribbean-American Perspectives* (New York: Phelps-Stokes Fund, 1978), pp. 75-78.

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[12] See *INS Reports 1951-1965*.

[13] Roy S. Bryce-Laporte, "Migration and Ethnicity: A Commentary on Inequality, Power and Development," in *Migration and Development: Implications for Ethnic Identity and Political Conflict*, eds. Helen Safa and Brian Du Toit (Paris: The Hague, Mouton Publishers, 1975), pp. 317-318.

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INTRODUCTORY ESSAY:
THE DYNAMICS OF CARIBBEAN RETURN MIGRATION

William F. Stinner and Klaus de Albuquerque

The past decade has witnessed the emergence of a sizeable interest in return migration encompassing both internal and international migration flows.[1] Respecting internal migration, one body of research has been focused on the role of return migration in the reversal of long standing rural to urban and intraregional migration flows in many postindustrial societies.[2] The other body of research on internal migration patterns has been undertaken in peripheral societies with a concentration on return migration flows between urban centers and rural villages.[3]

Shifting the attention to the international sphere, research has primarily been couched within a sociospatial framework of return migration from metropole to peripheral societies.[4] In the specific empirical instance of the Caribbean, this research is inclusive of return migration from the United States and Europe.[5] Of additional interest and importance within the Caribbean setting are the myriad intraregional return migration streams which have, prevailed both historically and in contemporary times as well as the return of indentured East Indians from the Caribbean to India.

Migration and return, and oftentimes remigration and return, have been an institutionalized aspect of Caribbean societies. Specifically, Caribbean people have utilized migration to either neighboring islands or more distant places as "... a basic means of individual and societal survival."[6] In some Caribbean societies this "livelihood mobility" dates back to the period following slave emancipation (1838 in the British West Indies) when landless peasants were lured to labor short areas (Cuba, Dominican Republic, Guyana, Puerto Rico and Trinidad) by promises of free passage, higher wages and better living conditions.[7] Continuing through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, discernible population movements have been evident among societies within the Caribbean region and also between the Caribbean and North America and Europe.[8]

While the general contours of intraregional Caribbean migration are fairly well-known, specific details, and in particular, quantitative data, are scarce. For this and for other reasons as well, students of Caribbean migration have focused their attention almost entirely on the outward migratory movements between the Caribbean and North America and Europe, choosing either to ignore the phenomenon of "return" or, while acknowledging its social and psychological importance, discounting its significance in terms of numbers.[9]

But migrants to the metropole and to other societies within the region do return and this return conveys important demographic, socioeconomic, and political implications for the original sending society and the migrants, themselves. Therefore, this collection of eight papers, an outgrowth of a panel on "Return Migration" organized for the Fifth Annual Conference of the Caribbean Studies Association in Curaçao, May 7-10, 1980, represents the first attempt to present a comprehensive portrait of return migration within the context of the Caribbean region. One set of papers is explicitly about return migration from the metropole societies to specific Caribbean societies. Included in this coverage are analyses of return from the United States to the Dominican Republic (Ugalde and Langham), Costa Rica and San Salvador (Poitras), and Puerto Rico (papers by Johnson and Levine) and from Holland to Surinam (Bovenkerk). English Caribbean societies are the focal point in the historical overviews of Rubenstein and Richardson. Rubenstein's focus is on return from both metropole societies and societies within the region while Richardson analyzes primarily intraregional return to St. Kitts and Nevis. Samaroo's paper stands by itself since it covers return migration of Caribbean

East Indians to India in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the above endeavors, a variety of materials are brought to bear including archival materials, national sample surveys and anthropological field studies.

Like Pirandello's six characters in search of an author, the papers provide much interesting new information that needs to be put into an adequate framework if it is to inform the current state of knowledge on return migration and suggest avenues for future research. One way of accomplishing this is to view return migration as a process with identifiable dimensions. The first dimension includes attributes of the return flow itself including its prevalence, selectivity and direction. More concretely, this initial dimension relates to the specific issues of the scope of return migration, the characteristics of the return migrants and their destinations within the original sending society. A second dimension revolves around the motivations for return, not merely in isolation, but as they relate to structural and individual conditions. A final dimension encompasses the consequences of return migration for the returnees, nonmigrants as well as the original sending society. Our review highlights and integrates the major findings emanating from the papers and provides directions for future research.

PREVALENCE, SELECTIVITY AND DIRECTION

The papers contained in the first section of this volume approach the issue of the prevalence of return migration in several ways: (1) actual volume of return flows; (2) propensity of emigrants to return; and (3) the demographic representations of returnees in the populations of their islands or home communities.

Regardless of the type of data, "... in sheer demographic terms and in relation to the number of territories affected, return migration is an extremely significant part of the Caribbean migration phenomeenon."[10] Rubenstein illustrates this prevalence in his overview of prior research, whether the measure is actual volume or demographic representation of returnees in the populations of their islands or home communities. Ugalde and Langham, focusing on the propensity to return, estimate that about two out of five original outward migrants to the United States from the Dominican Republic returned. In a similar vein, Samaroo, in his historical piece, notes that close to one-fourth of the East Indians, who came under indentureship to the Caribbean, returned to India. Bovenkerk provides longitudinal data, indicating a trend towards a declining propensity to return from the 1950s (25 percent) to the 1970s (2 percent) in Surinam.

Who are the returnees? Like outward migration, return migration is selective. Return migrants are older than outward migrants and often include retirees among their number. Samaroo reports that older East Indians were more likely to return to India because they wanted to die in the mother country. Although not providing specific age data, Johnson alludes to the retirement phenomenon. Alternatively, Ugalde and Langham report that rates of return to the Dominican Republic tend to decrease with age but they attribute this to the high rate of return among students who have completed their studies. Poitras finds that Costa Rican return migrants tended to be older than Salvadorean return migrants; however, no response distributions are given and no data are provided to assess the divergence between returnees and nonmigrants within each society.

Limited data are available on sex selection. Ugalde and Langham find no evidence of sex selectivity among return migrants to the Dominican Republic. Poitras finds a higher prevalence of males among return migrants to Costa Rica than to El Salvador.

Both Samaroo in his historical analysis of the return of East Indians and Bovenkerk in his investigation of returnees to Surinam stress the complexity of stream composition regarding social class. Specifically, they both point to a U-shaped pattern encompassing both the upper and lower rungs of the class hierarchy. Bovenkerk relates this heterogeneity to the eventual segmentation and compartmentalized reintegration of return migrants in the original sending society. Ugalde and Langham, however, employing rates of return, find in the Dominican Republic a positive relationship between social class and the rate of return. Nevertheless, divergencies by occupational situs within social class categories are evident. They conclude that these occupational differences may be due to differences in status, opportunities and income between the original sending and recipient society.

Both Bovenkerk and Levine suggest the presence of temporal changes in selectivity. Bovenkerk points to changes in political ideology (from conservative to left wing) among return migrants between the pre- or immediate post-World War II period returnees and the most recent returnees in Surinam. In Puerto Rico, Levine notes less selectivity over time in such domains as education, income and skill levels.

There is a continued need for more systematic data on selectivity encompassing both comparisons with nonmigrants at original point of origin and emigrants. Moreover, these analyses need to be placed in a specific longitudinal framework.

The next major issue to be addressed is the destination selection of return migrants within the original sending society. Ugalde and Langham find the majority of return migrants to the Dominican Republic residing in the capital city of Santo Domingo with the remainder evenly spread between rural and urban areas. Furthermore, they find a close parallel between residence at departure and residence upon return. This latter finding diverges from Taylor's (see references) earlier study of Jamaican return migrants. Although Jamaican return migrants tended to gravitate primarily to urban areas as did the return migrants in the Dominican Republic, there was a much greater tendency for the post-return residence to be in an urban area than either the pre-migration residence or birthplace. Further analysis needs to link destination selection of returnees to their pre-immigration migration patterns in the original sending society.

To what extent is destination selection related to specific attributes of returnees? Levine, in his Puerto Rican analysis, finds a tendency for the unsuccessful to return to their birthplace, frequently a rural area or small town. Although this type of destination most likely allows the unsuccessful returnee access to primary group support networks, it does not provide an especially viable opportunity structure for socioeconomic mobility.

A final point in the analysis of destination selection is the residential location of returnees within communities. For example, Johnson alludes to the concentration of Neoricans in residential enclaves. Given the close parallel between residential segregation and social segregation, further investigations should attempt to delineate the degree of residential segregation among returnees and also to relate residential segregation to the degree of residential segregation among returnees and also to relate residential segregation to the degree of closure in return migrants' social circles.

A prime problem in determining the scope and form of return migration, aside from data deficiencies, is the difficulty of explicitly defining what constitutes return migration. Implicit in most of the papers is a definition of return migration as movement back to one's country of origin. Bovenkerk, in an earlier work,[11] uses a rather limiting definition of return migration, choosing to define it as the return after the first migration. In his paper in this volume, Rubenstein identifies three types of return migration based on the form and frequency of return migration to the home community -- commuting,[12] temporary migration and recurrent migration. Of these three types, commuting and recurrent migration best describe intraregional migration in the Caribbean while temporary migration best describes extra-regional migration. Further work empirically delineating the relative prevalence of each of these types of return migration is sorely needed.

A specific element in the definitional problem is the apparent expectation of return upon initial emigration. Chaney[13] has suggested that a distinctive difference between today's Third World international migrants and earlier migrants is that their migration is intended to be temporary and not permanent. Philpott[14] in his earlier study of Montserratian emigration, concluded that even when return is no longer a viable alternative, migrants continue to act as if they will return. Rubenstein, both in an earlier article[15] and in his contribution to this collection, speaks of an ideology of return migration and details the precise mechanisms by which migrants maintain ties with home communities in the original sending society so as to provide a context for return, thereby enabling an actualization of intentions. In this respect, Poitras in his examination of migrant interchange among Costa Rica and El Salvador and the United States notes the necessity of not viewing movements to the United States and from the United States to the two sending societies as separate events; rather, the decision to migrate originally is linked to the decision to return so that the return decision is not whether to return but when to return.

Gould and Prothero[16] have argued that if there is specific intent to return among individuals who migrate, and that this intent is clear at initial departure, the movement should be considered circulation rather than migration since the essential element of permanency is missing. Goldstein,[17] however, has cautioned against strict reliance on intentions primarily since there is "... no assurance that moves intended to be temporary do not in fact become permanent, and that many of those initially planned to be permanent ... become temporary when disillusionment sets in because of unachieved goals." In either event, clarification of this matter will require analyses which are longitudinal in scope encompassing initial intentions, length of tenure in the recipient society, and return migration propensities.

MOTIVATIONS FOR RETURN

The bulk of the studies presented in this volume contain discussions of "reasons for return." Some of the authors merely catalogue reasons, whereas others provide actual response frequencies. In either case, a myriad number of reasons is evident. Nevertheless, most of these reasons can be distilled into a more parsimonious set of five generic domains (see Table 1). These domains include: (1) socioeconomic maladaptation; (2) life course transitions; (3) expiration, termination, or violation of contractual arrangements; (4) "homeland" linkages; and (5) societal socioeconomic situations. A residual domain labelled "other" includes two reasons not easily embedded within the five domains. These

TABLE 1
REASONS FOR RETURN BY DOMAIN FOR SOCIETIES/CULTURE GROUPS

Society/ Culture Group	DOMAIN					
	(1) Socioeconomic Maladaptation (Push)	(2) Life Course Transitions (Push)	(3) Expiration/ Termination/ Violation of Contractual Arrangements (Push)	(4) "Homeland" Linkages (Pull)	(5) Societal Socioeconomic Situations (Push/Pull)	(6) Other (Push/Pull)
Puerto Rico (Levine)	1. "Unpleasant life"[a] 2. Difficulties in child raising 3. Low job status 4. Health problems			1. Family reunification	1. Decreasing demand on Mainland 2. Discrimination	
(Johnson)		1. Retirement		1. "Illness of a relative" 2. Spouse "left behind" 3. Inheritance 4. "Romantic" attachment	1. U.S. recession 2, Discrimination	
Dominican Republic (Ugalde and Langham)	1. "Way of life"[b] (19%)	1. Termination of studies (20%)	1. Deportation[c]	1. Family reunification[c]		1. Sufficient savings (7%) 2. Accompanying[c] family

Table 1. Continued

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Costa Rica (Poitras)	1. No job in U.S. (1.5%)		1. Deportation (3.2%) 2. Visa Expiration (12.4%)	1. Family Reunification (31.5%) 2. Homesickness (ca 25%) 3. Job in home country (15%)		
El Salvador (Poitras)	1. No job in U.S. (2.58%)		1. Deportation (27.4%) 2. Visa Expiration (22.8%)	1. Family Reunification (33.2%)		
Surinam (Bovenkerk)	1. Inability to find employment/job dismissal 2. "Marriage Problems" 3. Status deprivation	1. Completion of studies (33%)				
English Speaking Caribbean (Rubinstein)			1. Labor contact termination			
East Indians (Samaroo)	1. Economic hardship			1. Family reunification 2. Religious ritualism		

[a] "drugs, language, persistent hassle of everyday life"
[b] Interpreted by authors to mean maladaptation.
[c] Suspected by authors to be part of "other category. The "other" category comprised 54% of responses.
"( )" - response percentages

domains can also be construed in terms of "push" and "pull" dimensions impacting on the decision to return. Data on response distributions are provided where available.

Socioeconomic maladaptation is inclusive of reasons focused on economic dislocations, marriage problems, child raising difficulties, health problems and status deprivation. The domain generally relates to day-to-day exigencies which impair effective functioning and adaptation in the recipient society and, hence, "push" people back to the homeland. Life course transitions include various career and familial transitions such as retirement, termination of studies, marriage or marital dissolution which "push" people towards the original sending society. The third domain comprises reasons linked to the termination, expiration, or violation of a contractual arrangement. Included within this domain are reasons such as termination of a visa or labor contract or actual deportation. These reasons, therefore, involve societal determinations of length and conditions of stay; thus, return migration under these circumstances is best thought of as compulsory rather than voluntary. "Homeland" linkages is the fourth domain. This domain consists of various economic, sociological, and psychic ties which serve to "pull" former emigrants back to the society of origin. Specific reasons embedded within this domain are family reunification, whether in general or for specific reasons such as the "illness of a relative" or "claiming an inheritance"; a job lined up in the home country; religious shrines available for worship; or "romantic attachment" and "homesickness."

Societal socioeconomic situations include conditions within either the recipient or the original sending society which "push" or "pull" the migrant. We would expect these conditions to work themselves out through individual and familial circumstances. Thus, cyclical changes in the economy of the recipient or sending society would be expected to impact on their respective economic opportunity structures and, hence, on individuals in such areas as job layoffs, and job prospects.

Both in the studies contained in this volume and investigations conducted elsewhere[18] noneconomic reasons predominate. Moreover, even though economic circumstances may mitigate return, these circumstances tend to be outweighed by various sociological, cultural and psychological conditions. Furthermore, these noneconomic reasons can be operant in either the host society or the original sending society.

Specific data on the impact of socioeconomic maladaptation following emigration on the propensity to return is available in three studies. Bovenkerk finds that two-thirds of his sample of Surinamese returnees returned because they failed to adapt to the recipient society. Ugalde and Langham note in the Dominican Republic that one of five returnees returned due to the "way of life" in the recipient society, which they interpreted to mean maladaptation. It is interesting to note, however, the prominence of noneconomic types of maladaptation. Bovenkerk, for example, notes not only the difficulty of finding or maintaining jobs in Holland, but also marital problems and psychological problems associated with status deprivation. Difficulties with child raising in the United States as well as health problems, are mentioned by Neoricans (Levine). Moreover, Poitras notes that only a minimal proportion of Costa Rican and San Salvadorean returnees came back to their homeland because they were unable to secure employment. Finally, Ugalde and Langham uncover various correlates of maladaptation.

Of special note in the area of "homeland" linkages is the role played by family linkages in the homeland. In six of the seven studies containing a discussion of reasons, some form of family linkage is mentioned. An example of the magnitude of this factor can be found in the Poitras study of Costa Rica and El Salvador, wherein about one-third of returnees came home to be reunited with their kin. In addition to family linkages, mention is also made of psychological attachment (Johnson for Neoricans and Poitras for Costa

Ricans) and religious linkages (Samaroo). Various career transitions either at the beginning with "termination of studies" (Ugalde and Langham; Bovenkerk) or at the end with "retirement" (Johnson) also figure prominently.[19] Recognition of societal socioeconomic situations includes not only economic demand factors but also discrimination (Levine and Johnson). Finally, the role of compulsory return is evident in the studies of the Dominican Republic (Ugalde and Langham), Costa Rica and El Salvador (Poitras) and the English Speaking Caribbean (Rubenstein). In El Salvador alone, visa expiration or deportation accounted for about one-half of the reasons advanced.

A full portrait of motivations for return should also include an analysis of why some emigrants choose to remain in place despite socioeconomic maladaptation, "homeland" linkages, life course transitions and poor societal socioeconomic situations. In fact, Rubenstein raises the question of nonreturn in the face of the substantial strength of the return ideology. His accompanying set of reasons are in many ways similar to the reasons for return already discussed. This leads one to the conclusion that our proffered set of analytical domains should not be interpreted as discrete but rather as interpenetrating. Therefore, future research on motivational determinants of both voluntary return and nonreturn needs to go beyond the mere cataloging of reasons and be guided by an interactive framework which encompasses: (1) macro socioeconomic situations in the recipient and homeland society; (2) the various economic, sociological, cultural and psychological linkages to one's homeland; (3) the degree of adaptation in the recipient society, not merely in some vague general way, but in specific life spheres and the specific roles the emigrant occupies (or fails to occupy) in those spheres; and (4) career and familial transitions as part of progression through one's life course. Furthermore, the interaction among these components needs to be addressed in a specific longitudinal context inclusive of elements of the original sending and receiving societies, the emigrants and the members of their social networks.

CONSEQUENCES OF RETURN MIGRATION

Evaluations of the consequences of return migration have been generally about one or both of two levels, i.e., micro or macro. At the micro level, the focus has been on the individual adaptations of return migrants and nonmigrants to various economic, social and political roles. At the macro level the emphasis has been on the broader economic, social and political structure and the role played by return migration in overall societal change.

Richardson points to the significant prestige, respect and admiration accorded returning migrants and the attendant ceremonial expression accompanying return in the Lesser Antilles. However, excepting Richardson's finding, the other contributors (Bovenkerk, Johnson and Samaroo) covering this subject suggest difficulties among returnees in reintegrating into their original sending society. Bovenkerk concludes that the returnees become a "new minority" and suffer all of the disadvantages minority status confers with none of the advantages. Samaroo notes how the majority of East Indian returnees returned to a "strange land." Johnson points to Neoricans as "cultural pariahs" in their homeland. Thus, a sentimental attachment to the home country does not necessarily translate into a "successful" return for the returnee. In fact, nostalgic attachment finds itself in direct competition with a new frame of reference for evaluating conditions in the original sending society upon return and the way in which this new frame of reference is received by nonmigrants.

What are the bases of successful versus unsuccessful adaptations? Following Goldlust and Richmond's[20] generalized model of immigrant adaptation we can view the adaptation of returnees as predicated upon their migration experience, characteristics, and situational determinants in the original sending society. However, unlike the case of immigrants, returnees are reentering a society where they had originally resided.

Initially, Richardson argues that the successful reintegration of returnees in the Lesser Antilles lies, at root, in the functional importance of migration in these societies. Richardson, given his holistic treatment, does not, however, explore the ways in which divergent migration experiences or migrant characteristics articulate with aspects of the societal situation and how these may or may not temper the prestige accorded returning migrants. Samaroo does illustrate how both factors associated with the migration experience and attributes (loss of caste, conversion to Christianity, and general changes in personality, habits and ideas) combine with situational determinants (climate, low wages, rising cost of living as well as general nonreceptivity) to engender adaptation difficulties. Bovenkerk, focusing on Surinam, refers to the increasing democratization of the emigration process and how this removed the glamour from return. Thus, residence in the Netherlands was not necessarily status conferring in the home society; instead, returnees had become the targets of ridicule, stereotyping and employment discrimination. Additionally, returnees were perceived as threats in the housing and labor markets and also as transgressors (in the moral sense) for having "turned their backs" on society by emigrating. Johnson, likewise, depicts how the experiences of Neoricans on the Mainland, through selective interpretation on the part of nonmigrants, vitiate their security upon return. Returnees are viewed as "pushy and aggressive" and "tainted" by mainland life styles and clothing. She further argues that the barrier of language reinforces segmentation and isolation.

Response to imposed marginality might consist of: (1) withdrawal (either individually or collectively); (2) sociopolitical activism; or (3) remigration. Samaroo finds evidence of both withdrawal and remigration. Specifically, some East Indian returnees eked out a meager existence in the slums of Madras and Calcutta. Others returned to the colonies as either reindentured laborers or as free workers. Both Johnson and Bovenkerk point to the tendency of returnees to withdraw and interact within their own social circles. However, Johnson finds strong support among Neoricans for the Statehood Party in Puerto Rico as a way of opting for the security of the American way of life. Bovenkerk, however, concludes that Surinamese returnees are too fragmented to consolidate for purposes of collective action.

The earlier observations of Romalis regarding Jamaican returnees still appear relevant:

> It will be interesting to see how many and which types of discontented returned migrants gravitate into an alienated, sterile withdrawal, and which channel their resentment into active attempts to transform their situation through social and political organization.[21]

Future investigations will need to articulate more clearly the conditions under which marginality results in alienation, activism or remigration among returning migrants.

We now turn to a discussion of the implications of return migration for the original sending society at large. In this respect we shift the level of discussion from a micro to a macro level, from speaking about the consequences of return for returnees to addressing the impact of the return migrant collectivity on the socioeconomic and political structure of the society. To begin, we contend that the societal level consequences of return migration are dependent upon a number of factors including: (1) the size of the return migration stream relative to the population base of the society; (2) the selectivity of the return migration stream; (3) societal receptivity; (4) the degree of solidarity among returnees; and (5) the prevalence of remigration.

Initially, for return migration to have a more than minimal societal impact, we argue that the size of the return migration stream must be large relative to the base population of the original sending society so that returnees constitute a significant portion of that society. Thus, Bovenkerk suggests that even if only a small percentage of emigrants return, this could have a notable impact if the society is small. For example, in Surinam 30,000 returnees translates into approximately 10 percent of the population. Johnson, although focusing on numbers returning in an absolute rather than in a relative sense, links large numbers of returnees to the level of statehood sentiment and election outcomes in Puerto Rico. Other areas which could be impacted include labor markets, consumption levels, and service delivery systems.

Although relative size might be viewed as a necessary condition for societal level change, it is by no means a sufficient condition. Indeed, Bovenkerk argues that the critical factors are qualitative rather than quantitative. One factor in this respect is the selectivity of the return migration stream relative to that of the nonmigrant population which we discussed earlier. Selectivity in the return migration stream manifests itself not only in terms of an average level of a given attribute but also in terms of the complexity of the attribute's distribution. Thus, we might argue that the greater the extent of physical and human capital (educational level, skills level, and work attitudes) in return migration stream the greater the prospect for socioeconomic development, *ceteris paribus*. A related issue in this respect is the use to which physical capital is put, namely, productive as opposed to consumption oriented investments. On the other hand, as Bovenkerk suggests, stream complexity militates against the development of solidarity. In Surinam the main axes in this respect were social class and ethnic complexity which eventually translated into a variety of readaptation patterns within the returnee population. In sum, there was no common basis for collective mobilization for joint action. Only among the young cadre of noncommissioned army officers who engineered the recent coup d'etat in Surinam was homogeneity apparent.

Even with a high level of human capital, the efforts of the collectivity of returnees might be frustrated given a hostile reception on the part of nonmigrants. In fact, a high level of human capital in the aggregate among returnees could militate anxieties among nonmigrants in the constricted labor and housing markets in Caribbean societies. That such hostility is indeed apparent in a number of Caribbean societies, has already been discussed. Bovenkerk presents an extensive discussion of the implications of this hostility for the social change role of returnees in Surinam. His conclusions are not too encouraging. The Surinamese returnee collectivity was characterized by high estrangement, correspondingly high frustrations and subjection to ridicule and employment discrimination. Given this context, one would not anticipate returnees, as a collectivity, to contribute notably to societal change.

Another factor of importance is the degree of solidarity among returnees. Bovenkerk traces the lack of solidarity among returnees, despite the sharing of and ethnic complexity which eventually translated into a variety of readaptation patterns within the returnee population. In sum, there was no common basis for collective mobilization for joint action. Only among the young cadre of noncommissioned army officers who engineered the recent coup d'etat in Surinam was homogeneity apparent.

Even with a high level of human capital, the efforts of the collectivity of returnees might be frustrated given a hostile reception on the part of nonmigrants. In fact, a high level of human capital in the aggregate among returnees could militate anxieties among nonmigrants in the constricted labor and housing markets in Caribbean societies. That such hostility is indeed apparent in a number of Caribbean societies, has already been discussed. Bovenkerk presents an extensive discussion of the implications of this hostility for the social change role of returnees in Surinam. His conclusions are not too encouraging. The Surinamese returnee collectivity was characterized by high estrangement, correspondingly high frustrations and subjected to ridicule and employment discrimination. Given this context, one would not anticipate returnees, as a collectivity, to contribute notably to societal change.

Another factor of importance is the degree of solidarity among returnees. Bovenkerk traces the lack of solidarity among returnees, despite the sharing of minority status, to the complexity of the migration stream, the shift in stream composition over time and the fact that earlier returnees were already occupying the key rungs in the socioeconomic hierarchy. In the latter regard, the outcome was intergenerational conflict as opposed to solidarity. Johnson's conclusions, however, would seem to suggest some basis for collective action among Neoricans rooted in the common Mainland experience.[22]

A final factor bearing on the issue is the prevalence of remigration. To the extent that a sizeable portion of returnees are not committed to remaining and eventually remigrate, the collective mobilization and/or contribution of returnees to the original sending society is mitigated. That this is a real alternative can be seen in the fact that 45 of the original 75 respondents in Bovenkerk's sample of Surinamese returnees had remigrated to Holland in the relatively short period of eight years subsequent to his original interviews. Poitras, in his analyses of Costa Rica and San Salvador, finds in both societies that more than one-half of returnees were fairly certain they would return to the United States.

In summary, a full analysis of the societal level consequences of return migration would require studying a number of Caribbean societies with an approach focused on the interaction among the above factors. How, for example, is the nature, type, and intensity of societal receptivity linked to the size and selectivity of the migration stream? To what extent are the previously stated relationships transmitted through actual competition for scarce resources and/or the status pretensions associated with the overseas experience as tempered by selective interpretations on the part of nonmigrants? To what degree and in what way do returnees actually become a minority? How do the size and complexity of the return migration stream impact on returnee solidarity? Is their impact direct or transmitted via societal receptivity? Under what conditions does hostile societal receptivity produce collective or a sizeable amount of individual withdrawal among returnees and under what conditions does it yield collective action? Finally, how prevalent is remigration and how does it defuse the role of the return collectivity as an agent of social change or a force for coordinated political action? All of these questions need to be addressed more systematically in future investigations.

NOTES

[1] See, for example, the bibliographic essays of Frank Bovenkerk, *The Sociology of Return Migration* (The Hague: Martinus Nijoft, 1974); and George Gmelch, "Return Migration," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 9 (1980): 135-159; as well as the compendium of studies in Robert E. Rhoades, ed., "The Anthropology of Return Migration," *Papers in Anthropology* 20:1 (Spring 1979).

[2] For more detailed discussions of the emergence of this reversal in postindustrial societies, its underpinnings and implications, see the collection of articles in David L. Brown, and John M. Wardwell, editors, *New Directions in Urban-Rural Migration: The Population Turnaround in Rural America* (New York: Academic Press, 1980). For specific treatments of return migration within the context of this turnaround see R. R. Campbell, D. M. Johnson, and Gary J. Stangler, "Return Migration of Black People to the South," *Rural Sociology* 39 (1974): 514-528; Daniel Johnson, "Community Satisfaction of Black Return Migration to a Southern Metropolis," *American Journal of Community Psychology* 3:3 (1975): 251-259; Larry Long and Kristin A. Hansen, "Trends in Return Migration to the South," *Demography* 12 (1975): 601-614; and Edwin H. Carpenter, "Metropolitan Migrants to Nonmetropolitan Migrants in the United States: Are They Being Retained?" in Robert E. Rhoades (ed.) "The Anthropology of Return Migration," *Papers in Anthropology* 20:1 (Spring 1979): 145-154. For specific examples of empirical research on internal return migration within a postindustrial society grounded in a specific theoretical formulation see Julie DaVanzo, "Differences between Return and Nonreturn Migration: An Econometric Analysis," *International Migration Review* 10:1 (Spring, 1976): 12-27; and Julie DaVanzo and Peter A. Morrison, "Return and Other Sequences of Migration in the United States," *Demography* 18:1 (1981): 85-101.

[3] See, for example the reviews in Nancy B. Graves and Theodore D. Graves, "Adaptive Strategies in Urban Migration," in Bernard J. Siegel (ed.) *Annual Review of Anthropology*, vol. 3 (Palo Alto, California: Annual Review, 1974), pp. 117-151; Sidney Goldstein, *Circulation in the Context of Total Mobility in Southeast Asia* (Papers of the East-West Population Institute, no. 53, August 1978); and Sally Findlay, *Planning for Internal Migration: A Review of Issues and Policies in Developing Societies* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Census, ISP-RD-4, 1974).

[4] Recent coverage of this type of study conducted outside the Caribbean region is presented in the over-

view of George Gmelch, "Return Migration," *Annual Review of Anthropology*, vol. 9 (1980): 135-159; and a specific sampling can be found in Robert E. Rhoades, ed., "The Anthropology of Return Migration," *Papers in Anthropology*, vol. 20, no. 1, (Spring 1979).

[5] See recent discussions in Stuart B. Philpott, "West Indian Migration: The Monserrat Case." London School of Economics Monographs on Social Anthropology, no. 47 (London: Athlone Press, 1973), pp. 108-111; Edward Taylor, "The Social Adjustment of Returned Migrants to Jamaica," in *Ethnicity in the Americas*, ed. F. Henry (The Hague: Mouton, 1976); Nancy Foner, *Jamaica Farewell: Jamaican Migrants in London* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 234-236; Orlando Patterson, "Migration in Caribbean Societies: Socioeconomic and Symbolic Resource," in *Human Migration: Patterns and Policies*, eds. William H. McNeill and Ruth S. Adams (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1978), p. 122; Hymie Rubenstein, "The Return ideology in West Indian Migration," in *The Anthropology of Return Migration: Papers in Anthropology*, ed. Robert E. Rhoades 20:1 (Spring 1979) (Norman, Oklahoma: Department of Anthropology, University of Oklahoma) pp. 21-38; and Antonio Ugalde, Frank D. Bean, and Gilbert Cardenas, "International Migration from the Dominican Republic: Findings from a National Survey," *International Migration Review*, 13 (Summer 1979): 235-263.

[6] Orlando Patterson, p. 106.

[7] See Roy Augier, S. C. Gordon, Douglas Hall, and Mary Reckord, *The Making of the West Indies* (London: Longmans, 1960); Michael Garfield Smith, *Kinship and Community in Carriacou* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1962); and Julia G. Crane, *Educated to Emigrate: The Social Organization of Saba* (Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1971).

[8] See Malcolm J. Proudfoot, *Population Movements in the Caribbean* (Port-of-Spain, Trinidad: Caribbean Commission Central Secratarist, 1950); Sheila Patterson, *Dark Strangers: A Sociological Study of the Absorption of a Recent West Indian Migrant Group in Brixton, South London* (London: Tavistock Publications, 1963); Orlando Patterson, *op. cit.*; R. B. Davison, *Black British: Immigrants to England* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966); Ceri Peach, *West Indian Migration to Britain: A Social Geography* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968); David Lowenthal, *West Indian Societies* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972); Roy S. Bryce-Laporte and Delores M. Mortimer, eds.

Caribbean Immigration to the United States. RIIES Occasional Papers No. 1 (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, Research Institute on Immigration and Ethnic Studies, 1976); H. E. Lamur and J. D. Speckmann, editors, *Adaptation of Migrants from the Caribbean in the European and American Metropolis* (Leiden, The Netherlands: CARAF, 1978); and Robert A. Myers, "Emigration's Impact: A Review of the Literature for the British and Dutch Islands, with Special Attention to Dominica, W.I." Paper presented at Fourth Annual Meeting of the Caribbean Studies Association, May 28, 1979, at Fort-de-France, Martinique.

[9] Some of the reasons advanced for the imbalanced focus on the Caribbean-North American/Europe flow include: (1) Intraregional migration in the Caribbean currently is of much smaller magnitude than the migration from the Caribbean to North America and Europe, (2) the metropolitan orientation of many students of Caribbean migration has led them to discount the significance and importance of intraregional migration. Ugalde, et al., pp. 235-263 have suggested that the relative neglect of return migration is due to the tendency to view migration as an irreversible flow as well as practical problems associated with locating returnees given their geographical dispersion. Rubenstein in this volume points additionally to the rural to urban concentration in migration research, static theoretical models, the brevity of the fieldwork period, and deficient governmental return migration statistics.

[10] See Hymie Rubenstein, this volume.

[11] See Bovenkerk.

[12] See also J. P. Fitzpatrick, *Puerto Rican Americans: The Meaning of Migration to the Mainland* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1971).

[13] Elsa M. Chaney, "The World Economy and Contemporary Migration," *International Migration Review* 13:1 (Summer 1979):204-212.

[14] Philpott.

[15] Rubenstein.

[16] W.T.S. Gould and R. Mansell Prothero, "Space and Time in African Population," in *People on the Move*, eds. Leszek Kosinksi and R. Mansell Prothero (London: Methuen and Company, 1975), pp. 39-49.

[17] Goldstein, p. 13.

[18] See Gmelch, p. 129.

[19] Since emigrants on student visas may be obliged to leave after completion of studies this type of return may not necessarily be a voluntary return.

[20] See John Goldlust and Anthony H. Richmond, "A Multivariate Model of Immigrant Adaptation," *International Migration Review* 3:2 (1974): 196 ff.

[21] Coleman Romalis, "Some Comments on Race and Ethnicity in the Caribbean," in *Ethnicity in the Americas*, ed. Francis Henry (The Hague/Paris: Mouton Publishers, 1976), p. 421.

[22] She is, however, quick to point out that the experiential differences between returnees and nonmigrants are differences of degree rather than kind.

Part I

Papers on Return Migration

RETURN MIGRATION TO THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN

REVIEW AND COMMENTARY

Hymie Rubenstein

Wage-labor migration and other forms of physical mobility have always been distinctive features of West Indian societies. The prehistoric movements of various groups of native peoples, European invasion and colonization, the forced migration of several million African slaves, the postemancipation immigration of indentured agricultural workers from various parts of the globe, and more contemporary regional and international population shifts are all part of the constant human flux in the area, testimony to the fact that migration is an integral Caribbean phenomenon.

Of all movements since Emancipation in 1838, the migration of English-speaking West Indians to Britain during the 1950s and early 1960s and to the United States and Canada starting from the 1960s has received scholarly attention. This is largely because these migratory flows represented the largest net removal to have ever taken place from the former British West Indies. By 1966, for example, there were some 330,000 native West Indians in Britain, exceeding by a considerable margin the previous highest movement to

Central America and the United States between 1881 and 1924.[1] The majority of these immigrants and their overseas-born offspring are now long-term residents in their new homelands. Although many of the native-born West Indians may continue to view return to their countries of origin as at least a distant goal, except for the occasional short visit home, few have yet chosen to act on this goal. Indeed there is reason to suspect that permanent removal may well be the outcome of these most recent migration streams despite the operation of the return intention.[2] For example, estimates that although most Montserratians in London view migration as "a temporary phase," no more than 20 percent may ever return to the island to resume permanent residence. The high rate of contemporary permanent removal is only one of several reasons that most studies of migrants (as well as the families and countries they have left behind) have tended to ignore the issue of return migration. Other reasons for this neglect are: (1) the sheer scope of West Indian urbanization since Emancipation has led to unidirectional, rural-to-urban focus in migration studies; (2) the nature of the theoretical models, especially structural-functionalism, used in Caribbean research has resulted in the exclusion of the study of all sorts of dynamic processes such as various sorts of extra-community movements; (3) the length of the field-work period -- generally no more than one year -- has resulted in migration being viewed as a static, one-way movement; and (4) the difficulty in collecting national return migration statistics, given the tendency of governments to be concerned only with the exit of citizens and the entry of aliens, has masked the extent of the homeward flow of migrants.

As a result, most migration studies have focused on the newcomer in the host society. In addition to a large body of literature devoted to race relations, there are studies of migrant social organization, ethnic identity, religious behavior, social integration, and physical and emotional well-being.

In recent years, however, there has been a shift in research direction from a preoccupation with the migrant in the receiving society to a study of the consequences of the overseas removal of people for the home society. While only a couple of these studies deserve careful attention, they still provide some information on the effects of emigration on such sending unit phenomena as demographic composition,[3] local-level and national development,[4] social differentiation,[5] and nonmigrant social and economic well-being.[6]

Yet, although a handful of studies are beginning to ask what happens to West Indian societies when so many people leave, hardly any effort has been made to find out what happens when migrants return. For the reasons already stated, this is not unexpected. For other reasons, however, this omission does come as something of a surprise. First, various forms of temporary exodus have characterized the greater part of West Indian emigration.[7] Second, a study of the homeward flow of migrants allows research in the kind of bounded, face-to-face rural locale traditionally favored by anthropologists as opposed to the open, complex, urban metropolis favored by contemporary migrants, but one which produces difficulties in regards to informant statistical representativeness[8] and the collection of ethnographic material using participant observation. Third, although most migrants in England and North America may never resettle in their native lands, a significant minority do participate in a counter movement home.[9]

The Caribbean is far from the only region in which return migration has not been adequately treated. Either in a theoretical way or in relation to particular geographical areas numerous researchers have pointed out that return migration has not received its due in migration research.[10]

Although interest in it has been overwhelmed by the more dramatic and demographically significant exodus of people, this is not to say that the homeward flow of migrants has gone totally unnoticed. In fact, the opening statement in Bovenkerk's[11] recent survey of return migration clearly applies to the West Indian literature taken as a whole:

> It is customary for the author on return migration to complain about the lack of theoretical and empirical knowledge on his subject ... It is true that not so many books and articles are devoted exclusively to return migration ... But this does not imply that no further research has been done and that therefore every new student of return migration had (sic) to begin from scratch. In numerous studies on emigration, migrant labor, immigration, integration, and assimilation, room has been made for a chapter or a paragraph on "those who returned" or "the migrants's return."

Thus, in the Caribbean literature there is to be found the occasional brief discussion of or passing reference to such topics as the "push" and "pull" factors encouraging the return of migrants,[12] the disposition of migration earnings and the effects of the migratory experience on the social position and economic well-being of the returnee,[13] the expectation of return and the continuing involvement with or sentiment towards the home area,[14] the effects of return migration and remittances on economic development and social change,[15] residential choice among those who return,[16] and the consequences of the return of migrants for family and household organization.[17]

What is lacking in the individual studies is the kind of detailed, synthetic treatment of the multiple features of return migration that can only be obtained through a systematic investigation of the topic within and between particular Caribbean societies. While such an undertaking is well beyond the scope of a short paper, I wish to discuss three of the many issues that need to be addressed if such a study is to be carried out. These are: (1) types of return migration; (2) extent of return migration; and (3) ideology of return migration. Each is dealt with in comparative terms rather than in relation to any particular Caribbean locale. This may help counterbalance the piecemeal way in which return migration (and, for that matter, the entire topic of migration) has been treated so far. No effort has been made to compare the findings from different migrant populations so as to distinguish the general from the unique in the West Indian migratory process.

TYPES OF RETURN MIGRATION

The nature and scope of return migration in the English-speaking Caribbean is dependent upon the forms that the migratory process takes. Based on the form and frequency of return to the home community, three general Caribbean migration movements may be identified -- commuting, temporary migration, and recurrent migration. In turn, each may be divided into two varieties based on the seasonality of the removal. More than one type may be present simultaneously in a given community and may even characterize, in sequential terms, the experience of individual migrants. In each case the period of return may be either well defined, as in a prearranged visit of a few days or weeks, or it may involve permanent resettlement, as in the case of retirement, or it may consist of an indeterminate but emically defined temporary layover.

1. *Commuting*. Given the strong social and emotional ties to the home community, the intention to some day resettle in their homelands, the predominance of economic motives for emigrating, the periodic or frequent return visits, the term "commuting" could probably be used to describe many persons who are usually labelled "migrants."[18] For the purpose of this paper, however, I reserve "commuting" for a form of physical mobility in which participants leave their home communities on a wage-labor or self-employed basis for short periods of time ranging between overnight and a week or two. Commuters retain their primary residence and the bulk of their personal and household possessions in their home communities. At the same time, I distinguish between the persons I have in mind here and the better-known type of commuter who leaves the home area only during the work period itself, an interval which often lasts no more than a few hours.[19] This is because the latter movement does not involve duality of residence and the concomitant social and economic arrangements characterizing what is normally considered true migration.

Commuting may take place on a seasonal or non-seasonal basis. Solien de Gonzalez's[20] description of seasonal migration generally fits much of the Caribbean situation.

> Seasonal migrants are those who travel once a year, either as completed or partial families or as single adult individuals, to areas in which great numbers of workers are needed temporarily in such occupations as harveting or processing of raw food items.

Commuting occurs where either the source of agricultural and related forms of wage labor does not involve great travel distances or where there are inadequate accommodations for the migrant worker at the place of employment.

2. *Temporary Migration.* This type of migration usually occurs during young adulthood and consists mainly of one or more wage-labor expeditions ranging from a few months to ten or more years followed by permanent resettlement in the home community.[21] Generally involving unmarried males, it may also include females as well as married men of up to middle age. Migratory periods may be separated by lengthy intervals at home where traditional economic activities are carried out. Even if the migrant does not return for several years, involvement with and commitment to the sending unit are usually maintained.

Where temporary migration is on a seasonal basis, the first experience often consists of young unmarried males employed as seasonal agricultural laborers for several months at a time some distance from their home community.

3. *Recurrent Migration.*[22] This type of movement has often been identified in the migration literature and has been referred to variously as "circulation," "cyclical migration," "circular migration," "temporary, recurrent migration," as well as "recurrent migration." Douglass refers to the participant in this type of movement as a "bird of passage" to emphasize the repetitiveness of the migratory process.

While some varieties of temporary migration share the oscillatory character of recurrent migration (e.g., repeated seasonal migration during young adulthood) they differ from the latter in the extent to which the original movement is repeated over and over so as to become a permanent fixture in the economic lives of its participants. No longer involving mainly young single males, migrants now consist of mature married men who leave their dependents behind, often for long periods of time. Contacts with and an orientation towards the home area are nevertheless maintained.[23]

Recurrent migration may be either seasonal or nonseasonal. In the former, adults, particularly, but not exclusively males, make repeated trips of several months each from their homes to areas of seasonal wage work, a practice which continues throughout their productive lives. Although the period of employment is defined by the regular but seasonal occurrence of some resource (agriculture, tourism, food processing, etc.)

this does not mean that all migrants will participate in it on an annual basis. A decrease in labor needs in the region of employment or the presence of more remunerative nonseasonal alternatives will affect the cyclical nature of employment.

In nonseasonal, recurrent migration, adults, again mainly males, are involved in a pattern of repeated to and fro movements from the home area to the same or different places of employment throughout their working careers. The migrant may return at frequent intervals, or remain away for several years without revisiting. Return trips, as in the case of temporary migration, may consist of short visits of only a few days or weeks or they may involve indefinite periods of inactivity or engagement in traditional community economic endeavors.

EXTENT OF RETURN MIGRATION

Commuting, temporary migration, and recurrent migration have all played a role in the migratory movements of West Indians.

Less reported on than the other two movements, presumably because it is not as dramatic a residential shift and because its socio-economic consequences appear to be far less significant, commuting, as defined here, occurs throughout the region. A few examples are the regular weekend visits home of seasonal agricultural laborers, the two to three day sales circuits of itinerant dry goods peddlers and food vendors, the trips home on days off of domestic servants employed in urban areas, and the weekly traveling of carpenters, masons, and other construction workers between their home communities and scattered building sites.

The more conspicuous forms of mobility, temporary and recurrent wage-labor migration, also have been pervasive features of West Indian social and economic history since the abolition of slavery. Taking place on both a seasonal and nonseasonal basis they have involved internal, regional, and circum-Caribbean destinations.

To begin with, the internal migration of seasonal cane cutters in Guyana, Jamaica, and Martinique has been an important form of voluntary mobility since 1838. R. T. Smith,[24] for example, found that out of a total adult male population (those over 18) of 151 in one of the Guyanese villages he studied in the early 1950s, 90-100 men regularly spent the cane cutting season in distant Demeraran sugar estates.

Regional and circum-Caribbean migration also began immediately after emancipation. Large numbers of ex-slaves from Barbados, St. Vincent, Grenada, and even such Leeward Islands as Montserrat[25] moved to labor starved Trinidad and Guyana to take advantage of higher agricultural wages and better working conditions.[26] Undoubtedly much of this resulted in permanent removal although Hill[27] argues that in the case of Carriacou:

> ... much of this was seasonal and some Carriacouans returned to their homeland with money not locally available.

Crane[28] also refers to the six month periods of seasonal migration of cane cutters from St. Maarten and from Saba after 1848 and 1863, respectively, to the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Puerto Rico.

Similarly, it is likely that at least some of the several thousand Jamaicans and other islanders who migrated to Panama from 1853 as railway construction workers[29] eventually returned home.

Overpopulation, limited employment prospects, and inadequate wages accelerated such movements and from the 1860s Jamaicans, Barbadians and other islanders migrated to Central America to work on coffee, sugar, and banana plantations.[30] The movement of agricultural laborers to Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa Rica continued into the 1880s when Nicaragua, Cuba, and Colombia appear to have joined the Latin American list of destinations.[31] Removal to these areas, while never on a tremendous scale, and nearly coming to a halt in the last decade of the nineteenth century, only ceased with the coming of the depression in the early 1930s when restrictive immigration regulations were put in place.[32] The extent of return from these countries is difficult to ascertain although between 1928 and 1934 Jamaica experienced a net inflow of 28,000 persons, most of them returnees from Latin America.[33] Proudfoot[34] also argues that migrant workers were being expelled during the Depression.

Less well-known movements resulting in return migration also occurred during the last third of the nineteenth century. In Andros Island, Bahamas, males were involved in recurrent sponge fishing expeditions of several weeks or months at a time interrupted by short visits home.[35] Far to the south in former British Guiana, the beginning of gold and diamond mining from around 1880 attracted many men from coastal villages who made regular extended trips to the interior mining areas.[36] Gonzales[37] also reports on various types of temporary and recurrent migration both seasonal and non-seasonal among the coastal dwelling black Caribs of Honduras and Belize. Since 1980 almost all Carib men have been employed in some type of wage labor, often close to their villages. The most important labor outlets have included dock work, ship loading, and wood-cutting. Up to 1930 the following pattern existed:[38]

> The money earned through these jobs brought many items which early became necessities rather than luxuries. Still, the money received was not sufficient to support their families completely. Therefore they continued to fish and to help with cultivation, even though wage labor gradually came to be their dominant work. But fishing and cultivation were still thought of as essential, as they actually were under the circumstances. For this reason, a Carib man had to be in a position to return to his home from time to time when his presence was demanded.

A little-known movement is also reported by

Dirks[39] who refers to what appears to be extensive temporary and recurrent migration of over 100 years standing from Tortola, B.V.I., to the more prosperous American Virgin Islands.

The largest movement during the last two decades of the nineteenth century occurred between 1884 and 1888 when large numbers of West Indian construction workers were involved in the first effort to build the Panama Canal.[40] Foner[41] tells us that over 84,000 Jamaicans alone were employed in the unsuccessful project. Large scale counter migration characterized not only the abandonment of the project but the intervening years as well. For example, although over 24,000 Jamaicans migrated during the 1883-1884 construction season, nearly 12,000 workers returned during the same period.[42] When the project was aborted in 1888, only 6,000 migrants were not repatriated.

The rebirth of the canal project in 1905 again witnessed the involvement of thousands of workers. Although Jamaica once more headed the list, [43] islanders from all parts of the Caribbean including Vincentians,[44] Nevisians,[45] Montserratians,[46] and Carriacouans[47] were employed as construction laborers. According to Proudfoot:[48]

> From 1905 till 1913 there was a constant number working in Panama of 35,000, most of whom were employed on a temporary basis. As one batch of workers returned to their home islands, a new group would come in.

Many of those who did not return after the completion of the Canal were deported during the depression,[49] although repatriation to Jamaica was still taking place up to 1945.[50]

The first decade of the twentieth century also saw the resumption of migration to Cuba of seasonal cane cutters, especially Jamaicans. This movement continued until 1925 when the flow began to reverse in ever increasing rates.[51]

Migration of banana plantation workers to Costa Rica[52] also occurred during the early years of the century. Like other migrant agricultural workers in the Hispanic Caribbean and Central America, they were obliged to return to their homelands during the 1930s.

Perhaps the largest migratory movement during the first quarter of the century was the removal of thousands of West Indians to the United States between 1900 and the passage of exclusionary immigration regulations in 1924.[53] Between 1911 and 1921 alone, 30,000 Jamaicans migrated to the United States.[54] Although most of these migrants settled permanently in northeastern cities a substantial number are known to have returned to the region.[55]

Interisland migration of seasonally employed cane cutters continued throughout the 1920s and 1930s with laborers from Nevis, Anguilla, the Grenadines, and

Montserrat being recruited for work in St. Kitts, Trinidad, and the Dominican Republic.[56]

An especially important removal resulted from the development of oil fields in Venezuela in 1916 and provided employment for several thousand British West Indians, particularly Trinidadians and Barbadians, until a prohibition on the entry of "foreign-born Negroes" was enacted in 1929.[57] Migration to Venezuela foreshadowed the even more significant movement of oil refinery and industrial workers to Trinidad and Curaçao from 1915 and 1916, respectively, and to Aruba from 1925.[58] Large-scale migration to these areas from the entire Eastern Caribbean continued throughout the 1920s, 30s and 40s.[59] All workers in Curaçao and Aruba, including those from the English-speaking Windward Netherlands Antilles, were hired on a temporary basis and large-scale layoffs and early retirement sent thousands back to their home islands during the early 1950s.[60]

Of all the migratory movements during this century the best-known and most intensively studied one has been, of course, the mass migration to Great Britain beginning in the early 1950s.[61] Sparked by an initial shortage of unskilled workers in vocational areas which gave promise of long-term employment prospects, the movement nonetheless has been far from unidirectional.[62] It is estimated that while a total of 86,000 Jamaicans departed for England between 1956 and 1959, 11,600 returned home during the same period.[63] Similarly, between 1965 and 1968 -- a period of very little migration from Jamaica to England -- some 52,000 Jamaicans left for home.[64]

The most recent example of large-scale physical mobility, removal to the United States and Canada from the early 1960s, has also resulted in at least some return migration. For example, West Indians holding student visas in Canada are constrained from working during their residence and most are obliged to leave after their studies are completed.

The importance of return migration in the English-speaking Caribbean may also be judged by its scope in particular communities.

R. T. Smith[65] tells us that in two of the communities he studied in Guyana "... probably most of the older men have worked in the interior of the colony at some time or other." Concerning the tiny island of Providencia, Wilson[66] states that "... most men leave the island during early manhood ..." In the community he studied in Andros Island, Otterbein[67] found that 42 percent of the adult male population spends most of its time away from the island and that two-thirds of the men have engaged in at least one period of seasonal agricultural labor in the United States. Similarly, Betley[68] found that 42 percent of the 630 household heads in a Vincentian village he studied were returned migrants.

The obvious conclusion from all this evidence is that in sheer demographic terms and in relation to the number of territories affected, return migration is an extremely significant part of the Caribbean migration phenomenon. But return migration has far more than just population or geographical referents. As a long-standing institutionalized aspect of the region's population mobility, it also has important economic, social, and cultural implications.

THE RETURN IDEOLOGY

Some of these implications are readily seen when account is taken of what I have called elsewhere the "return ideology" in West Indian migration.[69] This ideology consists of a set of beliefs and values forming one part of what Philpott[70] has termed the "migrant ideology," "...the cognitive model which the migrant holds as to the nature and goals of his migration." This migrant ideology is a feature of the institutionalization which normally takes place when some usage becomes a persistent multi-generational phenomenon. The return sentiment as an aspect of this ideology includes, among other things, ideas about the proposed length of the migration period, especially that it will be less than lifelong. Migration conceived as a temporary phenomenon is undoubtedly a notion which largely originated from the nature of the migration outlets and associated employment opportunities which were available before the opening up of England.

Several studies report the presence of a return ideology among West Indian migrants. In her book, *Dark Strangers*[71] Sheila Patterson argues that:

> ... apart from some earlier arrivals, most West Indians are still migratory in intention. All their efforts and hopes are directed towards accumulating sufficient capital or acquiring a new skill so that they may return to a future in the West Indies.

In a study of immigrant absorption among transit workers in London, nearly all of whom were from the West Indies, Brookes[72] found that 44 percent originally had intended to remain in Britain for up to five years, 37 percent had had no specific time for returning in mind, and only 4 percent stated that they wished to settle in England permanently. The need to distinguish between migrant motivation and the causes and reality of the migration process[73] is highlighted by the fact that 81 percent of the sample had already been in England for at least five years. Brookes[74] also found that although 65 percent of the sample now had no definite idea about when they wished to return to the West Indies, only 7 percent had no plans to return at all.

Comparable findings are also present in other studies conducted by Rex and Moore[75] and R. B. Davison.[76] Each of these studies took place between the late 1950s and mid-1960s, i.e., within a few years of removal to England. More recent work in the early 1970s conducted by Foner[77] and by Midgett[78] show no significant lessening of the return intention.

The return intention is not confined to West Indian migrants in England. Crane[79] tells us that returning to retire on Saba has always been a definite goal of many migrants while Hill[80] argues that the general content of the migrant ideology among Carriacouans in New York corresponds to that found by Philpott[81] among London-based Montserratians. Sutton and Makieskvy[82] also report that most West Indians in New York intend ultimately to return to their home societies.

If the return ideology is as strong as the literature suggests then why have more contemporary migrants not transformed their desire to return into reality? Although there is no simple answer to cover all cases, economic considerations of various sorts act to discourage many would-be returnees. As R. B. Davison[83] has stated:

> Coloured immigrants in Britain have moved in response to economic, rather than political, forces and the way they view an eventual return to their homeland will depend on their view of the future economic circumstances there. Their assessment of the possibilities of securing the financial means to return is another important factor, as is their expectation of the future for themselves, and their families, in Britain.

Thus, uncertain economic conditions in the home society, especially a lack of jobs,[84] a reluctance to go back to former activities such as peasant cultivation with their low rates of economic return and prestige, the possession of skills acquired abroad for which there is no market in the West Indies,[85] the failure to achieve financial or occupational success,[86] greater overseas occupational opportunities and security of job tenure,[87] and a desire to see their children complete their education abroad[88] all constrain the homeward flow of migrants.

While the importance of economic conditions seems clear enough, occasionally the intention to return may be simply a case of what Kenney[89] has called "institutionalized nostalgia" or what Connell et al.[90] have labelled the "myth of return." As R. B. Davison[91] states:

> Distance lends enchantment and to ask a Jamaican in the middle of an English winter whether or not he would like to return to Jamaica would be the most futile enquiry imaginable.

Similarly, Foner[92] suggests that:

> Some migrants react to their failure to gain full acceptance in English society by defining their stay in England as a temporary one.

In other words, an orientation towards the home society to some extent acts to reduce the social and psychological impact of racism and other disappointing features of life in England.

But even where the wish to return is an empty dream or a rationalization for failure, as long as migrants continue *to act* as if they will eventually return to their homelands, there will be significant consequences for both the migrant and the sending society.[93] Elsewhere,[94] I have argued in relation to a peasant village in St. Vincent that the mere *desire* to return as distinct from actual physical return has had the following effects: (1) affiliation among village peers in the host society; (2) a preference for marriage to fellow islanders; (3) a social and sentimental involvement with the home community and the household from which migration took place; (4) the support of the migration of close kin and friends; (5) the remitting of money to relatives back home; and (6) the overseas purchase of village housing and other property. In turn, the continuing home commitment of the migrant, particularly the meeting of remittance obligations, and the acquisition of property and other symbols of prosperity, have significantly affected both the lives of nonmigrants and prospects for local economic development. Although remittances have enhanced the style of life and material well-being of many of its recipients, they have adversely affected village agricultural productivity while perpetuating the emigration aspiration among the young, an ambition that few may be able to fulfill.

While the literature suggests that many of these effects occur elsewhere in the region,[95] a systematic review of the available material combined with an in-depth treatment of return migration in a particular Caribbean society are needed to precisely document these and other concomitants of the counterstream flow of migrants.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:

In this paper I have discussed three central topics in the study of return migration in the English-speaking Caribbean. A typology was necessary in order to have some means of classifying the different homeward movements that have occurred in the region for over a century and a half. On the one hand, some rather simple categorization system is needed to facilitate the systematic description of the migration pattern within a particular territory or community; on the other, the comparative analysis of intraregional return movements -- the next stage in the study of the phenomenon -- requires a standard classificatory framework to illuminate similarities and differences.

The extent of return migration is another basic topic that has to be considered in any study (whether particularistic or comparative) of return migration. While the scope of any social process demands documentation in order to show that it is not a trivial or unique phenomenon, and hence unworthy of intense investigation, this is doubly true of return migration. In order to counter the traditional idea of a one-way movement from rural areas to urban centers or from less-developed countries to regions promising higher standards of living, it needs to be shown that the homeward flow of migrants is a demographically and historically significant process.

The ideology of return migration is a third feature of the process that deserves careful treatment. Not only does the intention or desire to return home one day motivate the homeward movement of many migrants, the very idea of eventually going back (even where this is mere nostalgia or a justification for an unpleasant migration experience) has several important social and economic consequences among migrants and nonmigrants alike.

There are several other rather obvious candidiates for a list of topics that ought to be dealt with in a full study (either in a particular society or in wider comparative terms) of return migration. These include the following:

> (1) *factors effecting the return of migrants* (objective factors causing the return; personal motives and rationalizations for returning; push vs. pull factors and their relative impact on the decision to return; successful vs. unsuccessful returnees; reasons for *not* returning);
>
> (2) *characteristics of returnees* (sex, age, marital status, education, occupation, class, years of absence; comparison of returnees to nonreturnees and to nonmigrants);
>
> (3) *implications of returning for the existing society* (immigration policies and services; ethnic and racial attitudes and practices; push and pull factors effecting the decision of the migrant;

labor needs and shortages; shifting sources of migrant workers);

(4) *impact of the return of migrants on the original sending society and community* (implications for economic development; introduction of new skills and innovative behavior/ideas; investment of migration earnings; effects on pre-existing social organization and ideology; demographic and social service impact of large-scale return movements);

(5) *effects of return on the returnee* (readjustment and adaptation problems; social mobility and economic well being; retirement; the decision to re-emigrate).

What is required is a systematic investigation of these and other features of the homeward movement of West Indian migrants. Although logically research should begin with a detailed ethnographic account of return migration within a particular Caribbean society in order to present a well-rounded and integrated picture of its empirical elements, from the point of view of generalization and theory-building, the incorporation of regional and extra-Caribbean comparative material would seem to be essential. Such a study should receive high priority in Caribbean ethnology.

NOTES

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[21] Amersfoort, p. 18; Solien de Gonzalez (1961), pp. 1266-1288.

[22] "Circulation," Bovenkerk, p. 5; "cyclical migration," Bovenkerk, p. 4; "circular migration," Amersfoort; Connell *et al*, p. 121-125; Graves and Graves, pp. 119-120; "temporary, recurrent migration," Raymond E. Wiest, "Wage-Labor Migration and the Household in a Mexican Town," *Journal of Anthropological Research* 29:3 (1973), pp. 182-183; "recurrent migration," Solien de Gonzalez(1961), pp. 1268-1269; Douglass, p. 29.

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[32] Proudfoot, pp. 14-15, 19.

[33] Taylor, p. 216.

[34] Proudfoot, p. 19.

[35] Otterbein, pp. 10-11.

[36] R. T. Smith, p. 19.

[37] Gonzales (1969), pp. 30-44.

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[40] Proudfoot, p. 14.

[41] Foner, p. 9.

[42] Taylor, p. 216.

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[44] Betley, p. 207

[45] Frucht, p. 196.

[46] Philpott, pp. 27-78.

[47] Hill, pp. 220-221.

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[49] Proudfoot, p. 19; Philpott (1973), p. 28.

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[84] R. B. Davison, p. 108; Foner, pp. 212, 234.

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[86] Brookes, p. 132; R. B. Davison, p. 108; Foner, p. 212.

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[88] Brookes, pp. 132-133; Foner, p 32.

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[90] Connell et al., p. 210.

[91] R. B. Davison, p. 106.

[92] Foner, p. 21.

[93] Philpott (1973), pp. 178, 188.

[94] Rubenstein, pp. 21-38.

[95] Frucht; Philpott (1973).

THE ORIGINS AND CONTINUITY OF RETURN MIGRATION IN THE LEEWARD CARIBBEAN

Bonham C. Richardson

Ethnocentric categories often mislead rather than clarify. In assessing human mobility in the Third World, Western observers -- from a sedentary and socially-constrained vantage point -- tend to categorize any large-scale human movement as unilinear "migration," or as a response to perturbations that cause human movement from settlements where we assume people really *ought* to stay. Then when travelers come back we dub them "return migrants," unmindful that in refining our own culture-bound typologies we are really bagging our own decoys.

In many Third World regions human mobility or circulation is fundamental to livelihood. Leaving and then returning weeks, months, and even years later is routine and expected. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the Lesser Antilles where migration as livelihood had evolved within the broader framework, and partially in opposition to, the domination of the Caribbean by outside forces. Livelihood mobility in the eastern Caribbean has long since become legitimated by time. It is now a traditional process that calls for men and women to leave, though often to return again, in order to maintain and improve what they have left behind.[1]

Livelihood mobility, which of course involved "return migration," is as old, and in some ways older, than slave emancipation in St. Kitts and Nevis. Most of the information for this paper comes from archival and field evidence pertaining to only these two islands, but I hope that some generalizations presented here help to clarify broad differences in postemancipation adaptations between small and large states of the English-speaking Caribbean. I am, however, quite aware that all generalizations from St. Kitts and Nevis cannot be extended uncritically to encompass all of the Leewards and Windwards.

In 1838 freedmen in Jamaica, Guyana, Trinidad and, to some extent, the Windwards established "reconstituted peasantries" on lands free from direct plantation control.[2] Similar village adaptations were impossible in some of the smaller British Caribbean islands. In St. Kitts and Nevis planters continued to control literally all of the land, even the forested areas reaching to the mountaintops. Workers' cottages and provision plots thus remained appendages of sugar cane plantations, and few settlements of any kind fell outside direct planter control. Estate owners of St. Kitts and Nevis moreover prevented the establishment of free mountain villages for fear of slope erosion and the loss of their heretofore captive labor force. At the same time labor recruiters from Trinidad and Guyana were enticing local freedmen south by offering free passage, food, and shelter, as well as wages twice those offered by Leeward planters. St. Kitts and Nevis legislators countered with a series of vagrancy, trespassing, and emigration restrictions which were eventually overruled in London. In any case, within seven years after emancipation, over 3,000 Kittitians and Nevisians had migrated officially to Trinidad and Demerara, and possibly another 3,000 unofficially.[3]

In the years preceding emancipation, slaves on smaller islands had probably already anticipated escape by "migrating" from the islands themselves, while in Jamaica and the Guianas their counterparts found sanctuaries in the forested interiors and established Maroon communities. Neither St. Kitts nor Nevis offered similar physical refuge, but slaves from both islands could daily see each other's island plus Montserrat, St. Barts, St. Eustatius, Saba, and St. Martin -- constant visual reminders of escape and at least the possibility of freedom. The postemancipation migration from St. Kitts and Nevis to the southern Caribbean was thus partially an expression of freedom that had earlier been contemplated but usually suppressed.

Postemancipation voyages south to Trinidad were courageous and dangerous undertakings. A few migrants traveled on steamers, but the great majority traveled via small sailing craft commanded by black sailors who had learned their art during slavery and who recruited laborers throughout the Antilles, inspired by cash bounties for every worker they imported to Trinidad.[4] The voyages themselves were physically dangerous. Primitive navigational techniques, sudden storms, unmarked rocks and shoals, stormy interisland channels, and night travel marked the four hundred miles to Trinidad. Migrants faced not only inanimate hazards but also hostile colonial administrators in intervening islands and the possibility of capture and reenslavement on Guadeloupe and Martinique. In sum, the voyages were sailing adventures marking individual and collective assertions of freedom from a plantocracy that still controlled all of St. Kitts and Nevis. Passage to Trinidad was not escape from a wider plantation sphere but it signified successful resistance and an unwillingness to accept dictates from former plantation masters at home. Most significant for students of return migration, these journeys were not one way. By the late 1840s most small-island migrants had traveled back home, bringing money and gifts to families and friends and once again braving the interisland passage to do so.

This early migration and return in the Lesser Antilles boldly redefined an ethnic niche, leaving an imprint that still persists. Those traveling away and returning were almost certainly more admired by their peers than those who stayed, admiration associated precisely with migration and return. Within a decade after emancipation, economic and social success among the islands' laboring classes -- as well as freedom itself -- was probably closely associated with migration and return. This "return migration" thus signified much more than movement from one point to another and back again. It represented continuity with the past and future. Yearnings for freedom earlier suppressed were now realized by going away; and the future uncertainties of inhabiting tiny, drought-prone islands whose lands were still controlled by planters could in later years be ameliorated through emigration and return. In short, freedom on St. Kitts and Nevis involved a "migration adaptation" every bit as important as village adaptations in larger Caribbean territories.

Men and women of the laboring classes of St. Kitts, Nevis, and the other West Indian islands have continued to migrate away to compensate for landlessness and economic precariousness at home. However, destinations have changed in different generations. Trinidad remained the favored destination for Leeward migrants until 1900. In this century North American and European capital has created a series of boom-and-bust work projects in the circum-Caribbean attracting thousands of laborers from West Indian islands. Men -- and women in increasing numbers -- have traveled from St. Kitts and Nevis to work on the Panama Canal, the Bermuda dockyards, the canefields of the Dominican Republic and Cuba, U.S. armed forces bases in Antigua and Trinidad, refineries in the Netherlands Antilles, and tourist hotels and construction projects in the Virgin Islands, not to mention the North American mainland and the United Kingdom. As soon as particular projects have finished, suddenly unwanted Antillean laborers have been sent home by local immigration officials.

Although Kittitians and Nevisians have traditionally traveled together to foreign destinations, they have migrated first and foremost as individuals -- not as members of a highly organized economic or social group. In the decade after emancipation, workers' movements were in opposition to, rather than supported by, planters who controlled local governments. Since then similar movements have represented, in part, resistance of individuals to local planter domination. Therefore, migration and return in St. Kitts and Nevis have never been buttressed and facilitated as part of an organized "national" or cultural effort. There are no monuments, for instance, on either island dedicated to the post-emancipation voyages to Trinidad to memorialize or perpetuate a migration tradition. Moreover, contemporary Kittitians and Nevisians know little of this historical back-and-forth movement after emancipation. Instead, local folk tradition has passed from one generation to the next in the islands' villages, individuals of each successive generation facing their own local problems and seeking relief partly by traveling away to whatever destinations available. The cultural "persistence" of a migration tradition in St. Kitts and Nevis is therefore not an institutionalized inheritance from the past; this tradition survives because of its functional necessity for each successive generation of Kittitians and Nevisians.

As they have traveled away and returned, Leeward migrants' livelihood strategies have been subjected to shifts in world economic structures inevitably controlled by metropolitan forces. Yet it is misleading to portray Caribbean colonial history as outlining a rigid template that has predetermined movements of Kittitians, Nevisians, and other small islanders. Men and women of the two islands have struggled and survived in skillful, stubborn, and ingenious ways. The world outside, although indifferent, complex, and often hostile, has presented a variety of external resources that they have successfully exploited.

Within the broad guidelines laid out by North Atlantic powerholders, the common people of St. Kitts and Nevis have written their own histories. This is not to suggest that migrants (including return migrants) from St. Kitts and Nevis have asserted the glory of the human spirit to emerge victorious against all odds. Kittitians and Nevisians are far too practical and have been too preoccupied with survival to rely on such unproductive sentiment. Neither have they spelled out their migration histories in absurd quests that end in failure. Instead they have tapped external resources by overcoming natural and social constraints through the imaginative use of their skills and their intelligence. Above all, they have had to be flexible and adaptable in the face of natural and man-made hazards and economic depressions. Through individual mobility, underspecialization, and immediate response to change, Kittitians and Nevisians have rarely prospered, but they have always survived.

Scholars researching small West Indian island societies note time and again the contemporary ceremonial expression accorded migrants' returns as well as the inordinate peer respect given a successful returnee. Parties and fetes mark an individual's return on Montserrat.[5] Those who have successfully worked abroad and come back are the so-called *Special People* of Nevis.[6] Migration and return are ingrained in every dimension of local culture on Carriacou.[7] The list could be extended. Celebrations surrounding return migration in the Lesser Antilles is of course functionally significant because of the ongoing importance of migration in the contemporary societies. By no means a recent phenomenon, migration is now a traditional livelihood adaptation developed and sustained by men and women on St. Kitts, Nevis, and other small West Indian islands for one and a half centuries as a means of coping with a world they do not control.

NOTES

[1] For general, relatively recent statements about the importance of migration in the West Indies as a whole see David Lowenthal, *West Indian Societies* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 213-232; also Orlando Patterson, "Migration in Caribbean Societies: Socioeconomic and Symbolic Resource," in William H. McNeill and Ruth S. Adams, eds., *Human Migration: Patterns and Policies* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), pp. 106-145.

[2] Sidney W. Mintz, *Caribbean Transformations* (Chicago: Aldine, 1974), pp. 146-156.

[3] For documentation and detail of the early migration south see Bonham C. Richardson, "Freedom and Migration in the Leeward Caribbean, 1838-1848," *Journal of Historical Geography* (Forthcoming, 1981).

[4] This may be the origin of a folk sailing tradition that persists today in the eastern Caribbean. Horace Beck, "The Bubble Trade," *Natural History*, 85:10 (December, 1976): 38-47.

[5] Stuart B. Philpott, "Remittance Obligations, Social Networks and Choice among Montserratian Migrants in Britain," *Man*, 3:3 (1968): 465-476, ref. p. 467.

[6] Richard Frucht, "Emigration, Remittances, and Social Change: Aspects of the Social Field of Nevis, West Indies," *Anthropologica*, 10:2 (1968): 193-208.

[7] Donald R. Hill, *The Impact of Migration on the Metropolitan and Folk Society of Carriacou, Grenada*, vol. 54, part 2 (Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History, New York, 1977), pp. 191-391.

"In Sick Longing for the Further Shore":
RETURN MIGRATION BY CARIBBEAN EAST INDIANS
DURING THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES

Brinsley Samaroo

In 1917, Reverend C. F. Andrews, English advocate for the abolition of Indian indentureship in colonies abroad, visited Fiji to see for himself the conditions under which these immigrants worked. Andrews' report, which was widely circulated in England as well as in India, described an Indian population which was eager to return to the motherland:

> Wherever I went they fell at my feet, imploring me to get them ships to go away. They followed me about from place to place with blank looks of despair and with entreaties of every kind. I was reminded of that tragic scene described by the Latin poet, Virgil, in the Sixth Aeneid, where the spirits of the dead follow Aeneas to the brink of the river Styx -- the flood which divides the world of the dead from the world of the living -- and stretched out their hands towards him crying out in their despair:
> *Tendentes quae manus ripae ulterioris amore.*
> (and stretching forth their hands in sick longing for the further shore).[1]

In Britain's Caribbean colonies this longing for the further shore persisted well into the forties of this century. In 1938 an Indian missionary in Trinidad, Dr. Parashu Ram Sharma, toured the colony and reportedly "came across a very large number of East Indians who were very much anxious to return back to India" but were being forced to remain in the colony because there were no government arrangements for their repatriation.[2] Ten years earlier some 745 repatriates from British Guiana and Surinam left Georgetown for India; no fewer than 37 of these died en route.[3] And in 1949 there were as many as 300 aged Indians returning to India from British Guiana "because, as they themselves put it, they wanted to lay their bones on India's sacred soil."[4]

Wherever Indians have gone abroad they have always sought to maintain contact with the ancestral culture and with what they consider an Indian way of life. Whereas many India-born immigrants had a desire to return physically to the homeland, their descendants sought mainly an ethnic identity with things Indian, a "sense of peoplehood" based partly on cultural similarities between the colony and the motherland. Quite often this identification with the traditional culture was more symbolic than real.[5] And this has been particularly so in faraway places like the Caribbean where the cultural environment -- which molds people's values and beliefs -- was so different from India. Nevertheless, this identity has always been a part of the psyche of Indians abroad. This paper will deal with those Indians who, during indentureship and afterwards, availed themselves of the opportunity of returning to the further shore.

Let us begin by looking at the provisions for repatriation as they affected indentured Indians during the period of indentureship, 1838-1917. As a general rule the Indian laborer had to be resident in a colony for ten years before he qualified for the repatriation grant. The planters in the colonies, however, were constantly pressing for the abolition of this grant, and it was only because of Colonial Office insistence that the allowance remained on the books.[6] Nevertheless, planter-influenced colonial administrations were successful in gradually pruning down this obligation. In 1869, for example, they succeeded in establishing an offer of ten acres of land to any Indian who abandoned his right to a return passage. By 1872 this offer was modified when the time-expired Indian was offered ten acres or five acres and five pounds cash. In 1878 when it appeared that the majority of Indians were opting to stay, the offer was reduced to five pounds or five acres and in 1881, to a simple grant of five pounds. By 1890 the offer of either land or money in commutation of the return passage was withdrawn and five years later, those who wished to be repatriated had to contribute to their own fare: the men 25 percent and the women 16 2/3 percent. In 1898 these rates were doubled.[7]

Despite these incentives to remain many Indians opted to return home. In fact just under one-quarter of the total number who came actually returned.[8] Tables 1 and 2 give an idea of the numbers involved. But the number who left is only a proportion of those who would have liked to return to India. As has been pointed out earlier, there were people who wanted to return in 1938 but could not because of lack of arrangements for their return; during the period of the First World War very few returned because of the danger to shipping and during the sugar depression in the West Indies in the late nineteenth century, planters sought every means of avoiding payment of return fares. It is significant that during these years the various offers of land and/or money in lieu of return passages were at their peak. In addition, many an indentured Indian, in some distant plantation, found it difficult to travel to the capital and claim his return fare; some, despite a desire to return home, stayed behind because they anticipated cold comfort from the native hearth:

> The fear of social disgrace prevents many men and women from returning to India on the completion of their terms of indenture, and they have no other alternative than to resign themselves to their lot in their far-off lands.[9]

Why did these Indians wish to return to the further shore? For one thing, many of them had been duped into embarking on a voyage which took them to a land farther away than they had envisaged. Laborers in many Indian villages had been accustomed to seasonal migration during slack periods and when a recruiting agent (*arkatiya*) told them that Fiji or Trinidad was

TABLE 1

EAST INDIANS INTRODUCED INTO THE BRITISH CARIBBEAN MAINLY UNDER INDENTURE, 1838-1918

Period	Destination of Migrants							Total Migrants
	British Guiana	Trinidad	Jamaica	St. Lucia	Grenada	St. Vincent	St. Kitts	
1838	396	-	-	-	-	-	-	396
1845-50	12,374	5,568	4,551	-	-	-	-	22,493
1851-55	9,981	5,054	-	-	-	-	-	15,035
1856-60	16,206	11,208	2,121	1,215	944	260	-	31,954
1861-65	15,654	7,474	2,524	320	1,357	521	337	28,187
1866-70	22,436	11,836	5,279	-	269	1,145	-	40,965
1871-75	24,355	11,868	6,079	-	-	333	-	42,635
1876-80	27,374	12,763	2,313	1,184	458	213	-	44,305
1881-85	20,500	11,551	966	925	172	-	-	34,114
1886-90	20,471	13,988	2,135	554	-	-	-	37,148
1891-95	21,397	13,565	1,651	156	-	-	-	36,769
1896-1900	14,780	7,414	1,276	-	-	-	-	23,470
1901-05	13,177	12,433	1,471	-	-	-	-	27,081
1906-10	10,592	12,547	2,955	-	-	-	-	26,094
1911-15	7,304	4,051	3,091	-	-	-	-	14,446
1916-18	1,912	2,619	-	-	-	-	-	4,531
Total	238,909	143,939	36,412	4,354	3,200	2,472	337	429,623

Source: G. W. Roberts and J. Byrne: Summary Statistics on Indenture and Associated Migration Affecting the West Indies, 1834-1918. Population Studies Vol. 2, No. 1, July 1966. Table 2.

TABLE 2
INDENTURED MIGRANTS KNOWN TO HAVE RETURNED TO INDIA, 1893-1916

Period	Migrants Returning From							Total Migrants
	British Guiana	Trinidad	Jamaica	St. Lucia	St. Vincent	Grenada	St. Kitts Nevis	
1853-50	482	-	-	-	-	-	-	482
1851-55	1,908	1,395	1,520	-	-	-	-	4,823
1856-60	1,975	982	126	-	-	-	-	3,083
1861-65	1,316	817	-	-	-	-	-	2,133
1866-70	1,265	772	-	749	-	76	-	2,862
1871-75	3,620	970	1,952	162	-	-	-	6,704
1876-80	5,269	1,875	1,345	-	165	-	-	8,654
1881-85	7,335	2,265	1,815	95	559	29	-	12,098
1886-90	9,414	2,924	1,281	463	326	95	61	14,564
1891-95	10,082	3,775	834	604	-	78	-	15,373
1896-1900	6,988	3,638	-	-	-	-	-	10,626
1901-05	7,671	3,838	2,124	373	-	-	-	14,006
1906-10	5,838	3,471	111	-	-	-	-	9,420
1911-16	2,977	2,726	772	-	-	-		6,475
	66,140	29,448	11,880	2,446	1,050	278	61	111,303

Source: G. W. Roberts and J. Byrne: Summary Statistics on Indenture and Associated Migration Affecting the West Indies, 1834-1918. Population Studies Vol. 2, No. 1, July 1966. Table 9.

only a short distance away, they agreed to go, leaving their families behind. Some were even kidnapped and conned into accepting indentureship.[10] It was because of the prevalence of these dishonest methods of recruitment that a delegation from the Anti-slavery and Aborigines Protection Society demanded from the Secretary of State for India, in 1917, that an impartial board of emigration be set up in India with "a representative of coolie labor" so that prospective immigrants could be properly informed about conditions of indentureship.[11] And it was because so many families were left behind in India that a number of the West India Committee urged that some assistance be given to stranded families so that they could join their menfolk in Trinidad and British Guiana.[12] Nothing was done in this regard, so that heads of such families constituted one of the groups which wanted to return home. Some, like the Indian Presbyterian pastor, Babulal Behari of San Fernando, Trinidad, had saved enough to pay their wives' passages to the Caribbean. Most of the ex-indentured Indians could not do so; they had to take advantage of the repatriation money. Other returnees were drawn from those immigrants who had not been successful in establishing themselves in the colonies and who, therefore, had nothing to lose by returning; there were also indigents (paupers, lepers, invalids and lunatics) who were repatriated by colonial governments.[13]

There were also Indians who wanted to leave because of economic hardship. In 1938, for example, the Moyne Commission was told of some seven hundred of them who wanted to leave Jamaica:

> There are at present some seven hundred East Indians who are in bad circumstances and who are desirous of being repatriated to India in the same manner as this has been done in other islands. The majority are without work and are in a pauperized condition and the others that do get work are so badly paid that the conditions under which they have to live are appalling.[14]

During indentureship and particularly afterwards there were Indians who, as they became older, wished, in the Hindu tradition, to spend their last days in prayer and self-denying meditation (*sanyasi*) near some shrine or holy place in the motherland. The managing director of the major shipping line which transported Indians to and from India was not incorrect when he stated that "many make the voyage only to die in the native land."[15] In 1951 the Secretary of the All-India National Congress referred to this desire to die in the motherland as "the eternal call of the Ganges."[16]

Table 3 gives an idea of Caribbean East Indians who left for India between 1922 and 1928. According to Mahatma Gandhi, writing in 1926, these people were returning to India in order to visit the motherland and because they were misled into believing that India had obtained self-government.[17]

TABLE 3
RETURN EMIGRATION FROM THE CARIBBEAN TO INDIA, 1922-1928

Colony	Year	Total Embarked	Average Age Immigrant	Average % Deaths
British Guiana	1923	211	37	
	1924	417	34	3.3
	1925	492	34	.5
	1926	860	34	.4
	1927	570	37	3.3
	1928	745	35	.5
Trinidad	1922	1,075	31	1.5
	1923	994	31	3.3
	1924	886	34	.2
	1925	898	32	1.7
	1926	996	33	2.7
	1927	898	31	.3
Jamaica	1923	676	28	0.7
	1924	442	30	.1
	1927	68	28	2.4

Source: File 374/1929 - Report of Walker and Blandy to Secretary, Government of Bengal, 19 October 1928 Guyana National Archives. This report was prepared by the shipping company (Nourse Line) which did the actual transportation of the return immigrants.

Much has been written about the wealth, in cash and in jewelry, which the returning Indians took with them. Table 4 gives an idea of the wealth taken from British Guiana between 1881 and 1912:

TABLE 4
WEALTH RETURNING INDIANS TOOK WITH THEM

Year	No. Who Returned	Savings in Pounds	Jewelry Est. in Pounds	Remittances in Pounds
1881	1,416	20,434	5,104	474
1885	1,761	23,898	4,896	1,398
1890	2,125	25,021	5,208	5,192
1895/6	2,071	20,789	4,063	2,047
1900/1	1,017	7,167	1,167	2,180
1905/6	2,021	16,583	2,500	1,933
1911/12	802	7,687	1,000	2,722

Planters and Colonial Office people never lost an opportunity of tabulating the amounts taken by returning immigrants, in order to demonstrate how well the Indians were doing in the Caribbean.[19] Indeed the remittances by Indians were described by some as part of the "financial drain" of the colonies' resources.[20] However, it must be borne in mind that this wealth was very unequally distributed among the returnees. Only a few of them had substantial sums and these were persons who had served their indentures and had, by dint of diligent personal effort saved substantially. Such wealth, the first president of the British Guiana East Indian Association pointed out, "has been due not to the miserable wages paid by estate authorities but by their independent effort in other directions."[21] During 1913-14 out of 3,554 Indians returning to Calcutta no less than 61.22 percent were destitute.[22] In 1915 Lord Hardinge, Governor General of India noted that one-third of the returning Indians were destitute and that the average amount brought back after ten years by the remaining two-thirds was only 49 pounds per head.[23] A more recent researcher reduces Hardinge's figures. In 1913, he writes, the average for returnees to Calcutta was 24 pounds and for Madras 5 pounds. These figures of average savings, he points out, are for returnees from Fiji. "Natal and Fiji topped the list of colonies with savings, with the West Indies next and Mauritius a long way behind."[24] On the Indian end newspaper reports described some of these pauperized returnees:

> Thousands of Indians return from the colonies every year and there is no doubt that the Matiaburz problem is not a temporary one, it will be recurring again for a long time to come. We must also remember that many of the colonial governments have been playing one mischief, i.e., they are sending their paupers to India. After having given the best portion of their lives to the colonies these unfortunate people return to their motherland, complete moral and physical wrecks and these will never make good colonists.[25]

The reception of these returned immigrants needs further elaboration. As a general rule one can say that the few who went with substantial savings were able to afford the elaborate cleansing rituals required for readmittance into caste and village societies. Quite often the expenses involved in feeding the Brahmins which was a part of this ritual, left the returnee penniless.[26] Others were resettled in their original, or in nearby villages under the auspices of philanthropic organizations which made a special effort to assist the reintegration process. Groups such as the Indian National Congress and the Servants of India society did useful work in Northern India. Other returnees who found that the grass was greener in the colonies paid their way back before they could be fleeced of their savings by indigent relations or by urban swindlers,[27] but these people were the exceptions. The majority came back to a strange land; not the India which they had left. They now perceived India differently and India saw them through a glass, darkly. We shall look at some of the reasons for this mutually changed outlook.

Perhaps the major problem of the returning Indians was that of caste. And this, combined with the larger problem of other cultural changes which the indentured immigrant had undergone in the Caribbean, made reintegration into Indian society a very difficult problem. Interestingly enough, caste restrictions on non-Brahmins travelling abroad are only a relatively recent addition to the Indian value-system. By the first century A.D. Indian merchants had established active trade along the Red and Arabian Seas, dealing in pearls and other precious stones as well as spices and muslins.[28] A Chinese text of the fifth century A.D. spoke of five hundred Chou (possibly merchant) families and more than a thousand Brahmins who were spreading their doctrines in China.[29] Indeed the Manu-Smrti which Hindus throughout the centuries have regarded as the major guide towards the proper performance of their religious duties,[30] instructs only Brahmins that they should not cross the sea. Indeed it specifically enjoins other castes to go abroad and trade and Manu speaks of an extensive trade with the nations of Southeast Asia.[31] At the time of early European contact with India, the port of Surat on the West Coast was described as "one of the best, the finest and richest and greatest marts, not only of the Mogul's country, but of all the Indies ... It is here that the Indians constantly embark to trade on the coasts of Persia, Arabia, Egypt and Africa, even to the Cape of Good Hope and in the Island of Madagascar."[32] It is well known that a Gujrati mariner piloted Vasco de Gama from East Africa to India in 1498 and Shakespeare, writing in the late sixteenth century drew on the European contact with India to embellish his work. In a *Midsummer Night's Dream*, Titania's "changeling boy" was "stol'n from an Indian King." And, in the less popular play *Henry IV* (Part I) Mortimer describes Glendower as "bountiful as mines in India."[33]

From the late middle ages, however, this spirit of adventure was beginning to decline in India. From this time "the growing rigidity of caste, the growth of prejudice against crossing the sea and the purdah system discouraged emigration."[34] From around this time, Nehru states, "the urge to life and endeavor becomes less, the creative spirit fades away and gives place to the imitative ... the urge to adventure and an overflowing life which had led to vast schemes of distant colonization and the transplantation of Indian culture in far-off lands: all these fade away and a narrow orthodoxy taboos even the crossing of high seas."[35] British domination hastened the process of Indian introspection and tied her to a restricted relationship with Europe. From the British point of view, this sealing off of India from her Asian neighbors was necessary in the interests of security. "But it must be remembered that this political isolation is a recent and entirely novel feature in the history of India. It is the great landmark which separates the present from the past."[36]

One of the important features of this introversion was the spread of Hinduism in general and of Brahminism in particular. By the eighteenth century new definitions were being made and this was particularly true of Northeastern India, from where most of the Caribbean immigrants came. Here large numbers of tribal and other peoples were being reclaimed by Hinduism: "In Gorakkhpur in Uttar Pradesh people of a mountain tribe called Khateri were claiming all the dignities of the military order."[37] The same could be said of the cultivators in Bhagalpur and Shahabad in Bihar, and a Bihari "low tribe" the Bhumihars were all now claiming to be Brahmins. The same was true of Bengal. Similarly, many of the lower castes were renouncing the various social practices associated with them and began usurping high caste distinctions "with the avowed desire to rise in the social scale."[38]

In this movement of social change even the occupational divisions decreed by caste were becoming blurred. Brahmins in Northeastern India were increasingly taking to agriculture and military roles as employment opportunities with the East India Company became greater.[39] With the spread of Brahminism the injunctions against crossing "blackwater" (*Kala Pani*), normally restricted to Brahminism, became widespread. To agree to travel abroad would now be a revelation of one's low caste and was done only in cases of absolute necessity. British recruiting agents in India certainly mention this factor as a continuous brake in their recruitment efforts.[40] Conversely we may say that when immigrants returned from abroad very few of their erstwhile relatives and friends dared to break this new tradition by welcoming these "tapuha" (or island persons).

If the general act of crossing water caused the loss of caste, the particularities of the voyage to the New World and life on the plantations made a bad situation worse. On the ships bringing the immigrants to the New World, no regard was paid to caste differences as immigrants had to eat together, sharing most of the common facilities on board ships. Here, the caste system was replaced by a bond forged by the common experience of life in the compound in Calcutta prior to departure for the colonies as well as the shared happy and unhappy moments on the ocean crossing. This "brotherhood of the boat" (*Jahagi Bhai*) formed a new bond among immigrants which cut across caste/religious barriers and persists even today among the descendants of the original "jahagis."

On the plantations in the Caribbean, managers paid little attention to the caste hierarchy and so the immigrants had no choice but to work side by side, to live next to each other in long barracks, share common hospitals, water supply and bathing facilities. The shortage of women throughout the period of indentureship made the maintenance of caste endogamy impossible.[41] And occupational caste categories already in a state of flux in India broke down even further in the colonies. C. F. Andrews relates the case of a Kabir Panthi in Fiji whose strict religious code forbade the killing or eating of cattle. The man was now forced to become a butcher and he took his job so seriously that, on one occasion, he sought to win an argument by biting off his opponent's nose.[42] In such circumstances even those who wished to retain the caste system could not do so in the traditional manner. So that for most Caribbean Indians an Indian was either Brahmin or Chamar as caste became simplified in the new environment.[43] The retention of caste even in this attenuated form, was perhaps a stabilizing force for Indians in the Caribbean environment but it certainly removed them even further from the classifications in the ancestral land.

As bad if not worse than the loss of caste was the loss of religion, that is, conversion to a Christian faith. In India apostasy was regarded with such condemnation that converts feared for their very lives.[44]

Even the children of converts had to find a niche among the Christian Indian community in India, normally in a mission compound. One such person the Reverend J. W. Netram visited Trinidad in 1930 at the invitation of the Canadian Presbyterian Church. His anti-Hindu preaching caused a storm of protest among local Indians.[45]

A third factor which militated against the reintegration of the returned immigrant was the general change in his personality, habits and ideas. In the new and rapidly changing Caribbean environment the Indian, quite often without realizing it, became a different person. His language was now interspersed with English, Spanish and French patois words, his diet now had more meat and fish in it, he had become used to cheap and very available rum in the sugar islands and the ruggedness of plantation life had made him a more aggressive person. Now returned to India these "social lepers" as Gandhi called them, "were regarded by their counterparts of the subcontinent as almost alien" and suspected "of having apostatized from the religion of their forefathers.[46] According to another report, Trinidad-born Indians when taken to India by their parents clamored to be taken back to their place of birth. India was "entirely different from that to which they had been accustomed." In India they were "strangers in a strange land."[47] A returned South African Indian aptly summarized the feelings of others like him:

> The returned emigrant does not find himself at home here; he can hardly make a living, his sufferings are terrible and he is embittered against Hindu society which in spite of its boastful patriotism will not take him back into its fold.[48]

In addition to these major factors which prevented the reintegration of Indians, were considerations such as climate, low wages and the rising cost of living in India. Some tapuhas found that they could not use the village well, others that prospective brides or grooms would not accept their children as marriage partners. Some, finally, had unwisely left their dear ones in the islands. One investigator for the Imperial Citizenship Association (one of the organizations which did voluntary work among returnees) reported that he found among the returnees from Fiji, Trinidad, British Guiana and South Africa "mothers who had left their children behind, wives who came out without their husbands, husbands without wives and they were all clamoring to be reunited with their dear and near ones."[49]

What happened to these unfortunate people? For one thing a number of them returned to various colonies either as reindentured laborers or as free workers called "casuals." The latter paid their own fares. Cumulative statistics concerning either reindentureds or casuals are hard to find but it would be true to say that each year a small number arrived in the colonies; perhaps about 15 percent of the total. During the period 1856 and 1901, for example, about 17 percent or

18,966 immigrants who came to Trinidad were returning reindentureds.[50] Generally the planters tried to discourage returning immigrants since these "seem to assume some sort of control over newcomers and counsel them to defy the authorities."[51] Brahmins and other high caste people were even less desirable since they provided leadership to protesting Indian workers and were considered to be poor laborers.[52]. In 1890, for example, the Planters Association of British Guiana instructed the emigration agent in Calcutta "to exclude all high caste people and Brahmins." Indeed, in 1899 one high caste priest was deported for giving "bad advice" to the Indians.[53]

The rest had to manage as best as they could in the slums of Madras and Calcutta. As time went by, conditions in these slums deteriorated as more and more returnees crowded into them. In 1921, for example, a social worker described Matiaburz in the following way:

> Though, as I have said, I have visited this place frequently, especially during the last three years and a half, never did I see such pitiable scenes as I witnessed this year. Formerly these people could get some employment and they were pulling on somehow but now they are mostly unemployed and this unemployment has brought them on to the verge of starvation ... The lanes through which one has to pass are full of mud and stench. There are pools of stagnant water -- breeding places for mosquitoes and malaria, and consequently a large number of these returned emigrants are often suffering from malarial fever.[54]

In these crowded slums, a number of benevolent people and organizations tried to rehabilitate the returnees.

But they faced a most difficult task. The Indian Emigrants' Friendly Service Committee, for example, was formed with the support of the Bengal administration and with public subscription. There were also the Bombay-based Imperial Citizenship Association, Servants of India, the Indian National Congress and individuals such as C. F. Andrews and Totaram Sanadhya, a former laborer in Fiji. But these groups and persons were able only to scratch the surface of the problem. To their dismay they found that many of these returnees were stoutly refusing to accept employment offered in India. A number of reasonable employment offers were made but the returnees seemed clear in their view that they would go "anywhere, but out of India."[55]

Despite the virtually unemployable nature of some of these returnees efforts continued to be made by the aforementioned bodies regarding their reintegration into native places. Of greater importance, however, was the public campaign conducted in the colonies and in India to end the repatriation of Indians from abroad. For one thing, C. F. Andrews visited the Caribbean in 1929, touring Trinidad, British Guiana and Surinam, successfully converting the leaders of local opinion to an anti-repatriation point of view. He was able to stimulate active debate on the issue.[56] In place of repatriation, Andrews argued, there ought to be a scheme whereby free Indians might be assisted in coming to the

Caribbean.[57] He pressed this scheme for colonization with greater vigor in British Guiana than in Trinidad, possibly because there was more available land there and because since 1919 other similar schemes had been advocated for that colony.[58] In 1919, for example, there was the Nunan-Luckhoo plan for introducing free Indian laborers to British Guiana. By 1922, however, this scheme had collapsed because of financial problems. Again in 1924-26 a similar scheme was devised but this too, collapsed for the same reason.[59] When, therefore, Andrews came in 1929, the talk about a second wave of Indian immigration to the Caribbean was very much in the air.

The failure of these schemes, however, did not dim the enthusiasm of those who were against repatriation. In India public meetings as well as descriptions of the condition of returnees were sent to the colonial press.[60] The Servants of India Society went one step further. In February 1938 its president, Pundit Hirday Nath Kunzru, a member of the Council of State at New Delhi moved a motion requesting the governor-general of India "to urge the authorities concerned to take active steps to facilitate the settlement of Indians on land in British Guiana and to discourage their repatriation to India."[61] The British Guiana East Indian Association, in alluding to this fact, indicated that as far as their investigations went, repatriates were in a "most pitiable" condition:

> Many of them were unable to make two ends meet, and many of them were clamoring for a return to the land of their adoption, owing to the fact that they found themselves in an entirely changed environment, apart from difficulties in obtaining suitable employment.[62]

The association went on to endorse C. F. Andrews' suggestion that a "good stock of yeomen farmers with families" should be sent. "Mr. Andrews' suggestions, therefore, are worthy of the closest attention and scrutiny." But this scheme for colonization was another of those grandiose ideas that never came into being. The Second World War came in 1939 and put a damper on negotiations and in April 1940 Andrews passed away. With his death, concern for the residents of Matiaburz paled before other more urgent matters.

As the independence struggle in India reached its closing stages from the forties, the problems of a relatively small group of displaced persons received very scant attention either from Indian organizations or newspapers. Nor was it taken up by the colonial Indians who were themselves involved in the very real problems of coping with their new homelands. Occasionally there were murmurs from colonial Indians that they wished to be repatriated. In 1940-41, for example, Indians in Jamaica listed a number of grievances and demanded that these be looked into or the Indians be repatriated.[63] But the very paper which carried these demands cautioned against such a tendency:

> It is true that the East Indians here have Indian blood in them and as such their sympathies should and do go to India but they should not close their eyes to the fact that many of them were born in Jamaica, and most of them will spend the rest of their lives here ... It is their duty that they should do their share in improving conditions here and then their rights will be better recognized. Their welfare is more intimately connected with the welfare of Jamaica than with the welfare of India.[62]

Additionally, visiting scholars from India urged West Indian East Indians that their roots lay in the Caribbean rather then in India:

> He emphasized that the East Indians in this community should realize and accept that their roots are irrevocably planted in the West Indies, and that their first allegiance is to the federation and not to the land of their forefathers whose culture they should nevertheless study and attempt to introduce to the New World.[65]

It was stated at the beginning of this essay that just under one-quarter of the Indians who came as indentured laborers made the return voyage to the further shore. The three-quarters who remained in the Caribbean certainly fared better than if they had gone back. In the Caribbean they created their own tradition and culture out of the amalgam of the Northern (Aryan/Muslim) and the Southern (Dravidian) fragments brought here from India. To this a significant Western influence has been added. Indians in the Caribbean continue to speak of an "Indian tradition" but this has become quite different from the Indian tradition of India: both groups refer to the same source but that source is not the same. And the time-distance between the end of indentureship and the present has certainly made the further shore even more remote.

NOTES

[1] Cited in B. D. Sannyasi and B. Chaturvedi, *A Report on the Emigrants Repatriated to India Under the Assisted Emigration Scheme from South Africa and on the Problem of Returned Emigrants from all Colonies* (Calcutta, 1931), p. 3.

[2] CC. 950/777, No. 6024. Memo submitted to Moyne Commission by the Sanatan Dharma Board of Control 19th June 1939, paragraphs 88 and 89.

[3] *Daily Chronicle*, Georgetown 13 February 1929. Also File No. 374/1929 Guyana National Archives for enquiry into deaths on this voyage.

[4] N. V. Rajkumar, *Indians Outside India* (Delhi: All-India Congress, 1951) p. 36.

[5] M. A. Rauf, *Indian Village in Guyana* (Leider: Brill, 1974), p. 107.

[6] I. M. Cumpston, *Indians Overseas in British Territories* (London: Dawsons, 1969) pp. 95, 114.

[7] K. O. Laurence (a) *Caribbean Quarterly* 17:1 (1971): 42-43.
(b) *Immigration into the West Indies in the Nineteenth Century* (Barbados: Caribbean Universities Press, 1971), p. 59.

[8] Laurence, *Caribbean Quarterly*, p. 41.

[9] *The Indian Emigrant* 2:1 (August 1915): 13.

[10] See for example, declaration of Jal Chamar, a returned emigrant from Fiji, before Mr. A. C. Dutt, Presidency Magistrate in Calcutta. Reprinted in *The Indian Emigrant* 2:7 (February 1916): 207.

[11] Reported in *The Indian Emigrant* 3:12 (July 1917): 203

[12] Ibid., 3:10 and 11 (May/June 1917): 188.

[13] Laurence: *Immigration into the West Indies*, p. 58.

[14] C0950/21 Motta, Oppenheimer and Cox to Secretary, Royal Commission, 4 November 1938.

[15] File No. 374/1929. Guyana National Archives.

[16] Rajkumar, p. 36.

[17] *Young India*, 9 September 1926.

[18] T. Ramnarine, "The Growth of the East Indian Community in British Guiana 1880-1920." Ph.D. Thesis, University of Sussex, 1974, p. 108.

[19] See for example CO114/143. Report of Immigration Agent-General: 192/1 3, Georgetown, Guyana. Also CO295/564 for Trinidad figures.

[20] Laurence, *Immigration into the West Indies*, p. 58.

[21] Speech by T. A. Luckhoo, 24 April 1919 reported in *The Indian Emigrant* 6:1 (August 1919) p. 5.

[22] Protector's Report on Emigration from Calcutta, 1913-14. Carried in *The Indian Emigrant* 1:2 (1914): 126.

[23] H. Tinker, *A New System of Slavery* (London: Oxford University 1974), p. 340.

[24] K. H. Gillion, *Fiji's Indian Migrants* (Melbourne: Oxford University, 1962), p. 193-194.

[25] *Young India*, 23 September 1926. Matiaburz was a slum area adjoining Garden Reach, Calcutta from where ships took indentured Indians abroad.

[26] Gillion, p. 196.

[27] Sannyasi and Chaturvedi, p. 10-11.

[28] R. C. Majhumdar, et al. *An Advanced History of India* (London: Macmillan, 1960), p. 212.

[29] Cited in H. Quaritch-Wales, *The Making of Greater India* (London: Quaritch, 1974), p. 27.

[30] Manu was an ancient lawgiver who laid the foundation of the Hindu moral and social order and passed down an elaborate system of regulations. His Smrti or Tradition is often referred to as *The Laws of Manu: A Summary in English* (Madras: Christian Literature Society for India, 1921), p. 126 ff.

[31] V. S. Agarwala, *India as Described by Manu* (Banaras: Prithivi Prakashan, 1970) pp. 5, 6, 20, 21 and 40.

[32] Abbe de Guyon, *A New History of the East Indies* Vol. 1 (London, 1757) p. 272-273. Cited in V. P. Raghuvansi, *Indian Society in the Eighteenth Century* (Delhi: Associated Publishing House, 1969) p. 351.

[33] *Henry IV* (Pt. 1), Act 3, Scene 1.

[34] C. Kondapi, *Indians Overseas* (New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs, 1951), p. 1.

[35] J. Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (New Delhi: Indian Council for Cultural Relations, 1973), p. 54.

[36] E. J. Rapson, *The Cambridge History of India*, Vol. 1 (Delhi, 1908), p. 47.

[37] Raghuvansi, p. 77-78.

[38] Ibid., p. 78.

[39] Ibid., pp. 79-80. This possibly explains why, despite the best efforts of recruiters to debar Brahmins from engaging in indentureship, a number passed through the nets and came to the Caribbean.

[40] Report of Emigration Agent. Calcutta 19 June 1912 in J. & P. 2816, 1912. India Office Archives: London.

[41] C. Jayawardena, *Conflict and Solidarity in a Guianese Plantation* (London: University of London, Athlong Press, 1963), p. 19.

[42] C. F. Andrews and W. Pearson, *Indentured Labour in Fiji* (Allahabad 1916), p. 13.

[43] B. L. Moore, "The Retention of Caste Notions among the Indian Immigrants in British Guiana during the Nineteenth Century," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 19:1 (January 1977): 98 and 106.

[44] See for examples, Sadhu Sundar Singh, *With and Without Christ* (London, 1929) Also, J. W. Netram, *Will India Become Christian?* (New York: R. R. Smith, 1930), p. 124.

[45] *East Indian Weekly* 9, 16, 23 August, 4 October 1930.

[46] Dale Bisnauth, "The East Indian Immigrant Society in British Guiana 1891-1920." Ph.D. Thesis, University of the West Indies (Mona), 1977, p. 507.

[47] H. De Lisser, "Indians in Trinidad." Reprinted in *The Indian Emigrant* 1:10 (May 1915): 370.

[48] C. R. Reddy cited in Appendix XI, p. 45, Sannyasi and Chaturvedi.

[49] S. A. Waiz cited in Sannyasi and Chaturvedi, p. 9.

[50] CO295/402. Enclosure 3 in No. 256 of 17 June 1901. File No 29708, 1911. See also Ramnarine, p. 96.

[51] CO323/597, Report of a Colonial Office Committee on Emigration, enclosed with No. 29708, 1912.

[52] See Jayamardena, p. 18; Moore, p. 97; see also, D. W. Comius, *Note on Emigration from India to British Guiana*, (Calcutta, 1893) p. 79.

[53] Ramnarine, p. 76.

[54] Sannyasi and Chaturvedi, p. 17.

[55] Ibid., p. 8.

[56] For examples, *East Indian Weekly* 26 April 1930; June and 11 July 1931; and 12 March 1932.

[57] Ibid., 31 August 1929.

[58] *Daily Chronicle* (Georgetown, Guyana) 22 May, 15 and 21 June 1929.

[59] James Vining, "Grandiose Schemes for Foreign Colonization in Guyana: A Survey of Their Origin, Provisions and Abandonment," *Caribbean Quarterly* 24:1 and 2 (March - June 1978):p. 78.

[60] *East Indian Weekly*, 5 April 1930, 5 and 12 March 1932.

[61] CO950/673 (1938) Memorandum of British Guiana East Indian Association to Moyne Commission.

[62] Ibid.

[63] *The Indian*, Kingston, Jamaica. October 1940 and May 1941.

[64] Ibid. Editorial, November 1940.

[65] *Daily Gleaner*, Kingston, Jamaica, 8 July 1958. Report of speech by Shri. A. K. Saheb Kalekar visiting member of the Indian Parliament and former vice-chancellor of the National University of Gujarat.

INTERNATIONAL RETURN MIGRATION: SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC DETERMINANTS OF RETURN MIGRATION TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC*

Antonio Ugalde and Thomas C. Langham

Students of international migration have generally studied the out migration and rarely the return flow, an observation made almost 25 years ago by Saloutos[1] that apparently has had little echo among international migration experts. Obviously, one major constraint for the study of return migration is the high cost of identifying the relatively small number of returnees who tend to be widely dispersed. Only very large samples can provide randomness for generalizations. Thus, among the 25,000 households surveyed in the Dominican Republic we located only 715 households with a total of 1,012 international migrants of whom only 39 percent had returned at the time of the survey. It is understandable that the few studies of international return migration have been limited to specific groups such as the study of return professionals by Glaser and Habers,[2] to small samples in some regions for example the work done by Cesare[3] in Southern Italy, or the very unique case of Israel.[4] It should be further noticed that the main interest in the study of international return migration has been the possible effects that the returning migrants might have in the modernization process of their native nations,[5] and seldom the sociodemographic or socioeconomic determinants of the decision to return. In other words, the studies have centered on what might happen after the return and not so much on why migrants return.

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More recently, there has been a number of studies in Europe of what could be characterized as forced return migration. The massive migration of "cheap" labor from less affluent societies to more wealthy nations has been regulated to the extent that international migrants cannot always remain in their new countries or rather their new place of work since frequently labor contracts stipulate a date of return. These contracts provide quantitative information which has stimulated work on return migration.[6] In the United States since the dismissal of the *bracero* program the return of a large number of undocumented migrants has been left to the discretionary power of the Immigration and Naturalization Service which repatriates migrants according to the political and economic needs and/or pressures of dominant groups; thus without the need of contractual provisos, forced return migration is institutionalized in this country. Access to detained migrants at deportation centers facilitates data gathering which in turn allows quantitative analysis of forced return migration. A similar situation can be found in other countries such as Venezuela with undocumented workers from Colombia, but it should be remembered that studies of forced return migration leave out large numbers of migrants who return voluntarily to their country of birth.

In Latin America, and specifically in the case of Latin Americans who return to their native countries after sojourning in the United States, the research on international return migration is practically non-existent with the exception of some studies about Puerto Ricans[7] and the ongoing study of Mexicans by researchers at the Colegio de Mexico.

Undoubtedly, the literature on internal migration can be useful in the study of its international counterpart. Nonetheless, the two have some fundamental differences and extrapolations are to be cautious, and it should also be pointed out that internal return migration is one of the least researched aspects of migration.[8]

The first section in this paper analyzes some sociodemographic determinants of international return migration to the Dominican Republic. In the second part, the paper looks at the characteristics of those migrants who returned because they did not like or had difficulties in adjusting to the way of life in the country of immigration.

SOURCE OF DATA

The source of data for this paper is the Diagnos Survey conducted in 1974 by the Ministry of Public Health of the Dominican Republic. Diagnos is a stratified random-area survey of the entire Dominican Republic with the exception of a few remote and sparsely populated rural regions comprising about 3 percent of the country's population. The questionnaire was administered to each person in 25,000 households with a total of approximately 125,000 individuals. For sampling, the country was divided into rural and urban areas, population centers with fewer than 2,000 inhabitants being considered rural. With the assistance of aerial photographs, the survey team stratified the urban areas into poor, middle and upper classes on the basis of housing density and spatial location. For this study, we ran internal consistency checks between this categorization and literacy, education, occupation, characteristics of the household, use of electricity, piped water, and the presence of household appliances. The internal consistency was so high that we decided not to construct an SES scale, but rather to use the Diagnos stratification categories. The upper class was oversampled to insure a sufficiently large representation, and a weight factor was calculated and added to each record to correct this overrepresentation and expand the Diagnos sample to the entire population of the country. The appendix attached to this paper compares some sociodemographic characteristics of the Diagnos population with the 1970 Dominican Census and can provide a sense of reliability of Diagnos.

Diagnos included a battery of questions about members of the household who at any time had traveled overseas and had remained there for more than one year. Thus, short visits to relatives, business and pleasure trips were excluded. It also excluded those migrants who had returned to the Dominican Republic before the end of the first year of migration because of migration failure, deportation or any other reason. Specifically, the questionnaire contains information about social class, sex, relation of migrants to head of his/her household, physical characteristics of the dwelling, age and occupation at time of migration, year and country of immigration, reasons for migration, place of residence at time of survey, and in the case of return migrants the reasons for returning and year of return. Additionally, the survey contains the following information about heads of household who are migrants and spouses who are migrants: place of birth, marital status, number of children, occupation at time of survey, place of residence five years ago, literacy and education, age and a battery of questions dealing with morbi-mortality and fertility.

In the 25,000 households surveyed there were a total of 1,012 migrants. After expanding these figures by the weight factor we have information on 50,178 migrants, 11,531 of whom are heads of households and 6,688 are spouses. Migrant heads and migrant spouses are not necessarily members of the same household, in some cases the spouse is the only one to migrate. About 39 percent of Dominican migrants or a total of 19,583 had spent at least one year overseas and returned to the island by the time of the survey, of these 7,765 were heads of households and 3,765 were spouses. For purposes of comparing migrants to the rest of the population, a 2,000 random subsample of households without migrants was also drawn from Diagnos. When expanded by the weight factor, this subsample provides information on 154,314 households and 738,006 individuals. Throughout the rest of this report the expanded figures will be used and, unless otherwise indicated, smaller N's in the tables are the result of missing data.

It should be noticed that the survey could not identify entire migrant households and consequently, we do not have a random sample of the entire international migration flow but only of migrants who were attached to a household in the Dominican Republic at the time of the survey in 1974. It should also be kept in mind that some international migration is often characterized by a back and forth movement, migrants returning to their country of origin only to migrate again a few months or years later. Diagnos only gives us information at one point in the life history of the migrant, and this is indeed a limitation. However, given the large size of the survey, the relatively large number of return migrants and the few quantitative studies of international return migration, Diagnos provides some useful information for an exploratory and descriptive analysis of this phenomenon.

DETERMINANTS OF RETURN MIGRATION

With the exception of the work by Kayal,[9] all other studies of Dominicans in the United States[10] have affirmed that they are of peasant and low income urban origins. Contrary to this view, an earlier report based on Diagnos data[11] found the Dominican migrants to be primarily urbanites, mostly from Santo Domingo, of middle class extraction, highly literate (96 percent), well-educated (31 percent have some university training), young at migration (with 83 percent having migrated before the age of 40) and fairly evenly distributed by sex (53 percent males, see Table 1). The occupational structure of migrants corresponds to these social traits. The large majority of international migrants from the Dominican Republic went to the United States (71 percent) and Puerto Rico (19 percent), and the rest were divided among other American states (6 percent) and Europe (3 percent).

TABLE 1
INTERNATIONAL DOMINICAN MIGRANTS BY SOCIAL STRATA
DIAGNOS SURVEY, 1974 (PERCENTAGES)

		Urban				
Migrants	Rural	Lower	Middle	Upper	Total	(n)
All migrants	24	17	51	8	100	49,953
Migrants except student migrants	12	17	59	12	100	40,467
Household heads who migrated to U.S. and Puerto Rico	14	17	61	8	100	9,094
Non-migrants	52	28	18	2	100	738,006

That the few studies about the Dominican migration to the United States have only looked at the outflow is in our opinion an important oversight for policy decisions, for we have found that a relatively high number of migrants, about 39 percent, return. In fact, return migration has continued to increase since at least 1960 while net migration peaked in 1970 and then began to decline (see Table 2). Probably, the increasing number of returnees corresponds to the increasing number of deportable aliens found by INS after the passage of the U.S. 1968 Immigration Law, in other words, forced return migration appears to be on the increase. However, given the socio-demographic characteristics of return migrants, it is our opinion that there is still a substantial amount of voluntary return migration.

TABLE 2
NET INTERNATIONAL OUTMIGRATION FROM
THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. DIAGNOS SURVEY, 1974

Years	Outmigration	Return Migration	Net Migration Yearly Averages
Before 1950	2,528	1,227	--
1951-1960	3,641	395	325
1961-1965	9,358	2,007	1,470
1966-1970	21,685	6,419	3,053
1971-1973	12,552	8,604	1,316

As indicated in Table 3, 20 percent of the migrants who returned did so at the termination of their studies, 7 percent when they felt that they had saved sufficient and 19 percent because they did not like the way of life, that we interpret as having difficulties in adapting to the new society. Unfortunately, 54 percent of the responses were in the category of "other" and were not coded. We suspect that here are included deportable aliens and many who return for family reasons and/or accompanying spouses or parents. According to Table 3 most of those who migrated for reasons of studying returned at the end of their studies (76 percent), a finding that supports the research by Glaser and Nabers,[12] according to whom most students from less developed countries in industrial nations intend to go back home after the completion of their training. Specifically, 75 percent of the foreign students in the United States indicated that they would definitely or probably return home at the end of their studies.

TABLE 3
REASONS FOR RETURNING BY REASONS FOR MIGRATIONS
DIAGNOS SURVEY, 1974, (PERCENTAGES)

Reasons for Returning	Unemployed	More Money	Study	Join Kin	Other	Total
Studies ended	2	2	75	1	3	20
Saved money	13	20	0	1	0	7
Didn't like way of life	29	30	7	16	5	19
Other	56	48	18	82	92	54
	100	100	100	100	100	100
(n)	3,800	4,347	4,083	3,916	2,355	18,501

Where do return migrants go back to? About 55 percent reside in the capital city Santo Domingo, the rest are evenly divided between other urban and rural areas (22 and 23 percent respectively), 3 percent of the latter are in the rural zone of the National District and can for all practical purposes be considered suburban residents of Santo Domingo. The selection of residence seems to correspond closely to the residence migrants had at the time of departure.

Table 4 presents the rates of return by selected sociodemographic variables. The following analysis can be made from the Table: (1) There is no variance by sex, a fact that is consistent with Lee's[13] data on U.S. internal return migration; (2) Return rates are lower for rural than for urban migrants, however, migrants born in rural areas have higher rates than those born in urban areas, and within the urban areas those born in Santo Domingo experience higher rates of return than those born in other towns or cities. There is no contradiction in these findings, because since World War II there has been a large rural/urban migration in the Dominican Republic. Most of this migration has flown to Santo Domingo the primary city, and our hypothesis is that international migrants who had first experienced rural/urban migration are more likely to return; to say it differently, multiple migration movements enhance the possibility of international return; (3) For urban migrants social class is an important predictor of returning, the higher the social class the higher the rate of return. A similar relation was found by DaVanzo[14] for internal migrants in the United States. His findings were based on previous research by Lansing and Miller[15] according to whom internal return migration is more responsive to nonmonetary factors such as family, climate, and we can add for international migrants culture and language. DaVanzo concluded that it was easier for the wealthier classes to afford the nonmonetary attractions of return migration; (4) Lower income groups left the Dominican Republic more often than the upper classes in search of better economic conditions, consequently, it follows from the above discussion that those who migrated for unemployment and higher incomes have considerably lower return rates than those who migrated for other reasons, a hypothesis that is confirmed in Table 4; (5) In regard to the country of immigration, the lowest rate of return is for migrants to the United States, and surprisingly, there is no difference between migrants to Puerto Rico and other American states; (6) Rates of return tend to decrease with age at migration but the differences are not very marked and can be accounted for by the higher rate of return found among students (who generally are in young age groups). We can conclude that among labor migrants there is little variance by age, a conclusion already reached by Lee,[16] whose data also tend to refute the idea that return migration "is a phenomenon of retirement;" (7) As mentioned earlier, very few migrants are illiterate and the rate of return for illiteracy is based on a very small N, however, that a lower percentage of illiterates than literates return is consistent with our data for class and place of residence.

TABLE 4

RATE OF RETURNS OF INTERNATIONAL DOMINICAN MIGRANTS BY SELECTED SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS. DIAGNOS SURVEY, 1974

SEX		Male	Female			
		39	39			
	(n)	(27,566)	(24,143)			
ZONE OF RESIDENCE		Rural	Urban			
		22	47			
	(n)	(11,799)	(38,154)			
PLACE OF BIRTH*			Urban			
		Rural	Total	Santo Domingo	Other Urban	
		81	68	75	45	
	(n)	(4,284)	(6,809)	(5,904)	(905)	
SOCIAL CLASS URBAN ONLY		Lower	Middle	Upper		
		32	42	80		
	(n)	(8,247)	(25,770)	(4,137)		
REASONS FOR MIGRATION		Unemployment	In Search of Higher Income	Study	Join Relatives	Other
		26	29	54	57	68
	(n)	(14,826)	(14,826)	(8,895)	(6,919)	(3,459)
COUNTRY OF MIGRATION		U.S.	Puerto Rico	Other American	Europe	
		35	43	44	77	
	(n)	(32,304)	(8,735)	(3,054)	(1,491)	
AGE AT MIGRATION		-20	21-39	40-54	55+	
		40	38	37	32	
	(n)	(15,558)	(26,706)	(5,923)	(2,382)	
LITERACY*		Yes	No			
		67	57			
	(n)	(9,878)	(411)			

*Only for migrants who are heads of households and for migrants who are spouses.

As could be expected occupations associated with higher social classes tend to have higher return rates, but the important finding from Table 5 is that within classes occupations appear to be an important predictor of return migration. There are noticeable differences between professionals including physicians and other occupations of middle and upper class status such as managers, administrators, teachers and nurses. Similarly, differences are also pronounced between transportation, craft and sales workers who have relatively high rates of return and farm, service, construction and industrial workers with low returns. Military personnel is a very special case, and the low rate of return for this group probably responds to the political nature of their migration during the turbulent years that followed the assassination of Dictator Trujillo in 1961.

At this state of knowledge it is not possible to formulate hypotheses to explain the differences caused by occupation, but tentatively, the following comments can be advanced: other things being equal, differences in status, opportunities, and income between the country of origin and the country of destination could in part explain why workers in some occupations decide to stay or to return. For example, it is well known that nurses in the Dominican Republic compared to the United States have a relatively low status, and it is also known that

TABLE 5
RATES OF RETURN OF INTERNATIONAL DOMINICAN MIGRANTS BY OCCUPATION. DIAGNOS SURVEY, 1974

Occupation*	Rates	Rank	(n)
Religious workers	100	1	151
Professionals**	65	2	1,555
Physicians	64	3	994
Teachers	49	4	2,406
Managers and administrators	49	4	2,406
Transportation workers	44	6	1,826
Craft workers	39	7	1,701
Salespersons	38	8	481
Office workers	32	9	4,227
Machine operators	32	9	1,995
Nurses and other health workers	29	11	728
Farm workers	28	12	1,750
Artists	28	12	247
Service workers	27	14	2,677
Construction workers	13	15	1,082
Military personnel	11	16	1,631
Industrial and manufacturing workers	7	17	573

*Occupation at the time of migration. Occupation categories based on the revised 1960 COTA used for the 1970 census of the Americas.

**Excluding physicians, teachers, nurses and other health workers.

the shortage of nurses in this country creates an employment demand, it is understandable that under these conditions few nurses return to the Dominican Republic. Status differences are less marked for other professions, at the same time some professionals with formal or on the job training in the United States are in high demand in the Dominican Republic. Similarly, there are ample job employment opportunities for foreign workers in the United States construction industry, while opportunities for salespersons are more confined to the

Hispano neighborhoods. Income differences between the two countries exist for all occupations, however, the differences are more pronounced for some occupations than for others. For example, Dominican managers and administrators frequently are in businesses serving the Hispano population[17] and the wealth generated from these businesses could be several times higher than what could be earned in similar businesses in the Dominican Republic. Finally, each occupation has some peculiarities of its own. The case of the military has already been mentioned. It can be suggested that undocumented transportation workers are more prone to apprehension and deportation than other workers.

RETURN MIGRATION AND MALADJUSTMENT

It has been indicated earlier that 19 percent of the migrants who returned to the Dominican Republic did so because they did not like the way of life or could not adjust to the country of immigration. Maladjustment is not always equivalent to migration failure, an aspect of return migration studied by some researchers,[18] for a migrant could be successful and unhappy at the same time, only when the benefits of success stop compensating for the inconveniences will he return.

Table 6 presents rates of maladjustment among returning migrants for selected sociodemographic variables. From the Table we can make the following observations: (1) males are more likely than females to experience maladjustment, the subservient nature of Dominican women might in part explain the difference. On the other hand, males born in rural areas have considerably more problems than males born in urban areas, a situation that is reversed for females, an intriguing finding that merits further investigation. In regard to place of residence, there is no difference between urban and rural males, but once more, urban females show a much higher rate of maladjustment than rural women. It is also worth noting that females who are heads of households have significantly lower rates of maladjustment than male heads and female spouses; (2) younger migrants tend to adjust better to the receiving society, after the age of 21 this variable has little effect, and for the young the difference can probably be explained by the fact that for many of them the migration move was impermanent by intent (returning home after the end of studies); (3) contrary to our expectations, social class is not an important determinant, the rates between lower and middle classes are similar, and somewhat lower for the upper classes; (4) literacy does not have any effect on maladjustment (the rates are 19 percent for literates and 20 for illiterates), however, rates of maladjustment by number of years of education has a bell-shape form with a low for those with no education (predominantly rural females), a high for those with high school, and a low for migrants with college education. The supereducated, migrants with more than 16 years of formal education rarely have problems of maladjustment; (5) those who migrated for economic reasons and return did so for difficulties in adjusting; and (6) contrary to what could have been anticipated, there is no difference in rates of maladjustment between migrants who return from the United States and those who return from Puerto Rico. The high rates for these two countries contrast with low rates for Europe and other American states, the difference can be explained by the fact that many migrants to Europe and other American states are impermanent by intent (studying, business) while for the United States and Puerto Rico migration was for economic reasons.

Occupation is also an important variable in predicting maladjustment. Maladjustment is high in occupations as different as farming and administration/management, almost half of the migrants in these two occupations who return do so because of maladjustment. Service workers, many of whom are domestic servants and craftsmen follow in the upper ranks of Table 7, and at the bottom of the table we find professionals, very few of whom base the decision to return on problems of maladjustment.

We can only present some tentative and preliminary explanations for the differences caused by employment. Difficulties in adjusting to the country

TABLE 6

RETURN MIGRANTS. RATES OF MALADJUSTMENT IN COUNTRY OF IMMIGRATION BY SELECTED SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS. DIAGNOS SURVEY, 1974

SEX		Male	Female					
		22	16					
	(n)	(10,179)	(9,404)					
ZONE OF BIRTH*		Rural			Urban			
		Male		Female	Male		Female	
		30	22	13	18	19	21	
	(n)	(3,540)		(3,269)	(2,594)		(1,690)	
ZONE OF RESIDENCE		Rural			Urban			
		Male		Female	Male		Female	
		19	10	0	20	19	17	
	(n)	(1,438)		(1,162)	(8,741)		(8,241)	
SOCIAL CLASS URBAN ONLY		Lower	Middle	Upper				
		18	20	15				
	(n)	(2,623)	(10,926)	(3,458)				
AGE AT MIGRATION		-15	16-20	21-29	40-54	55+		
		10	12	22	24	23		
	(n)	(3,231)	(2,938)	(10,156)	(2,191)	(762)		
COUNTRY OF DESTINATION		U.S.	Puerto Rico	Europe	Other American			
		21	22	7	4			
	(n)	(11,284)	(3,710)	(1,052)	(1,344)			
YEARS OF EDUCATION COMPLETED*		None	1-5	6-11	12-15	16+		
		16	23	25	17	7		
	(n)	(492)	(2,251)	(3,890)	(2,297)	(1,783)		
REASONS FOR MIGRATION		Unemployment	Make More Money	Study	Relatives	Other		
		29	30	7	16	5		
	(n)	(3,800)	(4,347)	(4,083)	(3,916)	(2,355)		
POSITION IN HOUSEHOLD		Head		Spouse	Child		Other	
		Male	Female	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
		23	11	20	20	17	19	6
	(n)	(6,147)	(1,608)	(3,682)	(1,879)	(2,379)	(1,020)	(786)

*Only for migrants who are heads of household and for migrants who are spouses.

TABLE 7
RETURN MIGRANTS. RATES OF MALADJUSTMENT IN COUNTRY OF IMMIGRATION BY OCCUPATION AT TIME OF MIGRATION. DIAGNOS SURVEY, 1974

Occupation	Rate	Rank	(n)
Farmers	43	1	497
Managers and administrators	42	2	1,225
Service workers	37	3	715
Craftsmen	36	4	606
Office workers	23	5	1,369
Machine operators	22	7	608
Transport workers	21	7	805
Professionals	12	8	2,088
All other occupations	8	9	693

of immigration might increase as the manner or form in which the work is carried out varies between the country of origin and the receiving society. For example, traditional farming in the Dominican Republic contrasts with highly mechanized agriculture in the United States. Legal, ethical and cultural variations between the two countries are pronounced in business practices. It is the competition and interaction with supppliers, who unlike clients tend not to be Hispanics, which creates unpleasant pressures for Dominican entrepreneurs in the United States. Most likely, these problems are considerably reduced in the work setting of professionals. While we can advance these interpretations, a better understanding of the relation between work and maladjustment requires more specific research on the topic.

CONCLUSIONS

By the way of summary, and taking into account that our conclusions should be taken with caution because our data exclude migrants who returned before the end of the first year of residence overseas, and also those migrants who had returned and migrated again, we can suggest that place of residence and birth, social class and occupation are important predictors of migration return. Sex, age at migration and reasons for migration appear to be of very limited importance. Multiple migratory experiences increase the probability of returning. International migrants who were born in the countryside and migrated to Santo Domingo and belong to the middle and upper classes will tend to return. Rural and poor urban migrants in occupations with high occupational opportunities in the United States will tend to stay.

In regard to returning as a result of problems of adjusting in the country of immigration, sex, reasons for migration and occupation are important determinants of return while social class, zone of birth, and age at migration are poor predictors.

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RETURN MIGRATION FROM THE UNITED STATES TO COSTA RICA AND EL SALVADOR

Guy Poitras

This paper originates from the conviction that, no matter how significant Mexican immigration to the United States may be, research and policy based upon North-South migration in the Western Hemisphere must rest upon a considerably broader base. Mexican migration to the United States both in absolute and relative terms is important for comprehending migration of Hispanic peoples and the studies which have emerged have helped to define the phenomenon with respect to the composition, flow, behavior and impact of return migrants.[1] But it also seems to be the case that Mexican migration to the United States has been transformed into a major crucible in bilateral relations between these two neighboring countries. Adjusting of quotas and perhaps a temporary worker program, extended to Mexico but perhaps not to other countries, certainly reflect the elevated priorities these and related bilateral issues now seem to have.[2] However, if a broader view of international migration has any validity, then the matter of Mexican migration to the United States must be integrated into a more comprehensive regard for this social and economic phenomenon between the South and the North. Central America, the Caribbean and other subregions of Latin America cannot be safely ignored, either as research or as policy in the area of international return migration.[3]

This paper is only the first of several reports based on a binational research project which attempts to redress this oversight. Central America is a fertile and largely unexplored setting for broadening the data base on international return migration within the Western Hemisphere and certainly provides an opportunity for putting Mexican migration studies into a more expansive, not to mention more comparative context. The five Central American republics all exhibit the symptoms common to many labor exporting countries in the Third World. Some, such as Guatemala and El Salvador, fit the pattern more closely than others. All of the republics to some extent manifest high rates of population growth, economic growth, income and employment problems and proximity to labor importing countries like the United States.[4] Moreover, intraregional mobility is a matter of common knowledge. Nicaraguans go to Costa Rica; Salvadoreans go to Honduras or on to Mexico. In addition to all this, recent political developments raise the spectre of ominous trends. Nicaragua is submerged in civil war and its future directions become ambiguous. El Salvador throughout most of 1979 seems about to be overtaken by events. Civil war and political instability seem at least likely if not guaranteed.[5] Central America, then, fits the profile of a supplying region. And the drift of recent developments may heighten the patterns of international conflict, with some expected impact on migration of peoples.

BACKGROUND

Costa Rica and El Salvador were selected as two countries in Central America which could be used to broaden the data base on the composition, flow, behavior and impact of return migrants to the United States. The choice of these two was affected by several factors. The first was a concern for using national sampling of migrants which makes it impossible to generalize about all kinds of return migrants. We felt that it was both necessary, and indeed feasible, to design a national sampling framework that would make it possible to overcome some of these difficulties. By using national household samples for Costa Rica and El Salvador, we created national samples for return migrants.[6] They include not only segments from the major metropolitan area of both countries but from areas with smaller towns and rural composition. In addition to the sampling, there were logistical advantages too. This is a binational project. Trinity University in San Antonio and the National University of Costa Rica in Heredia created

TABLE 1
SELECTED DATA COMPARING COSTA RICA AND EL SALVADOR

	El Salvador	Costa Rica
Population in millions (1978)	4.3	2.1
Population in millions (2000)	8.1	3.2
% increase (1978-2000)	86.9	53.6
1976 birth rate per 1000	40.2	29.7
1976 death rate per 1000	7.5	4.6
Rate of natural increase (%)	3.2	2.5
Doubling times in years	21.0	28.0
Population under 15 years of age in % (1978)	46.4	41.1
GPN per capita in $ (1976)	490	1040
Average annual growth of GNP per capita (1960-1976)	1.8	3.4
Urban population as % of total	37.0	39.8
Students as % of all, 7-13 years	78.6	100.5
Students as % of all, 14-19 years	31.0	49.5
Students as % of all, 20-24 years	7.0	16.5
Illiteracy as % of all those over 15 years of age	43.1	11.6
Economically active as % of total population	37.0	31.3
Agricultural and related work as % of total population economically active	46.6	36.4

Sources: Interagency Task Force on Immigration Policy, *Staff Report* Washington, D.C.: Departments of Justice, Labor and State, March 1979); James Wilkie (ed.), *Statistical Abstract of Latin America*, Vol. 19 (Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center, 1978).

a joint enterprise to study return migration. Guy Poitras, of the Border Research Institute at Trinity University, conceived, designed and acquired funding for the project; Carlos Denton and Marcos Bogan of the Population Research Institute at the National University supervised and carried out the field work under an agreement with Trinity. The final reason for selecting Costa Rica and El Salvador was curiosity. Most studies of international return migration look at migration from the sending country to the receiving country. We thought it would be not only interesting but advantageous to do something different, to compare the return migration from *two* countries to a third country. Costa Rica and El Salvador offered a unique opportunity to compare and contrast migrants from two countries with demographic, economic, social as well as political similarities and differences.

The concerns of the project are those of other studies with a policy interest. Therefore, the instrument included standardized items for both samples which sought to delve into the demographic, economic, social and legal dimensions of the migratory experience. Questions consequently dealt with the standard demographic data and also with work histories and residential patterns. They also dealt with how the migrant went to the United States and the motivations behind the trip(s). Also of concern was the experience of the return migrant in the United States. Particular stress was placed upon any work experiences the migrant might have had. The earnings, occupation, hours, taxes and services of the migrant were particularly important to the study. Although difficult to define, the impact of the experience on the migrant, the United States and the home country was of principal interest in the study. The findings concerning these matters are beyond the scope of this paper but not beyond that of our concerns for policy-oriented research on return migrants.

The national samples of return migrants were created in early and late 1979. The size of the samples varied slightly, with 314 in the Costa Rican sample and 259 in the Salvadorean sample. We were guided by several criteria for inclusion within the migrant samples. First, the respondent had to be an adult (about 18 years of age or older). Second, he or she had to have made at least one trip to the United States. Third, this trip, or trips, had to have been made within a fixed time period of ten years, between 1969 and 1979. Lastly, the migrant must have remained within the United States for a minimum period of time. Those who stayed less than one month on a trip were not included in the sample. With this foundation laid for the survey research, the fieldwork began in August 1979 and was concluded by December 1979.

GOALS

No one these days is surprised about the mounting significance of return migration at the international level. If financial capital is increasingly transferred throughout an interdependent network of state and nonstate actors, then it is only to be expect- that human capital would be mobile at the same level. The Costa Ricans and the Salvadoreans make up a small part of this vast and mobile mass of humanity. But they may also be understood at a micro level. As sojourners, the Costa Rican and Salvadorean migrants must calculate the relative costs and benefits of crossing national boundaries to achieve personal goals within the structure of the international political economy. This structure shapes and limits their calculations. The room for individual choice is made possible by an international, and not just a national, context.

The phenomenon is obviously quite complex. It deserves the attention it seems to be receiving. Yet our goals here must remain more modest. They reflect the need to present for the first time in a straightforward and descriptive fashion some of the basic findings concerning return migration from the United States to Costa Rica and El Salvador. To do this requires that we make an assumption. The assumption is that the movements to the United States and from the United States to the home countries are not separate events. They must be studied as stages within a process which can attain a momentum of its own. The decision to migrate to the United States is related to the decision to return. We must therefore keep this in mind as one interprets and reflects upon the data we offer below.

Specifically, the goals here are to describe the personal and demographic characteristics of both samples of return migrants, to describe the patterns of migration to the United States and, finally, to examine the return of the migrants to their home countries. In stating a broad overview of these goals, comparisons will be drawn not only between the two groups of return migrants, where appropriate, but between the return migrants of this study and those of other studies dealing with Mexican and other Latin American migrants.

WHO ARE THE RETURN MIGRANTS?

Profiles of return migrants from Mexico and other Latin American countries alerted us to what might be expected of the migrants in this study. These profiles have lead to conclusions about not only who these people are but what their role and impact are in the migratory process. Unfortunately, the profiles of migrants in some studies are greatly affected by the unusual methods for sampling them. Cornelius has developed a well known profile of the undocumented Mexican worker who migrates (temporarily of course) to the

United States. But this profile is based largely upon the sampling of a particular type of return migrant who works in seasonal agriculture and comes from rural areas which have traditionally supplied braceros and other workers to the United States.[7] That is not the only profile available of course. By shifting from the rural areas of central Mexico to the urbanized factory towns, a colleague has developed a profile of the urban Mexican worker which is quite at odds with the rural profile.[8] Whatever the characteristics of each type of return migrant from Mexico, or from elsewhere, these and other studies have lead to expectations about the return migrant from Costa Rica and El Salvador. We expected broad similarities in some respects and more specific differences in other respects. And this is what in fact materialized.

The first broad similarity between the two samples of return migrants is that they tend to be males. Of the two groups, however, the Costa Ricans have a larger proportion of males than do the Salvadoreans. In general, this conforms to the findings of undocumented Mexican migrants if not to the findings of other Latin American migrants. The first major difference between the two groups is marital status. The Costa Ricans tend to be married while the Salvadoreans are less likely to be. Still, if legally married and common law migrants are taken together, the Salvadoreans who have some form of familial obligations equal 47 percent of all the migrants. Differences in marital status notwithstanding, the two groups of migrants as a whole average about the same number of children. Another point of comparison is age. The Costa Ricans are somewhat older on average than are the Salvadoreans. Both groups are in general older than undocumented Mexicans and, since only adults 18 years of age or older are included in the sample, they are far older in years than the general populations of their respective nations. Approximately 69 percent of the Salvadoreans are in their twenties and thirties; slightly more than 60 percent of the Costa Rican migrants are. Sex, marital status and age serve as initial comparisons in the two samples (see Table 2). And it is interesting to note that the Costa Ricans more closely resemble the undocumented Mexicans by sex but that the Salvadoreans more closely resemble the Mexicans by marital status and age.

Education, as measured by years of formal schooling, is another standard characteristic by which to help define and compare the return migrants. On the average, the Costa Ricans have slightly more education than do Salvadoreans. They have also experienced greater educational mobility as indicated by the difference between their father's and their own years of schooling. If intervals are defined for years of formal

TABLE 2
MEAN (X) DIFFERENCES OF SELECT
CHARACTERISTICS FROM THE TWO SAMPLES

	El Salvador	Costa Rica
% male	54.8	77.7
% married	37.8	62.1
Age in years	30.8	33.3
Father's education in years	7.5	7.2
Migrant's education in years	10.1	10.8
Parent's children	4.4	6.8
Migrant's children	1.7	1.8
Places lived as a youth	1.3	1.6
Places lived as an adult	1.1	1.5
Children of migrant in school	0.9	0.7
Dependents (other than children)	0.9	0.4
% speaking English well or very well	22.4	46.8

education some interesting differences emerge from the two groups of migrants. While 20.1 percent of the Costa Ricans completed six years or less, the Salvadoreans had relatively fewer, or 10.8 percent, complete just six years or less. The Salvadoreans are less likely to drop out early. The modal interval for the Salvadoreans was for seven to eleven years of schooling. The vast majority of Salvadoreans stopped at this interval. However, about two out of every five Costa Rican migrants went beyond the eleventh year of schooling;

only 27 percent of the Salvadoreans did. Education may be an indicator of success as a working migrant in the United States; so may be fluency in English. The higher levels of education and the higher levels of proficiency in English among the Costa Ricans are important for understanding their migratory experience to the United States. In this respect, they resemble other Latin American migrants or even Eastern Hemisphere migrants to the United States. The Salvadoreans, on the other hand, more closely resemble the undocumented Mexicans.

The families, dependents and mobility of the migrants warrant brief mention as well. Both groups average about the same number of children, although it is unlikely that either group of migrants has no procreative future at their ages. The Costa Rican migrants come from larger families than did the Salvadoreans. They also have slightly larger families of their own. Still, the Salvadoreans have at least partial responsibility for supporting more dependents (other than their own children) than do the Costa Ricans. It should be kept in mind that these differences, taken as a whole, are not great. Another point of comparison is the geographical mobility of the migrants within their own countries. It was assumed that those who were more mobile, either as adults or as children, would be more mobile internationally as well.

Neither group of migrants was very mobile, as it turns out. For whatever reason -- the small size of both countries, the concentration of most people in one major metropolitan area -- the histories of internal migration appear to be relatively unimportant. Still, both as children and as adults, the Costa Rican migrants tend to be more mobile geographically than do the Salvadoreans.

Profiles of both samples of migrants emerge from these preliminary observations. Put briefly, the Costa Ricans are more inclined to be males in their thirties or late twenties. They are fairly well educated. They tend to be married and are fairly mobile. The Salvadorean migrants tend to be males in their twenties. They are less mobile, more likely to be single and come from families with, and tend to have, fewer children.

GOING NORTH

The standard assertion in much of the Mexican literature on migration to the United States is that undocumented migrants shuttle back and forth between their homes in central Mexico and their jobs in the United States. The migrants make frequent sojourns of rather brief duration rather than one trip which involves a more lengthy stay. To the extent that this finding is based upon sampling of rural workers who are tied to the periodicity of agricultural seasons, it probably is valid. Mexican migrants who do not fit this profile may behave differently. For example, urban factory workers in Mexico will tend to arrive in the United States intending to stay longer in large United States cities. Whatever the presumed pattern in Mexican migration, the question for us here is to determine to what extent the Costa Rican and Salvadorean migrants resemble the Mexicans in this respect. Since they are not tied to agriculture, the migrants from Central America might be expected to be different from the rural Mexican migrant. We also want to know more about their actual movement north toward the United States. What are their routes, and how direct are they, for coming to the United States? What is their legal status at time of entry? What was the principal reason offered by the migrants for going to the United States? Given the complexity of individual motives, how does this compare with actual, reported behavior (work or no work, etc.) during their stay within the United States. It will become apparent in this section that neither the Costa Rican nor the Salvadorean migrants entirely fit the Mexican model. There are differences between the two migrant groups as well. Broad similarities do however emerge from the findings reported here.

The two groups of migrants average more than one trip to the United States. But the Costa Ricans have travelled even more, averaging more than two trips. The stay of both groups in the United States is more lengthy than the Mexican visits. Although it is not entirely evident why this is the case, the longer stays may be due to greater cost, greater distance and the kind of work experience they seem to have. In any event, the Salvadoreans stayed an average of 18.2 months; the Costa Ricans even longer, or 25.1 months. The duration of the stay is important to the migrants themselves and to the countries involved. Longer stays imply perhaps a different impact on all concerned and they certainly make more likely the possibility that the migrant may not travel alone.

This relation between duration of stay and companionship on the trip should not be overstated. But there is limited support for it in our findings. Migration for a temporary but undefined length of time may place strains on the social fabric of the migrant's family. It would therefore be easier on the migrant if familial responsibilities were minimal. Yet these burdens may in fact be a principal cause of the migrant's sojourn in the first place. If the migrant does have a family, he or she faces a painful dilemma: separation from the family or the cost and risk of having them accompany the migrant. Most Salvadoreans resolved the dilemma, at least in the beginning, by not taking anyone with them on their trip to the United States. Of course, they were the least likely to be married any way. But neither were the Salvadorians inclined to accompany anyone or to send for someone once they had arrived in the United States. The Costa Rican migrants were less inclined to resolve the dilemma in this particular way. Since they stayed longer in the United States and were more likely to have families, it is less surprising to find that 42.2 percent of them went to the United States alone but that 37.8 percent brought their immediate family members with them. In conclusion then, both groups of migrants tended to go alone on their temporary migrations but the Costa Ricans were more likely to resemble the non-Mexican Latin migrants of the North and Houstoun study who stayed longer and had family with them.[9] The Salvadoreans were more like the Mexicans.

Mexicans, with or without documents, will enter the United States by traveling through the border. But how do the Costa Ricans and the Salvadoreans go to the United States? There seem to be fairly well demarcated routes of entry to the United States for these two groups of migrants. The two samples share the feature of direct travel to the United States. A majority of the Salvadoreans and the Costa Ricas claimed that they went directly to the United States without stopping more than twelve hours in a third country on the way north. Still there is clear difference between the two groups in the sense that the Salvadoreans were more likely to arrive in the United States by way of Mexico. No less than thirty-four percent went north through Mexico. On their way back home, Mexico was not as important.

Only 6.6 percent of the Salvadoreans stopped there on the return trip, pointing to the possibility that the route of the Salvadoreans through Mexico is linked to their legal status at the time of entry. They of course would not need to use Mexico for such a purpose on their way back to El Salvador. Their point of entry tended to be the Los Angeles-San Diego corridor. It is another matter for the Costa Ricans, however. Mexico plays virtually no role in their entry to the United States. They tend to enter directly and with papers at a point of entry such as Miami, New York or Los Angeles.

This research, and other studies which may have inspired it, takes account of the legal and policy dimensions of return migration not because U.S. immigration policy is necessarily in tune with or adequate for the kind of international migration we know exists. Policy may not stop or even effectively regulate return migration but it does have an impact on the migrants themselves. This is clearly the case if we wish to understand the differences between the Costa Rican and the Salvadorean migrants and how they came to the United States. Only 1 percent of the Costa Ricans came to the United States without some kind of visa but 41 percent of the Salvadoreans did. The Costa Ricans were overwhelmingly "legal" at their time of entry; 60 percent of the Salvadoreans were. Legal status at entry is therefore different for both groups of migrants and this status may have had an effect on the degree of directness of the route chosen to migrate to the United States.

TABLE 3
STATUS OF MIGRANTS FROM EL SALVADOR AND COSTA RICA AT TIME OF ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES*

Status by Visa	El Salvador (259)	Costa Rica (314)
Immigrant	2.3 %	21.0 %
Student	9.7	18.8
Tourist	39.8	52.2
H-2 (temporary worker)	5.8	3.5
Border card	0.8	0.1
Commuter	---	1.3
Entry without inspection	41.7	1.0
Crew card	---	1.0
Diplomatic visa	---	1.0
	100.0	100.0

*No attempt was made in the survey research of this study to determine if the documents used by the migrants of either sample were valid, genuine or properly used.

The *prima facie* indication is that the Costa Ricans and the Salvadoreans both tended to be legal at time of entry more than the Mexican migrants portrayed in other studies. But a less limited perspective on this movement northward would be more revealing. To make this possible, we inquired about the principal reason for their trip and then considered this motivation in light of their status at entry *and* what they actually did while in the United States. The principal reason given by a majority of the return migrants in Costa Rica and El Salvador was predictable: work. A little more than two-thirds (or 67.2 percent) of the Salvadoreans and a little more than half (53.5 percent) of the Costa Ricans gave the reason of employment as their main reason for making their (last) trip to the United States. Many of the return migrants *intended* to become temporary workers, even as they applied for visas which prohibited working or as they entered the United States without papers in order to work. Under the terms of the visas granted to the migrants, only 8.9 percent of all the Salvadoreans were legally entitled to work and a little more than one-fourth of all the Costa Ricans were entitled to work. So, even for those who entered the United States legally, their intention was to violate their visa. They came to work and the visa was simply the method used to gain entry to the United States labor market.

The motivation of employment (and the visa used to acquire it) is not the entire story however, the intention of violating a visa by working is not the same as actually doing it. The migrants who wanted to work, and who applied for visas which simply allowed them to enter the United States temporarily, would have to mislead the visa offices of the State Department in both

Costa Rica and El Salvador. They would have to claim, perhaps falsely, that their reason for travel to the United States was to study, visit relatives, or have a vacation. And some of the migrants actually did do what they claimed they would. But for those who wanted to work, they would also have to find the work and not just secretly intend to work. The question arises: how many actually did work, whether they intended to or not and whether they violated their visas or not? The Salvadoreans clearly regarded work as relatively more important to themselves as a group. About two-thirds intended to work while only 8 percent could legally work. However, all but one Salvadorean actually did work on the sojourn to the United States. A little more than a half of the Costa Ricans intended to work in the United States while only about one-fourth could legally do so. However, 92.4 percent of all the Costa Rican migrants actually did work in the United States. Through the use of tourist and student visas, but especially the former, both the Costa Ricans and the Salvadoreans gained access to a labor market that was, under U.S. law, forbidden to them. Of course, many Salvadoreans not only worked illegally but entered the country illegally (without documents). These data have grave implications not only for the viability of visa issuance but perhaps for the basic assumptions and implementation of U.S. immigration policy as a whole. Our study confirms that American policy is seriously out of touch with the realities of return migration from Central America.

There is a final point which is of passing interest. One of the premises which we began with was that international return migration from Central America could be generalized in a certain way. That is, those who leave Costa Rica and El Salvador to go to the United States, and then return later, would also be likely to be return migrants from elsewhere. Our findings do not bear this out. Of all the migrants in both samples, 88 percent of the Salvadoreans and 93.9 percent of the Costa Ricans had never gone to a country other than the United States *to work*. There are return migrants among the many Salvadoreans and Costa Ricans who went to other countries than the United States. In these cases it is likely that their principal purpose for having gone was other than work per se. The two groups of migrants are in a migration stream which exists as an avenue for international labor. This avenue has very few "side roads" to neighboring countries which are closer. The two groups of migrants being studied here are in a migration stream which exists as an avenue for international labor. This avenue has very few "side roads" to neighboring countries which are closer.

"Going north" is a movement of return migrants clearly characterized by certain patterns. These patterns in turn reveal similarities and differences. The return migrants from Costa Rica and El Salvador tend to enter with papers, unlike the Mexican migrant. The Salvadoreans, of the two, more closely resemble the Mexicans, however. The Costa Ricans come more often, stay longer, arrive more directly and are more likely to be accompanied by family than are the Salvadoreans. This also sets the Costa Ricans as a group apart from the conventional wisdom concerning Mexican migrants. There are similarities as well. Although the Salvadoreans are more oriented toward work than the Costa Ricans, economic motivations are clearly the dominant factor for both groups. Intended in the beginning or not, the movement northward can largely if not entirely be regarded as the coming together of labor from the south and capital from the north.

COMING HOME

Return migration from the United States to Costa Rica and El Salvador is a major sequence in a migratory process that began with movement northward and that is affected by a variety of factors in the migratory experience as a whole. Therefore, the return of migrants to their home countries cannot be safely separated from the entire experience. Our purpose here is to describe the return migration from the United States by relating it to the northward movement, by analyzing the reasons given for returning home and by examining the possibility that the migrants will repeat their sojourns. Finally, we will examine the likelihood that the return migrants will cease to be migrants in the future by settling permanently in either their home country or in the United States.

From the very beginning, the return migrants from both Costa Rica and El Salvador did not envision permanent residence in the United States as a principal reason for migrating northward. Only 2.5 percent of the Costa Ricans and 0.4 percent of the Salvadoreans gave as their main reason for going to the United States the desire to become permanent settlers. These people cannot then be understood in the classical sense of an immigrant going to the United States to make a new life for himself. They are not "failed" immigrants because they departed the United States. Their intention was not to immigrate but to visit. Since the migrants of both samples had every intention of returning to their home country at the time they left it, their return migration from the United States is not a matter concerning whether they would return but when they would return.

The question we wish to answer is: what prompted, or affected, their decisions to return home when they did? The answer seems to depend upon the particular group and upon social and legal factors at home and in the United States. The principal reason for returning home cited by both groups of migrants was family reasons; 33.2 percent of the Salvadoreans and 31.5 percent of the Costa Ricans were motivated by a need or a wish to be reunited with their families in the sending countries. The migration northward and the return migration are of the same process but have different, if complementary, motivations. The movement northward was largely economic; the return migration was motivated, although not overwhelmingly, by social and psychological attachments. The family, and the strains of separation in that unit, is a significant factor in return migration.

There are other factors involved as well. While family was the frequent reason for returning for both groups of migrants, the second most frequent reason given points out a major difference in both groups. The Salvadoreans have a significant proportion of undocumented migrants in their group; the Costa Ricans have almost none. This is the key to the reason given for returning. U.S. immigration authorities deported or sent back Salvadoreans rather than Costa Ricans. Over one-fourth (or 27.4 percent) of all the Salvadoreans in the sample reported that they were sent home as deportable aliens or through proceedings of voluntary departure. Only 3.2 percent of the Costa Ricans were sent back under similar conditions. In other words, many Salvadorean migrants did not decide when to return.

That decision was made for them by U.S. immigration officials. The second most frequently given reason for the Costa Ricans was quite different. They cited homesickness (*mal de patria*). Almost one-fourth of that sample returned because they missed their country.

Other reasons played a lesser, but still interesting, role in the decision to return home. The expiration of a visa was offered by 22.8 percent of the Salvadoreans and by 12.4 percent of the Costa Ricans as the principal reason for leaving the United States. When this legal reason is combined with the other (deportation), it appears that half the Salvadoreans returned to El Salvador not apparently because they really wanted to but because they had to. Compulsion was much less important for the Costa Ricans. Taken together, social and legal reasons greatly outweighed economic ones in the decision of migrants in both groups to leave the United States. For example, the employment situation in the United States or in the home country seemed not very significant. Only 1.5 percent of the Salvadoreans reported that they left because they did not have a job in the United States; only 2.4 percent of the Costa Ricans left because they were unemployed in the United States. Jobs in the home countries were only modestly important for the Costa Ricans. Fifteen percent said they were returning to take a job; very few Salvadoreans had the same motivation.

The decision to return home, just as the decision to leave, cannot be regarded as irreversible. Just as the return migrants had not intended to settle in the United States permanently, neither do they seem permanently committed to staying in their home countries. Only 23.6 percent of the Salvadoreans, and virtually the same proportion of Costa Ricans, stated flatly that they had no current intention of going back to the United States for whatever reason. One-fifth of the Salvadoreans and 15.6 percent of the Costa Ricans thought they might return to the United States. A few in both samples were "not sure if" they would go back. On the other hand, more than one-half of migrants in both groups were fairly certain they would return to the United States one day. But when? One out of two Salvadoreans who said they would go back thought they would do so within a year; three out of five Costa Ricans who are going to return will do so in the same time frame.

Of course, all this is conjecture. The migrants may not fulfill their expressed intentions; some may go who did not think they would and others who think they will leave again may not in fact do so. But it does seem clear that one-half or more of all the return migrants consider themselves to be repeaters. Whatever their motivations or dreams of expected benefits, many of the migrants are "shuttle migrants" of one kind or another who will sooner or later find their way back to the United States. For those who do migrate again, their decision to return to the home countries from the United States is a temporary response to changing conditions which make their departures more likely.

It is conceivable of course that return migrants may be changed by their migration experiences. For example, if return migrants came back to the United States and decided to stay permanently, this would not only mean something to them individually but to both the United States and the sending countries. The impact of permanent residents would, for some very obvious reasons, be different from that of return migrants. A change from temporary migrations to permanent residence would have implications for the labor markets, public services, educational systems and other aspects of the United States on the one hand and El Salvador and Costa Rica on the other. What are the chances that the return migrants would consider becoming permanent residents in the United States? No one can be sure of course, least of all the migrants themselves, but it appears that there is little solid evidence from our study that the return migrants from Costa Rica and El Salvador want to live (and work) permanently in the United States. A clear majority of both samples said they would not consider residence in the United States on a permanent basis. Very few in either sample were doubtful about

TABLE 4
THE ATTITUDE OF RETURN MIGRANTS
FROM COSTA RICA AND EL SALVADOR
TOWARD PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

Would consider residence?	El Salvador (259)	Costa Rica (314)
No	62.5 %	64.3 %
Maybe	1.5	1.9
Yes	36.0	33.8
If yes, reason given:		
Better living standards	4.6	9.9
Politics/Papers	8.9	3.8
Had, but lost, residence	---	1.6
U.S. resident now	5.4	10.8
Retirement	---	1.0
Better working conditions	3.1	2.5
Study conditions	0.4	1.3
To live with spouse	13.5	2.9

their response. They said "no" or "yes" rather than "maybe." Of the one-third or so in both samples who said they would consider it, no single reason, or kind of reason, emerged. Family unification was most important to the Salvadoreans; the legal condition of existing residence status was important to the Costa Ricans who would consider living in the United States. Reasons relating to legal status were more generally cited than others but no one reason or kind of reason was dominant. Unlike their economic motivation for going to the United States as return migrants, economics was not an overwhelming consideration.

Return migration from the United States to El

Salvador and Costa Rica is something we should expect of those who go to the United States for other than family or personal reasons. As they return through routes which are more direct than those used to go north, we should also expect that sooner or later many of these return migrants will retrace their steps to the north again. Permanent settlement in the home country seems to be no more the motivation for returning than it was for leaving. Of course, the migrant has more or less permanent ties in the home country and much more transitory ties to the United States. But the situation in which they find themselves at any particular time, and what they have learned from their previous migrations may affect their decision to return to the United States, and therefore to their own home countries, at least one more time.

THE BEGINNING

This brief overview of some basic features of return migration from the United States to Costa Rica and El Salvador has served to introduce a new dimension to the study of North-South migration in the Western Hemisphere. Central America's role in international return migration to the United States had, until now, been neglected. It should now be clear that survey data on return migrants from Costa Rica and El Salvador broaden the scope of this important topic. It now makes a more comprehensive and more comparative approach to North-South migration in the Western Hemisphere a distinct possibility. From what has been offered so far, the data on migrants from Costa Rica and El Salvador point to similarities and differences important for research in other countries and for policy considerations in the sending and receiving countries.

There is much more in the data base on return migration from Costa Rica and El Salvador than we have been able to present here.[10] For example, our principal interest in further analyses will dwell upon the return migrants as one source of international human capital. Work is a principal motivation and behavior of return migrants in the United States. What is the impact of these work experiences upon the occupational status, mobility and earnings of the migrants and their families? How do these work experiences in the United States affect wages, services, taxes, consumption patterns, employers and unions in the political economy of the United States and how do these same experiences in the United States affect the economic position of the migrant's family in Costa Rica and in El Salvador? Whatever emerges from further analyses, what can be cautiously stated is that answers to these and other policy-oriented concerns are now within reach.

NOTES

[1] Jorge Bustamante, "Structural and Ideological Conditions of Undocumented Mexican Immigration to the United States," *Current Issues in Social Policy*, eds. Boyd Littrell and Gideon Sjoberg (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976); Wayne Cornelius, "Illegal Mexican Migration to the United States: Recent Findings and Policy Implications," *Congressional Record-House* (July 12, 1977): 7062-7068; W. Tim Dagodog, "Source Regions and Composition of illegal Mexican immigration to California," *International Migration Review* (Winter 1975): 449-511; Vernon Briggs, "Mexican Workers in the United States Labor Market," *International Migration Review* 112 (November 1975): 351-368.

[2] Special quotas for Mexico and Canada were proposed but not enacted in S. 1763, the Immigration and Nationality Efficiency Act of 1979. U.S. Congress, Senate, the Committee of the Judiciary, *Hearings on the Immigration and Nationality Efficiency Act of 1979*, S. 1763, 96th Congress, First Session, 1980.

[3] Non-Mexican immigration to the United States from Latin America is the subject of growing numbers of studies concerning the Caribbean and other supplying areas of the region; Elsa Chaney, "Colombian Migration to the United States: Part II," Interdisciplinary Communication Program, Smithsonian Institution, *The Dynamics of Migration: International Migration* (Washington, D.C.: ICP Occasional Monograph Series, No. 5, Vol. 2, 1976), pp. 87-141; Mary Kritz and Douglas T. Gurak (eds), "International Migration in Latin America," *International Migration Review* 11 (1977), 59-76; Nancie L. Gonzales, "Multiple Migratory Experiences of Dominican Women," *Anthropological Quarterly* 49 (January 1976), 36-44; Glen Hendricks, *Dominican Diaspora* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1974); Ian Rockett, "Immigration Legislation and the Flow of Specialized Human Capital from South America to the United States," *International Migration Review* 10 (1976), 47-61.

[4] Interagency Task Force on Immigration Policy, *Staff Report* (Washington, D.C.: Departments of Justice, Labor and State, March 1979), p. 221.

[5] Nicaragua now has a revolutionary government, El Salvador is apparently at the threshhold of a violent civil war. Honduras and Guatemala are experiencing political violence and Belice having gained independence from Britain is absorbing Salvadorean refugees and at the same time fearing invasion by Guatemala. (Since the date of the delivery of this paper the

situations of Nicaragua and El Salvador and most Central American countries have changed.)

[6] The samples of the return migrants from both countries were created from national household samples used by those doing the fieldwork. Those return migrants identified from the household samples also named others who had been return migrants but who were not in the household samples.

[7] Wayne Cornelius, *Illegal Mexican Migration to the United States* (Cambridge: Center for International Studies, M.I.T., May 1977).

[8] Ronald A. Grennes, "The Urban Mexican Worker in the United States Labor Market," (San Antonio: Border Research Institute, Trinity University, December 1979).

[9] David S. North and Marion Houstoun, *The Characteristics and Role of Illegal Aliens in the United States Labor Market* (Washington, D.C.: Linton and Co., 1976).

[10] Two federal reports will be forthcoming on return migration of Costa Rican and Salvadorean migrants, one for the Agency for International Development under a grant (AID/LAC-G-1336) and one for the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy under a contract (SCIRP-07031274-03).

THE NEWYORICAN COMES HOME TO PUERTO RICO: DESCRIPTION AND CONSEQUENCES

Roberta Ann Johnson

There are over five million Puerto Ricans. One-third live in the United States. Most of those no longer speak Spanish. Many have never seen Puerto Rico. Today, however, we are witnessing an extraordinary phenomenon: mass migration back to the island. Tens of thousands of Puerto Ricans are leaving the mainland United States and returning to their "homeland."

This paper focuses on both out-migration and back-migration -- why they left, why they are returning and the consequences of both moves.

When I focus on migration, I am not looking at a minor part of the Puerto Rican picture. The migration experience -- the experience of uprooting and resettling -- is very much a part of Puerto Rico's political, social, and economic reality. In fact, according to Kingsley Davis, "Puerto Rico's significance for the theory of migration lies in the fact that it ranks with Ireland in having had one of the highest rates of emigration ever to characterize an entire country."[1] No Puerto Rican remains untouched by migration, not with one out of every three Puerto Ricans residing on the mainland. To illustrate the true dimensions of the movement into and out of Puerto Rico, the one-way total of travelers in a single year surpasses the number of persons actually living in Puerto Rico.[2]

OUT-MIGRATION

There has always been out-migration for Puerto Rico under the United States. The first mass emigration occurred during the first year of United States rule -- it was migration to Hawaii to cut cane in the sugar fields. Five to ten thousand people left the island.

It was, however, during the time of World War II that the significant out-migration began. Migration jumped from an average yearly total of less than 1,000 during the 1930s to 20,000 annually between 1941 and 1950. During the 1950s the average out-migration rate "skyrocketed to over 40,000 per year, and hit 70,000 in 1953" (see Table 1).

TABLE 1
MIGRATION RATE OF PUERTO RICANS TO THE UNITED STATES

Year	Rate (per 1000 Population
1910-1920	0.8
1920-1930	2.6
1930-1940	0.5
1940-1950	8.8
1950-1960	19.9

Source: Status of Puerto Rico Report, p. 151.

There are certain enticements which explain this migration -- Puerto Ricans were enticed by American products, promise of a job, the personal influences and the low cost of air travel.

American-made products were thought to be an important stimuli encouraging out-migration. Says Rand, "Even in the thirties many of the basic commodities were imported from the mainland. The people began to yearn first for a radio, then for an automobile, and eventually for a TV set. After the War they began seeing new types of food -- even frozen food and so forth. Their desires were aroused; cash became more and more important to them and New York was the place to get it."[3] For Glazer and Moynihan, American products enticed, "its mass media publicized them, and its merchandising techniques spread the desire."[4] (It is important to note how American businesses profited by creating in Puerto Rico a new market for American products. By 1959, although Puerto Rico was only the sixth among the world's purchasers of American goods, it was highest in per capita purchases.[5] By 1965, Puerto Rico was spending $3,066,301 per day for goods and services from the continental United States. And by 1977, "Puerto Rico's imports contributed [illegible],000 jobs and $3.47 billion in gross income to the mainland economy ..."[6]

Encouraging out-migration was the promise of a mainland job. Even with island-industrialization, unemployment remained high in Puerto Rico (officially 14 percent). In fact, the unemployment rate remained substantially the same between 1948 and 1965[7] even with the large number of factory jobs being created. (By 1960 Fomento to factories provided 41,500 jobs;[8] by 1962, 86,000 Puerto Ricans were employed in manufacturing under government-controlled conditions, and the labor force had increased absolutely from 663,000 in 1948 to 769,000 in 1963.)[9]

True, there was an increase in the number of industry jobs, but there also was a constant rise in population and a decline in agricultural employment. So people left. It was the old squeeze-pull theory. The mass exodus of hundreds of thousands of Puerto Ricans was explained in terms of the "squeeze on the island" and the "pull of the mainland." American businesses profited from pulling in these new workers for they provided a new source of low-cost labor.

By the 1950s, there were enough people on the mainland to explode migration with personal contacts -- knowing someone in the United States motivated the move. There is, for example, the story behind the growth of a Puerto Rican community in a small city about twenty-five miles north of New York City. "Shortly after the Korean War, a Puerto Rican army 'buddy' of a local resident obtained employment in this city as a garage mechanic. This placement led to the recruitment of another mechanic from Puerto Rico. Within two years about 900 Puerto Ricans had arrived -- all from the same *barrio* of Lares, Puerto Rico, the original point of departure of the soldier-turned-mechanic.)"[10]

Participating in the networking were not only migrants but some of the over 40,000 Puerto Ricans who served in the Armed Forces during the Korean conflict. (Over 90 percent were volunteers.)[11] Thus, as Gordon Lewis suggests, "it would be difficult ... to find any small town on the island that does not possess its quota of younger people with stateside experience, or of veterans of American Armed Services."[12] This increases the likelihood of migration, because the decision to move is usually made in response to personal influence; there is little dependence on formal media. Face-to-face contact and letters are the most important source of information about the mainland.[13] Therefore, the more friends and neighbors there are with stateside experience, the more friends and neighbors will be influenced to migrate.

Finally, the airplane with its comparative low cost quickened, cheapened and encouraged Puerto Rican migration. "The airplane sets the Puerto Rican migrants apart from all other ethnic groups that have left their homes."[14] It is not unusual, not only to have half a Puerto Rican family on the island and half on the mainland, but for them casually to plan a Christmas family reunion in either place. Easy movement had become a natural part of the Puerto Rican experience.[15]

Thus, out-migration was spurred on by American-made products, the promise of work on the mainland, personal influences, and the low cost of air travel. Words to refer to the United States had to be developed to accommodate the new experience. Since the island *is* part of the United States, words such as "stateside," "continental," and "mainland" were needed as part of a new vocabulary to distinguish the mainland from the island.

The Puerto Rican newcomer to the city was seen as a new ingredient in the melting pot. Most social scientists used or implied an assimilation model to talk about the mainland Puerto Rican. The model assumed an open system in which hard work and conformity would be rewarded. (Class Model and Colonial Model are alternative perspectives.)

The assimilation model used on people of color was so unquestioned that Robert Dahl applies it to blacks while his data was screaming racism. In *Who Governs*, Negroes are included with other ethnics in a graph illustrating the three different stages ethnics pass, on their way to political assimilation. In his "impressionist summary" he indicates that it takes 40 or 50 years for the ethnics to go from Stage I to Stage II and a similar amount of time to reach Stage III. They are all at Stage III by 1950. But the Negro, who arrived a century before the others, only just reaches *Stage II* in 1950.[15]

	First Stage	Second Stage	Third Stage
Germans	1840-1880	1880-1920	1920-
Irish	1840-1890	1890-1930	1930-
"Russians"	1880-1920	1920-1940	1940-
Italians	1880-1930	1930-1950	1950-
Negroes	1784-1950	1950-	

The assimilation model was accepted by C. Wright Mills when he coauthored *Puerto Rican Journey* (see especially his preface); it was the perspective used by Glazer and Moynihan in *Beyond the Melting Pot* and in the classic, *The Newcomers*, Handlin recognizes race prejudice as a "temporary blockage" but blames the lack of advancement of Blacks and Puerto Ricans on their own lack of resources to cope with problems.

The assimilation model, which promises a ladder of success to those willing to come and make the climb is the picture behind the Puerto Rican migration. The 1950 Mills, Senior, Goldsen study referred to earlier was based on 1,115 interviews of New York Puerto Ricans from Harlem and Morrisania. They found that "Two-thirds of the group who had planned before migrating to remain permanently in New York (89 percent said) ... that they had looked forward to bettering their economic position."[17]

From interviews and narratives, it seems that the migrants usually accepted the idea that it is up to them to make it and that it is their fault if they don't succeed. Simplicio, from the Rios family in *La Vida*, is a case in point:

> At first my job was el delivery, walking all over everywhere with a big suitcase, eight hours a day, for forty-five dollars a week. Soledad showed me how to take el subway to Manhattan where the factory is, and after that they just turned me loose. It's lucky that the streets in New York are numbered and easy to find. So I learned as I walked around, making my deliveries. I often got lost. But when I did, I just wandered around until I found my way back. It took me about a month to learn to go places on el subway. I got lost there, too, but that was plain stupidity. In my hurry I often caught the wrong train. But early rising has never hastened the dawn.
>
> That's all I did when I started working there, el delivery. But I didn't mind because I know that if you don't have schooling you go down instead of up when you first come here. That's what many Puerto Ricans won't do and that's why they give themselves up to a life of vice. Because you feel lower than other people when you have to take a job as delivery boy. And that might make you turn to stealing or to taking drugs, it might lead you to quit your job and become a tramp. And then you'd be a failure for sure. Because here in New York if you don't work, you don't eat. This isn't Puerto Rico, where if the neighbor sits down to a meal he'll send a plate of food over to you. Here people, even the Puerto Ricans, throw out food rather than give it away. That's because people change when they come here, on account of always having to think about working. That makes you use your mind, think of tomorrow, you know. If I have twenty dollars to last me all week, I can't go out and spend ten now. Because I wouldn't be spending only today's money but also tomorrow's and the next day's. And when the money's gone,

> there's nobody you can turn to for more. So we become used to that and lose our own customs little by little.[18]

The migrant, eager to assimilate, was better off than those he left behind on the island but he was poor by mainland standards. Simplicio, for example, then goes on to boast about his factory job where he earns $65 per week. The fact was, and is, that most Puerto Ricans live on the mainland, in poverty.

The Commission on Civil Rights in 1976 described Puerto Ricans as being "relegated to poverty in the midst of glitter."[19] *The New York Times* assessed the Commission's report in the following manner:

> The Commission merely had verified old news to the residents of the heavily Puerto Rican areas of the city -- East Harlem, the South Bronx, Williamsburg, Bushwick -- and dozens of other communities in the region, where over half of the Puerto Ricans in the United States live. After 30 years of large-scale migration by these native-born American citizens, the 1.7 million Puerto Ricans (a census figure generally regarded as an undercount) were no better off and possibly even worse ...
>
> Puerto Ricans are at the bottom of the economic ladder, worse off than other Hispanics and most other ethnic groups. Their population is three times poorer than the national average. One of every four families depends on welfare, entirely or in part ... The percentage of those living in poverty rose from 29 percent in 1970 to 33 percent in 1974 and may have risen further since then.[20]

Puerto Ricans were aware of their relative poverty and what is more, given the assimilation model, the situation could not but foster feelings of inferiority.

Racial prejudice also promoted feelings that Puerto Ricans were not quite good enough. One Puerto Rican who had lived in New York for over thirty years talked about the prejudice in New York; "You live there but you don't feel part of the American dream."[21] Another Puerto Rican said about being in Puerto Rico after having lived twenty-four years in Brooklyn, "At least here I can be proud of being a Puerto Rican. In New York, the people won't even look at us."[22]

By 1970 there were 1,391,443 Puerto Ricans living on the mainland.[23] Drawn to the promise of economic opportunity, many, however, live in poverty and experience racial prejudice. What is interesting is that the experience does not result in hatred but rather, in an even stronger desire to be "American."

BACK-MIGRATION

The "new" Puerto Rican migration was "back migration." At first, it was nearly unnoticed because of the tremendous flow of people off the island. But even in the heyday of out-migration, Puerto Ricans were also returning. Figures for the flights to and from the island reveal the enormity of the movement (see Table 2). Margaret Mead, in reference to this movement of people, has stated that "At midnight, on a 747 between New York and Puerto Rico you'd think that all Puerto Ricans were moving in both directions."[24]

TABLE 2
MIGRATION INTO PUERTO RICO AND INTO THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

Year	Travel to Continental U.S.	Puerto Rico	Net Migration to Continental U.S.
1920	19,142	15,003	4,139
1921	17,137	17,749	-612
1922	13,521	13,154	-633
1923	14,950	13,194	1,756
1924	17,777	14,057	3,720
1925	17,493	15,356	2,137
1926	22,010	16,389	5,621
1927	27,355	18,626	8,729
1928	27,916	21,772	6,144
1929	25,428	20,791	4,637
1930	26,010	20,434	5,576
1931	18,524	20,462	-1,938
1932	16,224	18,932	-2,708
1933	15,133	16,215	-1,082
1934	13,721	16,687	-2,966
1935	19,944	18,927	1,017
1936	24,145	20,697	3,448
1937	27,311	22,793	4,518
1938	25,884	23,522	2,362
1939	26,653	21,165	4,488
1940	24,932	23,924	1,008
1941	30,916	30,416	500
1942	29,480	28,552	928
1943	19,367	16,766	2,601
1944	27,586	19,498	8,088
1945	33,740	22,737	11,003
1946	70,618	45,997	24,621
1947	136,259	101,115	35,144
1948	132,523	104,492	28,031
1949	157,338	124,252	33,086
1950	170,727	136,572	34,155
1951	188,898	146,978	41,920
1952	258,884	197,226	61,658
1953	304,910	230,307	74,603
1954	303,007	258,798	44,209
1955	315,491	284,309	31,182
1956	380,950	319,303	61,647
1957	439,656	391,372	48,284
1958	467,987	442,031	25,956
1959	557,701	520,489	37,212
1960	666,756	643,014	23,742
1961	681,982	668,182	13,800
1962	807,549	796,186	11,363
1963	930,666	925,868	4,798
1964	1,076,403	1,072,037	4,366
1965	1,265,096	1,254,338	10,758
1966	1,475,228	1,445,139	30,089

(continued on next page)

Table 2 - Continued

Year	Travel to Continental U.S.	Puerto Rico	Net Migration to Continental U.S.
1967	1,628,909	1,594,735	34,174
1968	1,858,151	1,839,470	18,681
1969	2,105,217	2,112,264	-7,047
1970	1,495,587	1,479,447	16,140
1971	1,566,723	1,605,414	-38,691
1972	-	-	-19,462
1973	1,780,192	1,799,071	-18,879
1974	1,622,001	1,630,525	-8,524

Source: Un Informe de la Comision de Derechos Civilos de Los Estados Unidos *Puertorriquenos en Los Estatos Unidos Continentales*, pp. 28, 29.

There were always significant numbers of "return migrants," as opposed to transients, visitors, or what Hernandez Alvarez calls "floaters." Between 1950 and 1960, 75,000 Puerto Ricans came home to stay; between 1960 and 1965, 70,000 returned permanently.[25] But by 1977, 70,000 was the number for *one* year's inflow of Puerto Ricans coming home.[26]

Back-migration has not been studied as thoroughly as out-migration, perhaps because it did go "unnoticed" for so many years. Besides Jose Hernandez Alvarez's study which focuses on back-migration in the 1960s, little else of a methodical or academic nature has been done. Most of the information about the reasons for the mass return comes from anecdotal newspaper articles, with titles like "The Loneliness of the Newyorican" in *The San Juan Star* and "Many from Puerto Rico Flee City for Homeland," *The New York Times*. Based on personal experience and this impressionistic data, there seem to be a variety of reasons why the Newyorican comes home to Puerto Rico. We will focus on these reasons and, later, some social and political consequences of their return.

Doubtless, the United States recession accounts for the return of some islanders. Out-migration has always been positively correlated with the ups and downs of the mainland economy (therefore one would expect that back-migration would be correlated). While there is a much higher unemployment rate on the island (unofficially, 30 percent) as one return-migrant put it, "at least you don't starve in Puerto Rico."

In addition, there are those who "come home" to retire and those who return to the island to find their roots or return to their roots. These moves show how temporary the mainland years really are.

Those who retire to Puerto Rico have savings and many buy houses which they can now afford. Coming home to the island in old age, coming home to die, seems to be a prevalent pattern among Puerto Ricans. Soledad states in *La Vida*, for example, that she wants to be buried in Puerto Rico and if she dies by accident in the United States, she wants her body to be flown back to the island. The sentiment of return also is expressed in a popular song, "In Old San Juan":

> Adios, Borinquen querida;
> adios, mi Diosa del mar;
> me voy, pero un dia volvere
> a buscar mi querer
> a sonar otra vez
> en mi viejo San Juan.[27]

Some younger Puerto Ricans seem also to be caught up in a romantic notion of homeland. Some even illustrate a Puerto Rican version of "roots." Puerto Rican students at Princeton and Rutgers even mentioned wanting to farm Puerto Rican land.

In addition to those who return because there are no jobs, those who return to retire, and those who return out of a romantic attachment to, or the idea of a homeland, many Puerto Ricans simply return for family or personal reasons. They might be returning because a relative is ill, because property is being passed on to them, because their spouse feels very strongly about returning. Also, the large numbers returning are that much higher because children return with their parents, (their numbers would fall under the category "family" or "personal" reasons.)

BACK ON THE ISLAND

For those who have spent most of their lives on the mainland, returning to Puerto Rico can represent quite a culture shock. Puerto Rico seems to be for some, like a foreign country. The mainland Puerto Rican usually looks very different from her island cousin. Therefore, new terms were coined to distinguish her, like "New Yorican" and "Neorican," and new labels for the island Puerto Rican began to be used, like "native," "local," "Puerto Rican Puerto Rican." The new terms were used with more frequency as more and more mainland Puerto Ricans began returning home. There, now, even exists a "Neo Rican Society" in San Juan, with 1,500 members, to help in the adjustment of Puerto Ricans returning to Puerto Rico.[28]

For the Newyorican or Neorican, it is not only in the barrios on the mainland, that they experienced prejudice; they do so on the island as well. The

Neorican often feels marginal in both places -- more Puerto Rican than American in East Harlem, more American than Puerto Rican on the island.[29] Natives call them pushy and aggressive, tainted by the mainland lifestyle. Their clothes and ways are criticized.[30] But it is the language barrier that creates the biggest physical separation and isolation. In a *San Juan Star* article one woman complained, "They call us Newyoricans, and if you don't speak Spanish too well they say, 'Well, why don't you go back to where you belong?'"[31]

Levittown, a Toa Baja suburb of 10,000 families located nine miles west of San Juan, became a symbol of the Neorican. Other residential enclaves developed like San Juanita in Bayamon where, because of their numbers, using English in school, and in everyday activities, would not be a problem.[32]

The irony of the situation, however, should not be lost. During the first three decades of American rule, Puerto Ricans struggled to insure that Spanish become the language of instruction in the island's public schools. Yet, in the decades to follow, hundreds of thousands of Spanish-speaking Puerto Rican children were to be educated and half-educated and miseducated in English on the mainland.

Governor Luis Ferre may have referred to Puerto Rico as the "Jibaro State"; Governor Carlos Romero Barcelo may have addressed the United Nations in perfect

Spanish; but the fact remains that many Puerto Ricans coming home to Puerto Rico use only English, and some use both languages so poorly they are not bilingual, they are called "nonlingual." Maldonado Denis refers to the "mutilation of the language" and the "idiomatic ambivalence" as symptoms of "a reality that condemn ... Puerto Ricans to the category of cultural pariahs in the metropolis as well as in the colony."[33]

I have been looking at the uniqueness of the Neorican as cultural pariah in her own homeland. Now let me change the perspective and look at what the Neorican has in common with those who stayed on the island.

Scholars were wrong to examine the Puerto Rican migrant only in terms comparative with the European migrant. I believe, for Puerto Ricans, New York City became a temporary extension of the island and the Puerto Rican urbanization process was simply played out on a larger land scale.

Out-migration from Puerto Rico to the United States should be seen simply as part of the basic move from countryside to city. That move was going on at the same time on the island as well.

Between 1950 and 1960, San Juan's population increased by 21 percent;[34] by 1960 over half the people living in San Juan were born in rural areas and 50 cent of all the persons born in rural areas had moved out.[35]

Hernandez Alvarez seems to support the contention that Puerto Rican migration was just a part of the urbanization process. His focus is on "return migration" but puts it in a clearer perspective by viewing it as one of many moves from (a) birthplace to (b) Puerto Rican residence before migration to (c) United States residence to (d) Puerto Rican place of return. Sometimes there are only three moves -- birthplace to U.S. residence to Puerto Rican place of return (a-c-d). However, by the time they return, all the mainland migrants are much more urban than the island pattern which, in 1960, still showed over 50 percent rural residence[36] (see Table 3).

TABLE 3
PUERTO RICAN POPULATION DISTRIBUTION

Year	Urban	Rural
1940	30.3	69.7
1950	40.5	59.5
1960	44.2	55.8
1970	58.1	41.9

Source: Antonio J. Gonzales, "El Desarrolo Economico y la Estructura Economica," University of Puerto Rico, 1965 (paper), p. 67; and *The Population*, Vol. 1, Part 53, *Puerto Rico, 1970 Census of Population*, U.S. Department of Commerce, Social and Economic Statistics Department, Bureau of the Census, p. 53-7.

In fact, Census Bureau data show that the general flow of Puerto Ricans back to Puerto Rico between 1965 and 1970 (including temporary as well as permanent moves), is of *mostly urban people*, the majority born in Puerto Rico[37] (see Table 4).

TABLE 4
PUERTO RICANS (5 YEARS OR OLDER) RETURNING
TO PUERTO RICO 1965-1970

Returnees to Puerto Rico 1965-1970	Total	Urban	Rural
Born in Puerto Rico	287,035	171,176	115,859
Born in U.S. or elsewhere outside	110,599	87,917	22,682
Length of stay in continental U.S. 5 years or more	120,218	87,471	32,747
Under 5 years	153,254	87,622	65,632

Source: *1970 Census of Population, Puerto Rico the Population*, Vol. I, Part 53, U.S. Department of Commerce, Social and Economic Statistics Administration Bureau of the Census, p. 53-195.

If out-migration is a branch of the urbanization process, then the Neorican should resemble the San Juan Puerto Rican or the Ponce Puerto Rican, or any urban Puerto Rican on the island -- and he does -- in aspiration, insecurity, sense of inferiority and partisan preference. Their experiences are similar -- they moved for increased opportunity; they experience the disparity in wealth; and they feel dependent on the United States for whatever gains they've made.

On the island, during the heyday of Bootstrap industrialization, factories were built at a dramatic rate. (By 1961, new factories were opening up an average of five per week.)[38] Masses of people migrated to Puerto Rican cities and towns for work, and to better their situation. They worked for North Americans who were rich and in control. And, alongside industrialization, tourism grew. In the 1960s, with each new year, the tourist trade expanded 20 percent[39] (see Table 5).

TABLE 5
NUMBER AND EXPENDITURES OF TOURISTS IN PUERTO RICO
1945-1970

Year	Number of Tourists	Expenditures (millions of dollars)
1945	9,023	1.6
1950	64,023	6.8
1955	134,625	22.9
1960	347,625	58.1
1961	354,963	55.7
1962	396,675	67.9
1963	461,857	81.9
1964	552,664	97.5
1965	606,093	119.3
1970	1,088,000	235
1976	1,299,000	380
1977	1,376,000	411
1978	1,474,000	466

Source: *Status of Puerto Rico. Report* p. 182; and Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico, *Puerto Rico in Figures, 1979*, Economic Research Department, P.O. Box 42001, San Juan, P.R.

The lush hotels were, for some Puerto Ricans, merely reminders of how poor they were. Soledad, in Oscar Lewis's *La Vida* speaks of "the pain one feels after being in a nice hotel and walking by the Caribe Hilton, seeing so many pretty things and then having to go back to La Esmeralda. Such terrible poverty, so much dirt, garbage scattered everywhere. They live in separate worlds, the poor and the rich."

And yet, according to Gordon Lewis, the influx of tourists brought little if any widespread hatred of the North American. Rather than resent the North American, their high standard of living was often seen as the inevitable result of being a full-fledged American.[40] Therefore, it is not surprising that it was in the growing urban areas that the support for the Statehood Party grew,[41] not only among the city's rich, but among the poor as well.

In the cities, statehood support is as strong *in the slums* as in the suburbs. According to Mintz, Lewis and Hanson, the Puerto Rican who has migrated to the city is "change-oriented" and is enjoying increased economic opportunities but also fears relapsing into rural poverty.[42] They experienced what Hofstadter calls "status insecurity."[43] They voted Statehood Party for the security of the American way of life. Erasmo expresses it in *La Vida*:

> The way it is now, as a commonwealth, what is Puerto Rico anyway? Suppose the United States should decide to say, "All right, we will send no more aid to Puerto Rico." Wouldn't we be worse off even than Santa Domingo then? We would.[44]

Statehood sentiment grew on the mainland for the same reasons it grew in the island's cities. The migrants moved for a better life, found increased economic opportunity and wanted to keep their new life secure. Uprooted, they found a new loyalty.

The Neorican experienced the disparity between what they had and the American wealth around them in an even more dramatic way than the Puerto Rican who was living in the island city. But the assimilation model promised success with work and made *them* responsible for their poverty. (If they were poor, they deserved to be. Poverty seemed to prove their inferiority.)

The Puerto Rican's economic dependency on the U.S., experienced both on the island and on the mainland, heightened and fed a sense of inferiority. The Puerto Rican mainland migrant, however, was to feel this sense of inferiority most strongly. Thus, living on the mainland, "living in the very guts of the most powerful capitalist society cannot help but produce a group of people who want to 'pass' into the society of the metropolis even at the cost of losing their identity and national culture."[45]

So, there on the mainland, in the midst of poverty, racism and disappointment grew pro-statehood sentiment. As one journalist, describing back-migration, put it, "For the most part, returning Puerto Ricans are ... stout statehooders, strongly pro-American, despite a deep sense of hurt over how they had been treated on the mainland."[46]

One clear example of strong mainland statehood sentiment occurred in 1967. There was serious debate over whether Puerto Ricans residing in the United States should be allowed to vote in the Puerto Rican status plebiscite. Referring to the New York Puerto Rican, Julio E. Sabater, deputy director of an East Harlem anti-poverty program, said "The Popular Democratic Party naturally opposes their voting because they are predominantly for statehood ... "[47] Consistent with his statement is the fact that commonwealth forces had continually opposed plebiscite participation by mainland residents, while statehooders continually argued for it.[48]

The major point, however, is that the experience of those who left was not so different from the experience of those who stayed. The only difference was that the mainland migrant experienced economic dependency, psychological insecurity and a sense of inferiority more intensely than her island cousin. And so the mainland migrant could be transformed that much faster. Therefore, it is not only because of their English and their clothing that the returning Puerto Ricans experience hostility towards them. In some sense, the Neoricans have become "scapegoats" because they are reminders to Puerto Ricans of the personal price they all pay for economic progress.

The homecoming of these foreigners seems to suggest that Antonio Barcelo's worst fears have come true.

> For we would join the Union immediately ... with the personality, characteristics and idiosyncracies of a people whose character is already formed and who have, for centuries, had a civilization perhaps older than yours. We Puerto Ricans want to be your brethren in equality, dignity, liberty and duty ... What we do not wish, what frequently disturbs our

> minds, is the thought of having to undergo a painful, indefinite process, during which all those characteristics will perish and which will annul our personality to such an extent that, upon the accomplishment of that solution (political integration into the union) if it ever be accomplished,it will not be we who share the immense benefits to be derived therefrom, but a shapeless hybrid, resembling us in nothing and differing from you also.[49]

NOTES

[1] Kingsley Davis in *Return Migration to Puerto Rico*, ed. Jose Hernandez Alvarez. Population Monograph Series No. 1 (Berkeley: University of California, 1965).

[2] A prediction made in ibid., p. 13.

[3] Christopher Rand, *The Puerto Ricans* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 53.

[4] Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press and Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 97.

[5] American goods purchased amounted to $290 per person, Earl Parker Hanson, *Puerto Rico: Ally for Progress* (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1962), p. 76.

[6] *Facts and Figures 1964, 1965 Edition*, published by Department of Labor-Migration Division, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, p. 9; and "P.R. Imports Seen Aiding U.S. Economy," *The San Juan Star*, December 11, 1978, p. 8.

[7] United States-Puerto Rico Commission, *Status of Puerto Rico: Report*, p. 54 and Antonio J. Gonzalez, "El Desarrolla Economico y la Estructural Economica," (paper) University of Puerto Rico, 1965, pp. 48-49.

[8] Ralph Hancock, *Puerto Rico: A Success Story* (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1960), p. 164.

[9] Hanson, *Puerto Rico: A Success Story*, p. 103.

[10] Hernandez Alvarez, p. 6.

[11] Hancock, p. 143; and *Facts and Figures 1964*, p. 8.

[12] Gordon Lewis, *Puerto Rico: Freedom and Power in the Caribbean* (New York: M R Press, 1963), p. 7.

[13] C. Wright Mills, et al., *The Puerto Rican Journey* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), p. 54.

[14] Earl Parker Hanson, *Puerto Rico: Land of Wonders* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), p. 37.

[15] See Oscar Lewis, *La Vida* (New York: Random House, 1966).

[16] Robert Dahl, *Who Governs* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961) p. 36.

[17] Mills, p. 49.

[18] Oscar Lewis, pp. 444-445.

[19] Un Informe de la Comision de Derechos Civiles de Los Estados Unidos, *Puertorriquenos en Los Estados Unidos Continentales: Un Futuro Incierto*, October 1976.

[20] David Vidal, "Dream Still Eludes Mainland Puerto Ricans," *The New York Times*, September 11, 1977, p. 6.

[21] Jon Nordheimer, "Puerto Ricans Accelerating Return to Crowded Homeland," *The New York Times*, May 10, 1978, p. A18.

[22] Juan M. Vasquez, "Many from Puerto Rico Flee City for Homeland," *The New York Times*, February 8, 1972, p. 17.

[23] *Subject Reports. Puerto Ricans in the United States*. 1970 Census, p. 1.

[24] Margaret Mead (interviewed by Bill Thompson), "Problems of Puerto Rican Cultural Identity," *Revista/Review Inter-Americana*, 5:1 (Spring 1975).

[25] Hernandez Alvarez, pp. 16, 17, 21.

[26] Nordheimer.

[27] *Farewell, Borinquen beloved;
Farewell, my Goddess of the sea;
I'm leaving, but someday I'll return
To seek my beloved
And dream again
In my old San Juan.

[28] The Society was set up to "educate the newcomers" about housing, financial investments and schooling. No doubt, such a club offers psychological and social benefits to its members, as well. Nordheimer, op. cit.

[29] Nordheimer.

[30] Nordheimer; also see William Stockton, "Going Home: The Puerto Ricans' New Migration," *The New York Times Magazine*, November 27, 1978, pp. 89, 90.

[31] David Vidal, "The Loneliness of the Returning Newyorican," *The San Juan Star* (Outlook Section), October 5, 1975, p. 5.

[32] Ibid., see also E. Seda Bonilla, *Requiem Para Una Culture* (Rio Piedras: Ediciones Bayoan, 1974), p. 276-278.

[33] Manuel Maldonado Denis, *En Las Entranas: Un Analisis Sociohistorico de la Emigracion Puertorriquena* (Havana, Cuba: Casa de las Americas, 3RA. YG El Vedado, 1976), p. 140.

[34] Hanson, *Ally for Progress*, p. 53.

[35] Melvin M. Tumin and Arnold S. Feldman, *Social Class and Social Change in Puerto Rico*. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961.

[36] Hernandez Alvarez, especially chapters 1 and 2.

[37] *Census of Population 1970. Puerto Rico: The Population*, Vol. I, Part 53, pp. 53-195.

[38] Hanson, *Ally for Progress*, p. 103.

[39] Marvin M. Karpatkin, "Puerto Rico: How Much Independence Does It Want?" *The New Republic* May 7, 1966, p. 14.

[40] Lewis, p. 7; Erasmo, in *La Vida*, says " ... there's the same poverty as always, and more crime. The only way we can progress is to become a State of the Union," p. 83.

[41] Robert W. Anderson, *Party Politics in Puerto Rico* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1965), p. 43.

[42] Sidney W. Mintz, "Puerto Rico: An Essay in the Definition of a National Culture," *Status of Puerto Rico: Selected Background Studies*, p. 388; Lewis, p. 186; and Hanson, *Puerto Rico: Ally for Progress*, p. 111.

[43] Richard Hofstadter, "The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt," in *The Radical Right*, ed. Daniel Bell (New York: Beacon Press, 1969).

[44] Lewis, p. 83.

[45] Moldonado Denis, P. 149.

[46] Nordheimer.

[47] Bill Jones, "New York Puerto Rican Backs Mainland Plebiscite Vote," *The San Juan Star*, March 8, 1967, p. 11.

[48] A more recent example illustrates the pro-statehood sentiment of mainland Puerto Ricans who returned to Puerto Rico. When an island Democratic primary was held in October 1978, to select delegates for the New Democratic Party, pro-statehood Puerto Ricans from the mainland were thought to be responsible. Returning Puerto Ricans wanted to be able to continue to affiliate with the Democratic Party and still be *pro-statehood*. (The island Democrats were traditionally for commonwealth.)

[49] Manny Suarez, "NPP to Gain 2-party Power with NDP Win," *The San Juan Star*, October 11, 1978, p. 18.

THE PUERTO RICAN CIRCUIT AND THE SUCCESS OF RETURN MIGRANTS[*]

Barry B. Levine

INTRODUCTION:

It is with increasing frequency that we hear academicians refer to the supposed 'normality' of the migration phenomenon or the experiences and fate of migrants, especially with respect to Caribbean societies. However, there are dangers in making bold assertions about such generalized normality. Whether or not it is the case is subject to empirical investigation of specific societies, migrants or migratory situations and thus, requires the exercise of caution pending the results of such specific works.

To stress the normality of the migration phenomenon on the experiences, fate or processes of the migrants is to miss the heroic aspect of migration, classify all migrants alike, miss the selectivity which takes place as part of the phenomenon, and underestimate the effects of migration on such processes as the overcoming of poverty and the transference of knowledge and skills from host to source society. In order to fully understand the context of Puerto Rican return migration and to appreciate the variance in experience, fate and achievement among those who comprise this migration, it is necessary to trace the (1) development of Puerto Rican-United States relationship; (2) changes in Puerto Rican economy; (3) statistics of exodus and return migration as well as (4) life histories of the returnees themselves.

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[*] This paper is essentially a recast version of the chapter on "A Note on the Historical Development of the Puerto Rican Circuit" in *Benjy Lopez: A Picaresque Tale of Emigration and Return* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1980), pp. 188-202. Printed with the permission of Basic Books and the author.

THE MIGRATION CIRCUIT

The exodus to the mainland and the modernization of the island have created a kind of migration equilibrium -- or circuit -- for Puerto Ricans, in that many individuals now have the option of going from one place to the other in search of economic and social opportunities.

The result is that today Puerto Ricans who want to work in industry, for example, can do so on the mainland or on the island. And those who want to lead a particular style of life can do so in San Juan or New York. Some Puerto Ricans will alternate, "migrating and returning at various intervals and for various lengths of time."[1] The more successful among them may become scheduled commuters as they alternate between periods of work in the United States and doing their main occupation in Puerto Rico. The less successful may have neither fixed employment nor residence and thus drift in what seems to be an aimless search for small advantages.[2]

For some observers the development of the two centers of Puerto Rican life may seem to create an irreparable fissure in the Puerto Rican community, so that island Puerto Rican and mainland Puerto Rican share no common purpose. But for others the Puerto Rican circuit is but an expanded field for those potential voyagers who think in terms of ever greater, often varied, economic and social opportunities not hemmed in by mere geography and habit.

UNITED STATES-PUERTO RICAN RELATIONSHIP

The relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico can be characterized by the concept of imperial development. "Imperial development" describes a sociopolitical relationship where one nation controls the ultimate prerogatives of sovereignty of another, ethnically distinct nation, generally through some federal political mechanism, and is obliged to promote economic and social development in the dependent territory as a condition of that arrangement. Puerto Rico became dependent politically on the United States in 1898 when Spain ceded it to the latter at the conclusion of the Spanish-American War. Puerto Ricans were further incorporated in the political system of the United States in 1917 when they were given United States citizenship. In 1950 U.S. Public Law 600 gave Puerto Rico the right to draft its own constitution. The relationship took on its present juridical form in 1952 with the Puerto Rican constitution establishing the commonwealth status. Since then, Puerto Rico has been a "freely associated state" of the United States. This political relationship has been the basis for significant economic consequences for the island.[3]

The United States takeover of Puerto Rico in 1898 profoundly influenced the island's economy. Before then coffee had been the principal crop; soon thereafter sugar was raised to prominence. Whereas in the nineteenth century farmers in the hills had farmed for subsistence, or *haciendas* were run by individual families, United States businessmen industrialized the island's sugar cane production and organized it around large plantations for export production. As a result, the Puerto Rican rural worker became extremely vulnerable to fluctuations in the world economy.

At the beginning of the 1930s two hurricanes wreaked havoc on Puerto Rico's rural areas, and the world-wide economic depression equally devastated international trade. Agriculture organized for export production consequently floundered. A high birth rate made for a large population and further stagnated the economy. The living standard was low, and poverty abounded. Rural life offered little opportunity for economic achievement; and this agricultural listlessness had not been counteracted by a significant urban economy. Work in the needlepoint trades or employment as a domestic provided for not much more than a bare urban subsistence.

Since neither agriculture nor industry were responding to the economic needs of the Puerto Rican people, there was much unemployment. People either had no work or occupied themselves with work so inefficient that it was a form of disguised unemployment. One commentator characterized Puerto Rico in the thirties as "an island of sick, starving, and superfluous people, without land, without work, without hope ... "[4]

Where, then, could individual Puerto Ricans look to find decent paying work, to find economic opportunities that would lift them out of economic stagnation? Federally sponsored emergency relief projects provided a stopgap solution for some people.[5] Industry initiated and owned by the Puerto Rican government helped others.[6] Still other persons in search of work enlisted in the federally funded National Guard, which upon being called into federal service for World War II became an active component of the United States Army. The latter's presence on the island was a consequence of the political arrangement that defines the relationship between the two societies.

While the Army did not play a large part in any plans for solving Puerto Rico's economic woes, it nonetheless had an important, unintended economic impact. One author has argued that, in addition to actual service in the armed forces, dependents' benefits, GI benefits, and federal spending on the island for military expenditures, et cetera, were critical economic stimuli.[7] Most important, however, was that the United States Army became the institutional prototype *par excellence* of the United States employer. Some 76,000 Puerto Ricans did military service during World War II.[8] And it was in the United States Army during the 1940s that many Puerto Ricans received their initial training in modern nontraditional urban skills.[9]

IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES MAINLAND

The Puerto Rican trek to the United States mainland in search of work began many years before World War II but did not gather speed until after the war. In 1910 some 1,500 Puerto Rican-born residents were living on the mainland.[10] By 1940 there were 70,000. The rate of migration kept climbing, and a great jump came in 1946. In that year 40,000 Puerto Ricans journeyed to the United States, which then contained approximately 135,000 Puerto Rican-born residents, 85 percent of whom lived in the city of New York. During the first five years after the war, over 30,000 Puerto Ricans per year emigrated, and by 1950 the total number of Puerto Rican-born residents surpassed 225,000. The migration peaked during the 1950s at an average yearly rate of 40,000. In 1960 the Puerto Rican-born population on the mainland reached 615,000, and the total of all Puerto Ricans there approached 900,000.

In 1970, 810,000 Puerto Rican-born residents and 619,000 of their descendants were living on the mainland, representing 35 percent of the total population of Puerto Ricans on and off the island. Another one third of a million were return migrants living once again in Puerto Rico. Thus, over 42 percent of all Puerto Ricans have shared the mainland experience!

The Puerto Rican influx to the United States has been called "the first great airborne migration."[11] For Puerto Ricans, *embarcarse*, "to emigrate," has been relatively easier to engineer than for other immigrants. The former as citizens of the United States have had no political border to cross to get to the mainland: permission needed neither from the sending country nor from the new host country; no passport, no visa. Moreover, air transportation after World War II became relatively inexpensive and rapid. Fares dropped below seventy-five dollars one way and were reported as low as thirty-five dollars in some instances.[12] The planes reached New York from San Juan not in weeks or in days but in a matter of hours. A "family intelligence service"[13] allowed easy communication with the island, making it less difficult for new immigrants to follow in the footsteps of their predecessors than had been the case among earlier waves of immigration. Furthermore, many Puerto Ricans had already been exposed to American society by virtue of having served in the United States Army.

These factors, however, were but the conditions for the possibility of a migration of such a size. They do not, however, provide the subjective reasons that moved each individual to emigrate. A pamphlet distributed to potential emigrants by the Division of Community Education of the Puerto Rican Government discusses several of the reasons frequently given by Puerto Ricans for undertaking the journey.[14] One goes north to escape the hard times of a depresson or a labor market where there were more capable workers than there were jobs. Or, one leaves in order to get ahead on the assumption that one can live better elsewhere, or one leaves for adventure and to see the world or even to escape reality and one's problems. Or, one goes simply to imitate those who have already left.[15]

Economic reasons, however, have been the principal ones behind the Puerto Rican exodus: net emigraton rates have dropped sharply during recession years in the United States;[16] years of net return flow to Puerto Rico have been years of high unemployment in the States;[17] there has been a high correlation between Puerto Rican migration and the United States business cycle.[18] Statistically, migrants moved in response to "significantly greater absolute and relative earnings differentials from prospective jobs."[19] The typical Puerto Rican emigrant perceived migrating to be an economic opportunity, a chance to do better, a chance to make more money. Thus, many Puerto Ricans often accepted jobs in the States that gave them more money, though less status, than they could expect on the island.[20]

Migration as an international social phenomenon has come to be recognized as one particularly effective means to escape from the accommodation to poverty.[21] It is that kind of opportunity that requires choice; moreover the person who chooses to emigrate must perceive its potential value and must have the capacity to risk seeking that reward and the motivation to take that risk. Those who initially take such an opportunity can be expected to be either less insecure economically, having been able to take advantage of previous opportunities, or to be more adventuresome, or both.[22] Members of this nonaccommodating minority are the first to spot and take the opportunity. They demonstrate to others the feasibility and effectiveness of the adventure, and those others who so choose soon follow.

Indeed, the first Puerto Rican emigrants played such a role. A 1947 study reported that Puerto Ricans in New York City had higher incomes than Puerto Ricans on the island, that they were more urban, more skilled, and more educated and had a more stable record of employment than those who had not emigrated.[23] It is important to note that although the Puerto Rican immigrants studied were characterized as more "urban/industrial" than those who stayed home, they were, of course, characterized as less so than the mainland work force. (This comparison with the mainland work force is one way in which migration presents itself as an opportunity to potential emigrants.)

Those who had come early were essentially urban dwellers: the rural proletariat had not yet begun to emigrate. Thus, emigration at first did not help those who needed it most (except possibly in some kind of trickle-down effect). It was the better prepared or the more adventuresome who went first. Once these forerunners were successful, and word of their success got back to Puerto Rico, others who were less prepared and less daring, came to perceive the migration opportunity as less risky, and ventured forth to try to take advantage of it. Analyses of Puerto Rican immigrants during 1957-61 demonstrate that about 35 percent of those people migrating who were in the labor force were farm laborers as compared with the few rural immigrants found by the 1947 study.[24] A comparison of the 1950 and 1960 censuses with the 1947 study shows that an ever-increasing proportion of unskilled to skilled workers were emigrating[25] -- until finally they came to form the bulk of the total emigrating population.

When compared with others in the States, the Puerto Rican immigrants have not done well economically. Even by 1969, analyses of family income data show the average Puerto Rican family to be substantially behind other groups (median income in 1969 of families headed by Puerto Ricans was $6,230 -- almost $4,000 below that of families headed by non-Spanish whites).[26] The same study has suggested that the lag is largely traceable to less schooling, fewer wage earners, and the high percentage of Puerto Rican families headed by females. Areas of statistical parity between Puerto Ricans and non-Spanish whites, however, do include the following: mainland-born Puerto Rican males have jobs similar to non-Spanish white males; mainland-born Puerto Rican males who have gone on to college earn the same as non-Spanish white males who have gone on to college; families headed by mainland-born Puerto Ricans who live outside of New York have a mean family income close to the national average.[27]

The United States Commission on Civil Rights has also articulated the economic difficulties Puerto Ricans face in the States.[28] For example, it notes that in 1975 median income for mainland Puerto Rican families was $7,629 -- over $5,000 below the median for all United States families. The report warns, however, that the aggregate data disguise areas of economic success. To wit: in 1974, 104,000 mainland Puerto Ricans earned $10,000 or more, 25,000 earned over $15,000, and 5,000 over $25,000; in 1975, 198,000 mainland Puerto Ricans were high school graduates, 12,500 were college graduates, and 17,000 were enrolled in college; in 1975, over 42,000 mainland Puerto Ricans held professional, technical, or managerial jobs.

CHANGES IN PUERTO RICAN ECONOMY

While the emigration was in process, the Puerto Rican economy was undergoing great changes. Not only were Puerto Rican workers traveling to the United States for jobs created by U.S. capital, but U.S. capital was invited to come to Puerto Rico where it created jobs for Puerto Ricans.[29] The Puerto Rican Government focused on the possibility that its political tie with the United States might provide the source for the development of its own economy.[30] In a sense it generalized from its experience with the United States Army and embarked upon an intense program to attract many United States institutions to the island, providing a variety of jobs. The plan, "Operation Bootstrap," offered tax exemptions, aid in the construction of manufacturing plants, inexpensive labor, inclusion within U.S. tariff walls, and many other incentives to entice the U.S. capitalist. As a result, massive amounts of money have been invested in the island, and a U.S.-style economy has been created there.

The Puerto Rico that many immigrants left was largely underdeveloped and agricultural. The one to which they returned was developing rapidly and had become urbanized and industry-oriented. For example, in 1940, the gross national product of Puerto Rico was $287 million. By 1965, its GNP had jumped to $2,748 million (in constant 1954 dollars, economic production had multiplied four times). Per capita income, which was under $120 in 1940, had risen to $889 in 1965; family income rose from $611 in 1940 to $4,292 in 1965 (in 1954 constant dollars, family income had multiplied three and one-quarter times).

Agricultural employment declined from 45 percent to 16 percent of all employment on the island, losing some 100,000 jobs in the interim. Manufacturing, commerce, and the public sector, which had provided 24 percent of all jobs in 1940, increased to 51 percent in 1965 -- some 200,000 additional positions. During this period 1,000 factories opened, providing 70,000 jobs. Government bureaucracy emerged to become the principal employer on the island. The ratio of unskilled to skilled members of the labor force was five to one in 1940 and two to one in 1965. In 1940 there were 500 medical doctors and 6,300 teachers; in 1965 there were 2,700 of the former and 18,600 of the latter. In those twenty-five years, registered motor vehicles climbed from 27,000 to 319,000; telephones from 17,000 to 195,000; annual electric energy production from 166,000 thousand kilowatts to 6,652,000 thousand kilowatts. Urbanization increased from 30 percent of the population to over 50 percent.[31]

The growth has continued: in 1977, GNP was $7,900 million; per capita income was $2,472; family income was $9,838. Urbanization has continued climbing (over 58 percent of Puerto Rico's population lived in urban centers in 1970). Agriculture has continued declining: only 5 percent of the jobs were in agriculture in 1977. Recent data, however, demonstrate that the growth is not automatic, and that extremely serious problems exist in the Puerto Rican economy: the rate of growth fell to zero in 1974 and was a negative 2 percent for 1975.[32] Also, in considering the so-called Puerto Rican miracle -- that is, the rapid pace of economic growth on the island -- one needs to remember that it was not simply a result of the industrialization and heavy emigration.[33] And as long as caveats are in order, the reader should be aware that the great economic growth has not meant the elimination of poverty on the island. Poverty is a concept that measures relative economic rank. The growth of the Puerto Rican economy has meant the substitution of one system of inequality for another, although at a much higher level of economic capacity; it has not eliminated poverty.[34]

RETURN MIGRATION TO PUERTO RICO

Beginning around 1955 the phenomenon of the return migration began to gather momentum.[35] The growth of the Puerto Rican urban economy increased the number and the quality of jobs available to Puerto Ricans whether they were living on the island or on the mainland. Consequently, for some who had migrated to the States return to the island became a practical economic alternative to remaining on the mainland. But returning to Puerto Rico was not like leaving it to look for work. As in the case of the original emigration, there were many reasons for a decision to return. Some returned to accept better work, some because of the "decreasing demand for blue collar workers performing repetitive and routine jobs"[36] on the U.S. mainland. Others returned to find jobs that, although possibly paying less than had their jobs in the States, would have more status.

Some returned for more existential reasons. Life in New York was unpleasant. The problems of living in the city were overwhelming: drugs, discrimination, language, the persistent hassle of everyday life, all made it difficult for one to create a meaningful life.

Return to the island had significance in and of itself. For some Puerto Ricans it meant that they could rejoin family and friends; for others, that they could bring up their children properly; for still others, that they could satisfactorily deal with health problems. For many, return in fact meant that they could start to think in terms of building a better life in their own country.

As in the case of the emigration from Puerto Rico, the first to return were both more skilled and better educated than those who stayed on the mainland.[37] As one commentator has written, "Return migration is selective of the occupational elite of the Puerto Rican migration population."[38] It is also apparent that the return migrants were better educated and more skilled than those who had not emigrated and against whom they would compete for opportunities back home.[39] Similarly, they were both more urban[40] and had higher incomes[41] than the nonmigrants. Furthermore, those who were returning were better skilled than those who were leaving the island for the mainland during the same period.[42] The net result during at least the initial stages of the return migration was thus to make the island labor force look more like the labor force of the mainland. As the return migration grew, however, the characteristics of the returnees became less selective; educational and skill levels of later returnees are notably lower than those of returnees who came back before 1960.[43]

During the time the Puerto Ricans on the mainland had been pressured to "Americanize," the Puerto Rican economy also was responding to similar "Americanization." My first-person sociological testimonial, *Benjy Lopez: A Picaresque Tale of Emigration and Return*[44] recounts the life history of a Puerto Rican who made the trip to New York and then back to Puerto Rico. It was written precisely to emphasize the 'heroic' nature of the migration experience. It is a picaresque tale that takes the protagonist from rural Puerto Rico to San Juan; to the National Guard and the U.S. Army; to New York as a student, pimp, taxi driver, and merchant seaman; and then back to the island. During Benjy Lopez's adventures he encountered a labyrinth of race, ethnicity, class, and bureaucracy in the cosmopolitan world of New York City. He hustled hard in the city but unlike the myth of immigrant success in the United States, Lopez didn't go to the United States and make it; rather, he went there, *learned how to make it*, and then went home to claim his reward. It was only when he returned to Puerto Rico and applied his street smarts and New York knowledge on his own turf that his story became one of ethnic success.

Lopez's life demonstrates the resiliency and resourcefulness of those human beings who have learned to beat the system. His story differs from the typical testimonial of the Puerto Rican, and especially of the Puerto Rican migrant, who has been denuded of his vitality and presented as a person unable to take advantage of the world he lives in, unable to use it for his own purposes. Indeed, Lopez, too, sees himself as 'heroic,' as someone who can successfully find a way to triumph over adverse conditions. His migration and return provided the framework within which he was able to demonstrate and articulate these capacities.

Thus, when an "America-smart" Benjy Lopez, for example, returned to an "Americanized" Puerto Rico, he brought a whole host of skills and tastes that he had acquired in New York and that he was able to put to his own use back home on the island. In this sense, the mainland economy has served as a vast training ground where returnees learned both formal and informal skills relevant to the urban environment that had developed in Puerto Rico. Many returned not only with specific skills and new ways to do things but also with knowledge of how to capitalize on these new ways. Thus, for example, Puerto Ricans who were employees of manufacturing concerns in the States, might well, on returning to the island, work in or even start their own retail businesses.[45]

Among those who have returned, many have been relatively successful, while others have not. Comparing these two groups, a 1964 study drew the following differences. Those who were successful represented a middle-class or new elite element of Puerto Rican society, who having taken advantage of opportunities which became available as a result of modernization resumed their lives in Puerto Rico under favorable circumstances -- as professionals, white-collar workers, and highly skilled technicians and many started life in rural areas but ultimately settled in San Juan, thus experiencing a fair degree of social mobility.[46] Given their economic self-assurance, the subjective reasons they offered to explain their return most frequently had less to do with earning a decent living than with the social conditions that could allow them to live such a style of life.[47]

On the other hand, those who were unsuccessful on the mainland felt an economic compulsion to return. Having lost a job or having had a job "only once in a while" or not having ever had a job, such a Puerto Rican returned to the island for sustenance and maintenance by family and friends until he or she could find employment. And such a person was most likely to return to his or her birthplace, frequently a rural area or a small town -- neither one a strong base for social mobility.[48]

CONCLUSION

A balance sheet on the economic success of migration would have to compare Puerto Ricans who have migrated and their descendants with what their situation would have been had they not migrated. It would also have to compare the life standards, statuses and skills gained by the returnees, taking into account Puerto Ricans such as Benjy Lopez who have struggled in New York only to make it *back home*. Like migration, return migration involves structure and experience, variation and selection. The life histories of return migrants and the context of their saga can be important sources of diffused, deferred or different forms of achievement, success, or failure and more subtle levels of acculturation or acquisition than are touted in the conventional wisdom of academicians.

NOTES

[1] José Hernandez Alvarez, *Return Migration to Puerto Rico* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1967), p. 2.

[2] History Task Force/Centro de Estudios Puertorriquenos, *Labor Migration under Capitalism: The Puerto Rican Experience* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979), p. 141.

[3] For an elaboration of these ideas, see Barry B. Levine and Ralph S. Clem, "Imperial Development: The Cases of American Puerto Rico and Soviet Georgia," *Comparative Studies in Sociology* (1978) I: 319-36.

[4] David F. Ross, *The Long Uphill Path: A Historical Study of Puerto Rico's Program of Economic Development* (San Juan: Editorial Edil, 1969), p. 18.

[5] For a history of the Federal Relief Projects, see Thomas Mathews, *Puerto Rican Politics and the New Deal* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1960).

[6] For a history of the Puerto Rican Government's industrial enterprises, see Ross, *The Long Uphill Path*, chap. 4.

[7] A. J. Jaffe, *People, Jobs and Economic Development: A Case History of Puerto Rico Supplemented by Recent Mexican Experiences* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 39-42.

[8] History Task Force, *Labor Migration*, p. 124.

[9] Others were to get that kind of training working for Americans on the United States mainland to which they would migrate. While still additional others were to get it working for American employers who later were invited to set up business on the island. The Army was thus the first example of this kind of experience. History Task Force, *Labor Migration under Capitalism*, pp. 129-33, has argued that, for Puerto Rico, emigration and industrialization have been two sides of the same coin; that of the integration of the Puerto Rican worker into the United States controlled economy and labor force. In any case, Puerto Ricans have thereby historically been faced with both options described by Galbraith for leaving poverty: "escape from" via emigration and "escape within" via urban employment. See John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Nature of Mass Poverty* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979).

[10] Migration statistics computed from sources cited in Clarence Senior and Donald O. Watkins, "Toward a Balance Sheet of Puerto Rican Migration," in United States-Puerto Rico Commission on the Status of Puerto Rico, *Status of Puerto Rico: Selected Background Studies* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 703; Kal Wagenheim, *A Survey of Puerto Ricans on the U.S. Mainland in the 1970s* (New York: Praeger Special Studies, 1975), p. 71; History Task Force, Labor Migration under Capitalism, pp. 186-87; and Rita M. Maldonado, "Why Puerto Ricans Migrated to the United States in 1947-73." *Monthly Labor Review* (September 1976) 99 (9): 13. Data compiled by the United States Bureau of the Census, the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Puerto Rican Planning Board.

[11] Joseph P. Fitzpatrick, *Puerto Rican Americans: The Meaning of Migration to the Mainland* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1971), p. 2.

[12] Hernández Alvarez, *Return Migration*, p. 3. Also C. Wright Mills, Clarence Senior, Rose Kohn Goldsen, *The Puerto Rican Journey: New York's Newest Migrants* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1950), p. 44.

[13] Senior and Watkins, "Toward a Balance Sheet of Puerto Rican Migration," p. 706.

[14] René Marqués, ed., *Emigración* (San Juan: Division de Educación de la Comunidad, 2nd ed., 1966), pp. 20-21.

[15] Marqués, "A donde va la gente, va Vicente" ("Wherever the people go, there goes Joe"), *Emigracion*, p. 21.

[16] Lloyd G. Reynolds and Peter Gregory, *Wages, Productivity and Industrialization in Puerto Rico* (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1965), p. 30.

[17] Senior and Watkins, "Toward a Balance Sheet of Puerto Rican Migration," p. 703.

[18] Mills et al, *Puerto Rican Journey*, p. 43.

[19] Stanley L. Friedlander, *Labor Migration and Economic Growth: A Case Study of Puerto Rico*(Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1965), p. 128. Reynolds and Gregory. *Wages, Productivity, and Industrialization*, pp. 246-47, argue similarly: they see migration as "a rational attempt to maximize income."

[20] Cf., Mills et al., *Puerto Rican Journey*, chap. 4; and Senior and Watkins, "Toward A Balance Sheet of Puerto Rican Migration," p. 736.

[21] Galbraith, *Nature of Mass Poverty*, chap. 8.

[22] They are among "those best prepared for rescue" from poverty, in Galbraith's words (*Nature of Mass Poverty*, p. 138).

[23] Mills et al., *Puerto Rican Journey*, chap. 2.

[24] Friedlander, *Labor Migration*, p. 113. He hypothesizes that the beginning of the farm labor migration started with the decline of agricultural employment between 1950 and 1953 (ibid., p. 114, n.10).

[25] Ibid., p. 112.

[26] A. J. Jaffe, Ruth M. Cullen, and Thomas D. Boswell, *Spanish Americans in the United States -- Changing Demographic Characteristics* (New York: Research Institute for the Study of Man, 1976), p. 238 ff.

[27] Ibid.

[28] The United States Commission on Civil Rights, *Puerto Ricans in the Continental United States: An Uncertain Future* (Washington: Office of Management, Publications Management Division, 1976). Their data are taken from the current population surveys of the United States Bureau of the Census, published annually as *Persons of Spanish Origin in the United States*. These surveys are based on samples one-fortieth of the size of the decennial census and in contrast may prove somewhat exaggerated. The March 1978 report concludes that the 1977 medium income for mainland Puerto Rican families was $7,972, less than half the median for all U.S. families in *Persons of Spanish Origin in the United States: March 1978*, Series P-20, No. 339, (June 1979).

[29] Lloyd Best has aptly titled this style of economic development program "industrialization by invitation" in "Black Power and Doctor Politics," *Caribbean Review* 2:2 (Summer 1970):5.

[30] See Levine and Clem, "Imperial Development," p. 322 ff.

[31] Sources for the statistics on development are drawn from Puerto Rico Planning Board, *Indices Seleccionados de Progreso Economico y Social* (San Juan: Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 1970); Puerto Rico Planning Board, *Informe Economico al Gobernador 1976-77* (San Juan: Commonwalth of Puerto Rico, 1978).

[32] See Herman Nickel, "Puerto Rico's Drift Toward Statehood -- and Dependence," *Fortune* (13 August, 1979), p. 165; and José A. Cabranes, "Puerto Rico: Out of the

Colonial Closet," *Foreign Policy* (Winter 1978-79) 33:81: "the boom built on cheap labor may be over forever."

[33] See Celia F. de Cintrón and Barry B. Levine, "Quienes son los pobres en Puerto Rico?" in Rafael Ramirez, Barry B. Levine, and Carlos Buitrago Ortiz, *Problemas de Desigualdad Social en Puerto Rico* (Rio Piedras: Ediciones Libreria Internacional, 1972), p. 26.

[34] Ibid., p. 15.

[35] Hernandez Alvarez, *Return Migration*, p. 9.

[36] Ibid., p. 7.

[37] Ibid., p. 48, analyzing 1960 census data.

[38] Ibid., p. 91.

[39] Ibid., p. 48; Friedlander, *Labor Migration*, p. 99 ff. The returnees also ranked higher occupationally when compared with all employed persons on the island in 1964 in Senior and Watkins, "Toward a Balance Sheet of Puerto Rican Migration," pp. 755-56.

[40] Hernández Alvarez, *Return Migration*, p. 29.

[41] Ibid., p. 91.

[42] Friedlander, *Labor Migration*, p. 102, analyzing 1957-61 ramp surveys taken at San Juan airport by the Puerto Rico Bureau of Labor Statistics, finds that those going to the island were very much more skilled than those leaving it; however, these data include, among those going to the island, not only returnees but also non-Puerto Ricans.

[43] Steven Zell, Puerto Rico Planning Board. *A Comparative Study of the Labor Market Characteristics of Return Migrants and Non-Migrants in Puerto Rico* (San Juan: Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 1973), pp. 74, 162.

[44] (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1980).

[45] Hernández Alvarez, *Return Migration*, p. 92.

[46] Ibid., p. 104. A 1973 study similarly concluded that among return migrants there was "a group tendency toward upward mobility" in Celia Fernandez de Cintron and Pedro A. Vales, *Social Dynamics of Return Migration to Puerto Rico* (Rio Piedras: Social Science Research Center, University of Puerto Rico, 1975), p. 54).

[47] Hernández Alvarez, *Return Migration*, p. 110.

[48] Ibid., p. 116.

WHY RETURNEES GENERALLY DO NOT TURN OUT TO BE "AGENTS OF CHANGE": THE CASE OF SURINAM*

Frank Bovenkerk

The future looked rosy when Romeo Pengel (the name has been changed) left the Netherlands to return to his native country of Surinam. Romeo, a boy from a middle-class Creole background, had been sent to the Netherlands three years earlier on a Surinamese scholarship for the police academy. He was now twenty-six years old and a police inspector; he was to serve on the police force in the country's capital, Paramaribo. There were very few police officers in Surinam with the inspector's diploma, and in addition to a high salary for Surinamese standards, his status was to be high as well. Pengel was specialized in dealing with the drug trade and the illegal possession of arms. "If they give me the chance to set up my own drugs department in Surinam, then you'll really see something!"

At our first interview, just before he left the Netherlands, there were some doubts in his mind. What would it be like to work in a less highly developed

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*See the Dutch version of the paper in *Nieuwe Westindische Gids* (September 1981).

country with the police methods that he had learned in the Netherlands? Would his Dutch wife be able to adjust? In Surinam, people often say: "You can't compare Holland with Surinam, but still ..." There were a lot of things that made Surinam more attractive than Holland. "There is plenty of money in Holland, but it is not a good life. When I'm away at work all day, I don't want my wife to be shut up on the fourteenth story of a pile of bricks taking tranquilizers. I don't want my children to have to play in a corner of the room and I don't want Daddy to come home in an evil mood from all those millions of cars all around him. I want to live life my way, not like in Holland." During our interview his wife expressed her agreement and stated that she was willing to do her utmost to adjust to the Surinamese way of life. "I don't want to behave like a colonial. You won't find me in those all-white swimming pools." And another point: "You should go back, our country would never amount to anything if we all just stayed in Holland." Pengel resolutely said no to an attractive job offer at a large Dutch police department. "It will be all right in Surinam, there are a couple of boys on the police force there who studied at the academy, just like me."

Our second interview took place a few months later, in Surinam now. The Pengel family was living in a roomy wooden house with a beautiful garden. The salary was more than enough to live on, and it was very pleasant to sit on their balcony, where a soft breeze blew in the tropical heat. The contact with Holland was still intact. They subscribed to Dutch newspapers, "otherwise you lose touch, with the culture too. A theater or a concert, you don't have that here." Except for this one aspect, life seemed to be quite satisfactory.

But after a few months' experience on the Paramaribo police force, things did not turn out to be as easy as Pengel had thought. The atmosphere among his colleagues was not good, and this was largely due to the faulty promotion policies. "I know that when there weren't any inspectors on the force here who had been trained in Holland, they didn't used to have much to choose from. But nowadays the people who are promoted are just promoted on the basis of seniority or because they have politicians behind them, and not on the basis of their capacities." According to Pengel, the police force was dominated by an atmosphere of traditionalism. "'We always did things this way, why should we suddenly do things differently just because of that new guy?' And if you ask them for something like their patrol schedule, they just don't know what you are talking about." Another point was that he had to do without the equipment he was used to: "I didn't get a desk for months, if you ask for a folder you don't get it, because you just got two of them last week. There aren't enough cars and there are hardly any walkie-talkies."

In the following months, Pengel and I saw each other often and there was no end to his complaints. He sometimes stressed the humorous side. It was difficult to apply the Dutch kind of universal criteria in this small society (Surinam has a population of about 300,000) where so many people know each other and where everybody seems to know the members of the elite. "I was standing behind a tree trying to teach a policeman how to give somebody a traffic ticket. When he stopped somebody, the man opened the window and said 'Don't you know that I am Dr. so-and-so?' So I growled from behind my tree, 'Give the guy a ticket, even if he is the good lord himself, give it to him.' But I saw what a tricky situation that cop was in. People here are not used to treating everybody the same, no matter who they are." And there was also the corruption. "They have gradually realized that there are some young inspectors here who have come back from Holland and who aren't in for corruption. But the other day a restaurant owner came to bring us some food, and that man was one of the people being questioned in a police investigation. We sent the food right back."

Pengel did view it as a challenge to combat this kind of thing and introduce new techniques to the police force. They learned to conduct "directed" campaigns, the driving test was modernized, and a system of position evaluation was introduced for judging the personnel. It was not easy to challenge the authoritarian and traditionally organized police bureaucracy. "We do give each other support, and we visit each other at home, because the older officers don't understand us at all. When we talk about the profession, they often don't even know what we are talking about. The way we act with the people who are below us in the hierarchy is also much more relaxed. The patrolmen really look up to us, up till now all they ever got from their superiors was authoritarian behavior, orders are given in the imperative and there are never any reasons given at all. The older men experience this as a threat and, quite honestly, we haven't been able to make many changes yet, our group is still too small."

I later interviewed his superior, the police commissioner of Paramaribo. He had returned to Surinam eleven years earlier, with the first group of graduates from the police academy in the Netherlands. He thought the younger men were in too much of a rush, that they would be wiser to let the older officers be. "I have learned that if you want to introduce changes, then you appoint a commission with one of the men of the old school as chairman. You make a young inspector the secretary, and you simply let him do everything. That way, they will accept it." He stated that he had learned to make do with the old Surinamese system. During our interview, various of his inferiors came into the room and he spoke to them very cordially. But no one entered the room without first energetically clicking his heels, and when the commissioner picked up a cigar, they rushed up to light it for him. He was one of the few men left in the police force from that first group of Dutch police academy graduates. A number of his colleagues had switched to commercial jobs in the world of trade and industry, where they were much in demand because of their organizational capacities. In the period from 1969 to 1972, a second group of young inspectors had arrived (Pengel was one of them), and the temptation to abandon the daily frustrations on the police force for a better-paid job elsewhere was also very great for them.

Early in 1973, Surinam experienced the most violent civil tumults in its history. Rioters set fire to a school, and the Paramaribo tax office also went up in flames. For weeks, thousands of people demonstrated in the streets and the police were faced with the task of maintaining some semblance of law and order. Day and night, the police were forced to resort to violence to control the crowds, tear gas was regularly used. It was a political battle between the trade unions and the Surinamese government, and many weeks later there was still no prospect of any solution to the situation. To some of the young police officers, this was the straw that broke the camel's back. According to Pengel, the older men accepted the situation without objections. But the younger men who had returned from the Netherlands resented being used as if they were military troops against the population, while the government itself wouldn't even take the trouble to seek a political solution. What was one to do? There was also the commercial world of trade and industry, and there was a good chance of getting a job in the Netherlands. When the social conflict finally came to an end, Pengel left the police force.

This story of Pengel and the young police inspectors who had studied in the Netherlands is not the only one of its kind. Numerous educated returnees have been faced with similar frustration, and in general their main complaint is that they have so little opportunity to put the things they learned in the Netherlands into practice in Surinam, a country still in the process of developing. And Surinam, in turn, is not the only country of its kind. The literature about return migration is filled with examples of the problems facing citizens of a wide range of developing countries who have been educated abroad, problems in utilizing their knowledge and skills in behalf of modernization.[1] Levine wrote about university graduates returning to Ethiopia: "It must be said that the returnees as a whole have so far done little to modernize their country (...) they have been little more than misfits."[2] Baldwin seemed to agree with "the more thoughtful Iranian intellectuals" that "foreign study unfits the typical young Iranian for a useful career at home."

> But it is striking how often the idea that returnees will be the driving force behind progress in the developing countries is propagated by such a wide range of authors and with optimism. I shall cite a number of examples with respect to the Caribbean area. Friedland believed that the large number of Puerto Ricans who had attended school in the United States and had been trained in the industrial labor processes, and then returned to their native country, would contribute to the development of Puerto Rico.[3] Gonzalez was of the opinion that the same applied to the women who returned to the Dominican Republic from the United States.[4] In an official agreement with the Republic of Surinam, which had just become independent, the progressive Dutch Minister of Foreign Development Aid stated that the Netherlands would support the returnees in their efforts to utilize their knowledge and skills for the modernization of Surinam.
>
> The one thing which all these optimistic views have in common is that they are not backed by any thorough empirical research. Friedlander was interested in developing an economic model, Gonzalez really did no more than sum up the difficulties, and the Dutch Minister of Foreign Development Aid appealed to the political aspirations of the Surinamese population in the Netherlands.[5]

In reality, however, most of the researchers have come to the conclusion that returnees make no more than a negligible contribution to the modernization of their native countries in the Third World, and they have given a number of reasons why. These reasons all sought the cause of this "failure of the returnees" in the returning emigrants themselves or in shortcomings of this category as such. I shall mention a number of reasons that are often cited. The people who returned were the "wrong" ones, they were a negative selection of the least enterprising and least successful emigrants. They came back for the "wrong" reasons: they either failed as emigrants or came back for their actual retirement or simply because they wanted to live the kind of life associated with retirement. The kind of education they had had was not really suitable for a developing country. Too many students had chosen majors which were not practical (e.g., law instead of agricultural technology), or had had an education which was too specialized to be applicable.

No matter how accurate these comments might be in a large number of cases of return migration, there is still one important element missing, without which it is impossible to comprehend the issue in its full dimensions. In this paper, I would like to devote attention to *the dynamics of the process of return migration itself*.

It seems plausible that in those cases where the "good" migrants returned, where returning migrants had had an adequate education and where they were willing to make certain sacrifices, it *still* turned out to be very difficult for them to exert the influence they had in mind on the modernization process. Among the returnees, there was a definite contingent of people who more or less fit the specifications given above. Why, then, have even they so often been excluded from playing a role in the social development of the country?

It struck me in Surinam how people tended to speak of "the returning migrants from Holland" in such generalizations. This tendency was sometimes also evident in descriptions of returnees to other countries. In Surinam it seemed as if people viewed returnees as a kind of new (ethnic) minority; there were a lot of stereotypes pertaining to the returnees, particularly about their arrogant conduct. In the following sections, I shall try to show that, in a certain way, the returnees to Surinam did indeed meet with the minimum requirements needed to classify a social category as a real minority. I want to show how difficult it has been for them to cope with the social prejudices, and how that obstructed the effectiveness of whatever they might have tried to do.

On the other hand, there is the fact that minorities, certainly when they consist of well-educated people, can develop a certain strength of their own on the very basis of their minority position. It would be feasible for them to exploit their status as a minority, by means of their solidarity and the utilization of a certain monopoly position, to achieve their common goals. However, no such thing has taken place in Surinam. Numerous conditions can be cited which make this social category too heterogeneous to be able to act jointly as a group. *The tragedy of Surinamese return migration is that the returnees experience the disadvantages of the minority status without exploiting the advantages.*

Before further elaborating upon this proposition, it is necessary to make a few comments on the nature and the composition of the migration from Surinam to the Netherlands and of the subsequent return migration.

CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF THE MIGRATION FROM SURINAM TO THE NETHERLANDS

The migration from Surinam to the Netherlands was of a somewhat different nature than the labor migration from other parts of the Caribbean area. West Indians in the United Kingdom and Puerto Ricans and Dominicans in the United States are generally to be found rather uniformly in the lowest ranks of the labor market. Holland does have a similar kind of immigration of migrant laborers, but they come from Turkey, Morocco and other Mediterranean countries. The migration from Surinam to the Netherlands, however, has been a migration of people to the colonial mother country. In principle, they came to Holland to get the kind of education that would enable them to return to Surinam and attain a prominent position there, preferably in the bureaucracy.

At least, this has been the nature of Surinam-Holland migration ever since the beginning of the nineteenth century. The elite of colonial society sent their children to Holland to get a European and, more specifically, a Dutch education. In the mid-1960s, the Surinamese middle classes also began to participate in the migration, in the 1970s they were joined by the urban proletariat of Paramaribo, and in the years just before the country became politically independent (1975), tens of thousands of Hindustanis and Javanese also came to Holland, sometimes straight from the countryside. Although it was very clear that most of the migrants were mainly interested in improving their material situation, it was striking how many migrants viewed the socially successful elite of the past as the example they were following. Various surveys conducted among people about to leave Surinam showed that "studying" was the main motivation for migrating.[6] Once again: this did not mean that all the migrants actually engaged in some kind of "studying"; in fact most of them looked for a job. But it did mean that people still measured the success of their migration according to the Dutch diplomas which they attained. The successful Surinamese emigrant was the one who got a good education in the Netherlands and then returned home.

All things considered, the extent and the diversity of the migration from Surinam to Holland has been enormous. When Surinam became completely independent in a political sense (1975), the number of emigrants was estimated at 130,000, which was about a third of the total population of Surinam at that time. In that same year, the governments of Surinam and the Netherlands signed an agreement pertaining to the residence rights of both of their subjects in each other's countries. In its haste to be rid of this troublesome colony, the Netherlands accepted conditions set by the Surinamese government which meant, in fact, that virtually all the people of Surinam could still leave for the Netherlands. At the moment about two thousand people migrate every month and if it goes on at this rate, by the end of 1980 no less than about half the population of Surinam will have migrated.[7]

I have already described how this began as an elite migration, and how the social level gradually declined. By 1972, the migration had "ripened"[8] to the point where a cross section of the population was taking part in it. The migration not only became heterogeneous with respect to social class and sex, the ethnic background of the migrants now exhibited the same diversity as that of the entire Surinamese population. The migrants included Creoles, Hindustanis, Javanese, and small numbers of bush Negroes, Chinese, whites and Indians.

CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF THE RETURN MIGRATION FROM THE NETHERLANDS TO SURINAM

Ever since the Second World War, return migration has been a prevalent topic of discussion among Surinamese people in the Netherlands. Before then, many intellectuals had returned to Surinam. However, with the decline in the social level of the migration, there was a rapid decrease in the number of people who returned. In the 1950s about a quarter of the emigrants returned; in the 1960s this fell to about 10 percent; in the 1970s to less than 5 percent and at the moment the number of Surinamese who return from the Netherlands is less than 2 percent a year. The number of Surinamese people who return to Surinam from the Netherlands is now less than a tenth of the number of people who emigrate there. The fact that so few people return to Surinam does *not* mean that the desire to return home is negligible. Various superficial opinion polls conducted among Surinamese people in the Netherlands by commercial research firms have shown that about two-thirds of the people interviewed did plan to return to Surinam some day. However, this type of opinion poll cannot be viewed as a reliable predictor of what people will actually do in the future. The results of these polls can be viewed as a reaction to what these people view as the regrettable decline in return migration. This phenomenon -- the discrepancy between what people really do and what they say about it -- has been referred to by Amersfoort as "return ideology,"[9] and I later interpreted this phenomenon in a similar fashion.[10]

In a numerical sense, return migration to Surinam might be much less significant than the ideology around it, but even if only a relatively small number of people do return, this can definitely be of significance within the small population of Surinam (approximately 300,000). What is more important, however, is the qualitative effect. Within the group of returnees, there is a relatively high percentage of well-educated people (for instance, people who have had the kind of specialized education which is not available in Surinam at all, thus giving them a kind of European monopoly), people who have come into contact with different kinds of political ideas, and people who are accustomed to the way of life in an industrialized, urban society.

I estimate that at the moment, there are between 20,000 and 30,000 people in Surinam who at one point in their lives lived in the Netherlands, and that is between 7 percent and 10 percent of the Surinamese population. But as I said before, their quality is the important point. Many of them would be capable of playing a very functional role in the Surinamese development process. It would not surprise me if Surinam had the highest percentage of intellectuals of all the developing countries.

In 1972 I began a longitudinal study among 75 returnees and their families or other dependents: a total of 147 individuals who returned to Surinam from the Netherlands in that year. They were selected in such a way that they constituted a reasonably representative cross section of the people who returned to Surinam that year.

> This study differed from the more common single interview of the returnees because I followed them during a long period of time. The longitudinal study is still being conducted, although I have already written several papers on the subject.[11] In the course of the past eight years, I have come to know these people quite well (during four visits to Surinam), and what began as conversational interviewing has turned into something very close to participant observation. This type of research method makes it clear how much more complicated the migration process is than most studies show. It not only provides insight into the initial motivation for emigration, the reasons for returning and the process of reintegration into the original society. It also shows that some people leave Surinam for the Netherlands a second time, that some of them make a second attempt to remigrate back to Surinam; it shows how people's motivations can alter in the course of time, how they can even change their versions of events that took place in their own past.

This study made it clear that the returnees came from a wide range of social backgrounds (as was also the case with the emigrants). The group studied included Creoles and Hindustanis, Chinese and an Indian. There were older people (the oldest was 70) and younger people; people from the very poorest urban proletariat of Paramaribo; their occupations ranged from prostitutes and welders to journalists, teachers, economists and sociologists. They had lived all over the Netherlands; If we look at the group as a whole, it can be said that about two-thirds of them belonged to the category of "unsuccessful emigrants." They were people who had predominantly come from the poorest classes; none of them had succeeded in finishing any kind of education or training course in the Netherlands; many of them were unable to find work or were fired; some of them had returned to Surinam because of marriage problems; and a number of them returned to Surinam as a result of the pressure of psychological problems which were often directly due to their status as migrants. Most of them suffered a painful loss of face when they returned. There is hardly any point to asking how much potential this category of unsuccessful migrants will furnish for the modernization of Surinamese society. Most of them did not bring anything back but their frustrated emigration expectations.

However, about a third of the returnees (22 of the 75 in the sample) had completed their studies at Dutch universities or technical colleges and were clearly "successful." They included a number of very striking success stories; boys from a humble background who went to Holland and came back as important men with good degrees. A successful return is very closely associated with a good education. The type of migrant who earns a lot of money somewhere else and then comes back to set up a business of his own is virtually unknown in Surinam. But for the people with college or university degrees, the prospects in Surinam are excellent. It is very easy for them to find a job suited to their capacities, and although they usually do earn less than they would have in the Netherlands, the social status which they hope to attain in Surinam is much higher than would have been the case in the mass anonymity of the Netherlands.

With respect to this category of successful, well-educated migrants the question as to whether they would be capable of acting as "agents of social change" was very relevant. The answer, however, was generally a negative one. With this general answer, I am expressing the opinion prevalent among the returnees themselves: their general complaint was that people in Surinam paid very little attention to their expert knowledge, nor did anyone seem to be especially interested in their opinions. This brings us back to the central issue of this paper: why were well-educated and successful returnees not capable of bringing about modernization? The first part of the answer lies in the fact that in Surinam returnees were viewed as a new minority and as such were confronted with social prejudice.

RETURNEES AS A NEW MINORITY

When migrants returned from the Netherlands twenty years ago, it was a special event, they could count on a cordial reception and a sharp rise in esteem. Ever since the 1960s, however, the "democratization" of the emigration process has taken the glamour out of return migration. It became a routine matter, and the fact that a person had lived in the Netherlands no longer automatically meant a rise in prestige. One of the returnees commented sadly: "Everybody used to admire you if you came back from Holland. It isn't like that any more."

A lot has changed, the general opinion of the returnees has changed for the worse. Let us note what was said about them in *De West*, one of the most influential daily papers of Surinam. Returnees were repeatedly referred to in the editorials, where they were called "good-for-nothings," who have been "spoiled by the easy life in Holland" and were often depicted as criminals. "In Surinam, the last thing we need is the return of thousands of *bums, pimps, drug dealers* and other *gangsters*. It would be a calamity for the country if these people were to return to Surinam," was how *De West* put it on September 29, 1976. Another prevalent theme was that the returnees always thought they knew everything better: "The feelings of hostility which the returnees are faced with in Surinam are often caused by the arrogance of people who have spent some time in Holland and think they know everything better than the people who stayed here," according to *De West*, March 24, 1977.

It was striking how greatly this daily paper indulged in generalizations. It was not an isolated case, public opinion did the same. For example, the distinction was rarely made between permanent emigrants to the Netherlands, Surinamese people who have only come back for a short vacation, and permanent returnees. All kinds of unflattering comments about the people who turned their backs upon Surinam were often heard, and people liked to confirm their unfavorable impression by focusing their contemptuous attention on especially arrogant tourists. The returnees were then said to be "high and mighty" and they "liked to show off." A group of people back in Surinam on vacation who promenaded about in the center of the city in fur coats were even referred to on the opinion page of another daily paper. The returnees were thought to act phony and put on a strange Dutch intonation, they showed off with their expensive clothes and they were thought to have replaced consideration for other people with cool and calculating behavior.

All this indicated that we are dealing with a category that had been attributed the status of a minority. I want to take the term minority to mean a relatively small number of people who: (1) are generally viewed within a society as belonging to one and the same group on the grounds of certain socially relevant features; (2) who themselves also experience these features which they have in common as a binding principle; and (3) who bear a relation to society as a whole or to certain parts of it in which more or less fixed patterns of conduct have developed pertaining to the treatment of the group by society and vice versa.

From what has been said above, it is clear that the first condition has been met. Was there also an internal recognition of this minority status? This condition has also been fulfilled, although much less clearly. It could be ascertained that there was indeed some form of personal interaction on the grounds of common experiences in Holland. In particular the returnees from the higher classes regularly sought each other's company, they met each other in certain bars, restaurants and clubs, which were sometimes given a Dutch nickname. There was relatively little evidence of mutual ties and solidarity. There was nothing among the Surinamese returnees to compare with the exuberant and organized way that Japanese academics who studied in the United States regularly meet each other,[12] or the very marked way that Middle Eastern students who have returned from studying in Germany still persist in hanging out at the local Goethe Institutes.[13]

The third condition, however, was very clearly met with: a wide range of more or less fixed patterns of behavior have developed between Surinamese who have never been away and returnees. The latter are the target of ridicule ("He is so Dutch he took along his radiator."), and subject of numerous stereotypes (spoiled, arrogant, conceited) and certainly also the victims of discrimination. I systematically questioned employers about their willingness to hire returnees. If there was no one else available, they were willing to hire returnees with the necessary qualifications, but for the rest they had a marked preference for people who had never been away. The opinions were widespread that the returnees would expect to earn too much, that they would have become estranged from the Surinamese way of doing things, that they would make their colleagues jealous by constantly bragging about how wonderful everything was in Europe, that they would be arrogant ("They act like they aren't Surinamese any more, as if they are better than you and they look down on you as if you were a piece of dirt.").

No matter how determinedly some returnees resolved not to take any notice of this kind of discrimination, they too were tempted to react now and then. They couldn't keep a remark about "you people" or "this country" from slipping out, they complained about the slow work rate, the rigidity of the bureaucracy, the authoritarian interpersonal relations within the various organizations and about the lack of a sense of responsibility. One returnee, a teacher, was so tormented by the backwardness of the Surinamese educational system that he said to his colleagues: "If a man from the Middle Ages were transported to Surinam, he would wonder what it was all about. But at the school he would say: I know all about that, that is a school." The irritation was also sometimes expressed when people publicly took it upon themselves to perform a pedagogic task: "In Holland we do it like this!" Or: "They speak such bad Dutch here and when I hear it I sometimes make some little corrections. But they don't appreciate that one bit, they say you suddenly think you know everything if you come back from Holland. They just don't want to hear the truth here."

A strategy often used in an attempt to combat the antipathy towards returnees consisted of putting forward the claim that one had left the Dutch fleshpot to bravely return to Surinam "to build up the country." This phrase might be very suitable for propaganda purposes, but anyone who used it in daily conversation was looking for trouble. The response would be furious. "These people come back and they think they can say anything here." Or, "That might be very well and good in Holland, but we are in Surinam here," or "If it is so wonderful in Holland, why didn't you stay there?" Another classic comment was "If it is good for Holland, that doesn't necessarily mean it is good for Surinam."

I deliberately only gave examples of the reciprocal interaction between the people who had never left and the returnees which bore witness to the form and not the contents of the conflict. A great deal of the antipathy towards returnees was based on their status as members of a minority. It was not the modernization proposals in themselves which gave rise to antipathy, it was also important who thought them up and who put them into words. The returnees were told again and again that they were not better for their Dutch experience.

There were two main reasons for this hostile attitude towards the returnees. In the first place, in various ways the returnees did present a real threat. They were competition on the labor market and on the housing market. In the tiny country of Surinam, some occupations only had perhaps a few people practicing them, so that one more colleague could be a direct material threat, especially when it was someone who had just finished a vocational training course and was familiar with the most modern techniques and methods of the occupation. In the second place, this antipathy was also the result of a certain degree of resentment towards people who had once turned their backs on Surinam. They made it clear that they didn't think their own country was good enough to build up a life there. The returnees -- no matter how much enthusiasm there might be about their new preference for Surinam -- now had to pay for their transgression in the past. So the antipathy towards returnees had a material motivation as well as a moral motivation.

RETURNEES AS A DIVIDED SOCIAL CATEGORY

We have seen that the minority status of returnees was defined within Surinamese society as a whole, and that a more or less fixed pattern of personal interaction had developed between the returnees and the rest of Surinamese society. In addition, there was very little evidence of a sense of belonging together, and even less evidence of mutual solidarity. Internally, the "minority" of returnees did not really have much in common with what we usually think of as a minority, it was an extremely heterogeneous collection of people. The following three main factors were responsible for this phenomenon: (1) as a result of the complexity of the compostion of the stream of migrants, there was no real common basis for common conduct; (2) in the course of time, various generations of returnees had come into being with conflicting interests; (3) there was an attractive alternative: reemigration to Holland.

1. We already noted that all the various social classes of Surinam participated in the emigration to the Netherlands. The same was true of the return migration, though here the two extremes of the social stratification system were overrepresented. A disproportionate number of returnees were the highly educated people who filled the country's leading positions, and the "failures" who mainly returned to the lowest social

ranks. This was not a good basis for organization and joint action.

Moreover, there was the issue of ethnic segmentation. Surinam is one of the most heterogeneous multiracial societies in the world. All the various ethnic groups were represented in the emigrants, and the same held true for the returnees. The various church associations, political parties and other organizations, each representing a specific ethnic group, formed their own social frameworks for a compartmentalized reintegration.

According to public opinion, the returnees might all exhibit the same attitude of conceit and arrogance, but in reality a wide range of readjustment patterns could be distinguished. There were certainly returnees (and even more so, people on vacation!) who behaved arrogantly. However, there were also many who returned with very little show of self-confidence, or who did their best not to attract any attention at all. There were also people who were willing to go to a lot of trouble to show that they were "still Surinamese," they did their very best not to act like a *blaka bakra* (white Dutchman). This was also not conducive to the development of mutual solidarity.

Practically all the returnees came back individually (with their immediate families or other dependents); I do not know of any cases of a group of any substantial size returning together in an organized manner.

2. Return migration is a phenomenon that has been in existence for a very long time. Among the intellectuals, various generations of returnees could be distinguished. There was a generation of people who had returned before or immediately after the Second World War, and who were generally quite conservative. They had played an important role in the colonial and neocolonial system, but had now ceased to do so. A second generation had returned to Surinam in the fifties and sixties, and it was in their ranks that Surinamese nationalism was born. They now held the most important positions and belonged to the established elite in the young republic. The generation of more recent returnees sometimes had nationalistic ideas, but they were also often politically quite left wing. One of the main reasons for the antipathy which the most recent returnees were faced with was the very fact that the previous group of well-educated returnees had already filled the key social positions. This subsequent return of new generations did not provide a basis for solidarity; instead, it was a source of intergenerational conflicts.

3. In his paper about return migration to Jamaica, Taylor[14] noted that returnees consciously or unconsciously tended to constantly evaluate their posi-

tion against the background of the "foreign" frame of reference. Returnees had had one more experience, life abroad was a real alternative to them. We have seen how different the reactions of individual returnees were: from the very beginning, some of them were very unassuming and unobtrusive and simply accepted their new situation. Others were initially recalcitrant and rebellious when their attempts to introduce changes met with failure, but later did manage to find some kind of *modus vivendi*. However, there was also a category of returnees who had met with so much opposition and antipathy and frustration that they had no choice but to reemigrate to the Netherlands. And this was a sizeable group: of the 75 returnees (and their families and dependents) in my 1972 sample group, no less than 45 have reemigrated to the Netherlands by now (1980). Return migration to Surinam was anything but easy!

A RECENT DEVELOPMENT: THE COUP D'ÉTAT ON FEBRUARY 25, 1980

I have shown how difficult it was for returnees to cope with their minority status, and how they were too segmentalized to be able to utilize this minority position for purposes of joint action. That was the situation up until very recently.

On the night of 24-25 February, 1980 a group of young noncommissioned officers in the Surinamese army

(SKM) succeeded in carrying out a coup d'état. It is still too early to evaluate this "intervention," as the officers euphemistically referred to it. The newspapers did their best. One reporter viewed it as a move against inefficiency and corruption, another saw it as an attempt to alter the course of the economic development model, and a third thought that the whole point was to eliminate the ethnic conflicts within the country. All the commentaries expressed the hope that Surinam's great problems would now be solved.

However, up till now there has been little evidence of this solution. The "boys" (as the new men at the top are referred to) did not have a blueprint for a new social system. They summoned representatives of the various political groups and had them explain how they thought things ought to be organized in the future. The sergeants even put up a suggestion box at the gate to the army base, so that anyone who had a good proposal could drop it in. A civil council was appointed to take over the management of the administration, but it was not exactly a group of people from whom a fundamentally different political line could be expected. It looks as if the sergeants have been taken by surprise by their own victory.

It is interesting to note what the immediate cause was that led to the coup d'état. It was a conflict between the noncommissioned officers and the people in command of the army, who were supported by the Surinamese government. The disputed issues involved legal rights, salaries and promotion policies in the army. The commanding officers reacted to all the demands pertaining to these issues in an extremely condescending manner. The Surinamese government viewed it as insubordination and took legal action, which was to result in disciplinary punishment. Just before a new court judgment was to be passed, the noncommissioned officers seized power.

In an article written by one of the Dutch journalists (Jansen van Galen, *Haagse Post*, March 1980), a remark was made that seemed much more to the point than all the essays in depth about the true background of the coup d'état. Jansen van Galen remarked that it was a rebellion of returnees from the Netherlands. And it was true: all the new men in power had had their military training in the Netherlands. There they had come into contact with the Dutch way of doing things in the army, with the existence of a real trade union of soldiers (unique in the world) and with a military organization within which the privates and noncommissioned officers had a say regarding their own rights. This Dutch system was one of the attainments of the democratization of Dutch society in the sixties, and was very far removed from the way superiors treated their inferiors in Surinam. A say in the matter? A fair discussion? It was all very alien to the kind of centralized and authoritarian type of social organization that Surinam had, a social organization that still exhibited numerous aspects of colonialism.

How can we explain the fact that these sergeants did succeed in gaining control of the country, whereas previous generations of returnees had always failed? Of course a very important element was the simple fact that soldiers have arms and know how to use them. But that was and is also true of policemen, and the example presented at the beginning of this paper showed that the policemen also failed in their efforts.

It is still very difficult to analyze this question, but it does look as if a number of conditions stated above were indeed met with in the case of the sergeants. In the first place, the antipathy which the noncommissioned officers were confronted with as a minority within the army was very pronounced. The attitude of the higher officers who had *not* had their military training in the Netherlands was very arrogant; one of the things they made the young noncommissioned officers do was polish the buttons of their uniforms. The younger men viewed their superiors as the exponents of a colonial, obsolete era.

In the second place, these sergeants exhibited a greater degree of social homogeneity than had ever been the case with other categories of returnees. All nine of them (that was all there were!) were young and the great majority was from the Creole proletariat. They all returned in one and the same year (1975), and they all studied at the very same Dutch military academy and they knew each other quite well. The question remains as to whether these sergeants really will introduce progressive changes, or at least make it possible for them to be introduced. This isn't really the kind of thing we have come to expect from military men. But who knows?

NOTES

[1] F. Bovenkerk, *The Sociology of Return Migration: A Bibliographic Essay* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974).

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Part II

Notes on Remittances

THE IMPACT OF REMITTANCES IN THE RURAL ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN: NOTES ON THE LITERATURE

Hymie Rubenstein

INTRODUCTION

Even when migrants do not go back to the West Indies they may still have a significant impact on conditions in the region. For as long as migrants *believe* that they will eventually return, they will continue to behave in a manner which will effect their home society.[1] The most tangible sign of this behavior is the ongoing remitting of cash and other economic resources to the home society. Remittances, of course, are not peculiar to the West Indian migratory situation. But as a concomitant of population movements in so many parts of the world, remittances are felt to be both one of the most common motives for physical mobility and the one which is most frequently cited as having a positive effect on the sending unit. Over the years, many writers have noted that homeward transfers of cash have a beneficial impact on individuals, the local area and, in the case of international migration, the national arena as well.[2]

The primary aim of this paper is to examine the extent to which these benefits occur in the rural areas of the English-speaking Caribbean. More specifically, it is to explore the impact of remittances -- as a concomitant of return migration -- on the economic development and well-being of the countryside through a survey of the available literature. The situation of particular societies may have changed somewhat and some of the ethnography in the paper seems dated. However, this gap is the inevitable result of the lack of attention paid to the topics of West Indies return migration and remittances. Therefore, the secondary aim of this paper is to provoke interest in a phenomenon which for too long has been neglected but which have important academic and social implications for the region.

THE RETURN EXPECTATION AND REMITTANCE OBLIGATION

Two main sets of factors influence the transfer of funds and other resources from West Indian migrants to their home communities. These are (1) a general expectation that they will someday resettle back home and (2) a specific obligation to support particular individuals, especially close kin, who were left behind when they migrated.

Most West Indian migrants retain their home ties and many intend to return to their native land. Even long periods of absence has hardly altered the home commitment of many migrants.[3] Many fulfill this commitment and hundreds of former rural residents now living abroad annually visit their natal communities for periods from a couple of weeks to several months.

The elements making up the home commitment and return orientation are part of what might be called the 'return expectation' in West Indian migration.[4] Several studies report an early tradition and continuing intentions by migrants to return to the West Indies.[5]

The return intention is not always acted upon and much of the contemporary migration to North America and England may well turn out to be irreversible. Yet as long as migrants continue *to act* as if they will eventually return home, this will have significant consequences for the sending societies and its members. Several scholars have pointed out that the remittance of cash and other gifts is an important migrant obligation.[6] Migrants typically send money and other gifts to their dependents and primary relatives for support and personal use, or they attempt to finance passages of those who wish to emigrate.[7]

The sums sent home by migrants are often substantial. Remittances are the principle sources of hard currency in several small islands.[8] Dirks found that in one small community in Tortola, B.V.I., external cash inputs accounted for 45 percent of the income of the average household.[9] In 1951 the export value of cotton, Montserrat's main cash crop, was nearly nine times the value of remittances; by 1960, at the height of the return to England, a complete turnabout had occurred with the value of remittances almost four times that of cotton exports according to Philpott. An almost identical situation is reported for Nevis by Frucht where revenue from sea island cotton, also the island's chief export crop, was well exceeded by revenue from remittances by the early 1960s. Similarly, Hill reports that in some years in Carriacou remittances and other repatriated earnings exceed local cash income from all sources.[10]

Seasonal migrants also send back money to their home communities. Foner and Napoli estimate that farm workers in the United States remit between one-third and one-half of their earnings to their families in Jamaica. Contributions of remittances to individual households is equally impressive. For one rural community in Barbados Sutton and Makiesky reported that 25 percent of adults received funds from relatives overseas. In the two rural districts in Montserrat studied by Philpott over 55 percent of households depended on cash from overseas for between 70 to 100 percent of their money incomes.[11]

In a sample of 100 households in a rural Vincentian community I found 26 households counted on extra-island cash gifts for at least 25 percent of their support while only 36 households received no external support. Although only 4 of the 100 households were almost wholly dependent on nonisland residents for support, almost two-thirds of the total received some cash from overseas. Moreover, nearly every village household not currently receiving extra-island support has a history of remittance contributions from present or former members.[12]

THE DISPOSITION AND ALLOCATION OF REMITTANCES

To determine the probable developmental impact of externally-generated cash inputs requires knowledge of the gross amount of money migrants send home; and the manner in which remittances are allocated.

In the Grenadian dependency of Carriacou, Smith notes that men are initially obliged to migrate in order to send money home to purchase land or build, repair or furnish a house so as to meet the culturally-defined expectations of marriage. Additional post-marital trips take place to acquire the means to invest in traditional local enterprises such as shops, sloops, schooners, land and livestock.[13]

According to Otterbein, in rural communities in the southern parts of Andros Island, The Bahamas, remittances are also initially earmarked for building or furnishing a house in preparation for marriage. Agricultural wage-labor trips to the United States likewise provide money to buy clothing and foodstuffs to supplement the local subsistence economy. For these reasons, 42 percent of the adult male population of these Andros Island communities spends most of its time away from home.[14]

Crane also found in Saba that a large portion of the adult male population was off the island at any given time and local residents had become ever more dependent upon money sent back by these men overseas. Most of what was received seems to be spent on subsistence needs. Much of the remainder was used to finance either the wage-labor migration or extra-island education of others, or to purchase or build island homes for potential retirees or those who have been laid off overseas.[15]

In nearby Nevis, Frucht related a number of ways in which remittances from the Caribbean (Trinidad, Curaçao, Aruba, and the United States Virgin Islands) and elsewhere (the United States and Britain) were employed. Gifts from workers who left for the Southern Caribbean soon after the end of World War II were used to support their families back home or were invested in savings later used to buy cultivatible land and small shops. Monies sent from the more recent exodus to England were also meant for the subsistence of island dependents or to finance the overseas migration of additional family members.[16]

Nevis's former sister colony, Anguilla, has had one of the longest experiences of return migration in the region. Even before emancipation Walker points out that slaves were often sent to other islands to labor on plantations for wages. Workers still emigrate throughout their productive years, remittances sent back to family members used to acquire the imported food needed to supplement the low island agricultural output. As in Carriacou and Andros Island, remittances and repatriated savings also finance Anguillan marriages and house construction. Davison reports that the acquisition of a dwelling back home also occurs among Jamaican migrants residing in England.[17]

Further south in Barbados, Sutton and Makiesky found land and housing acquired via remittances during the latter part of the nineteenth century resulted in the formation of numerous independent rural communities. More recently, external funds sent to rural areas have been spent on modern housing, refrigerators and other consumer goods, school fees, and celebrations marking births, marriages, and other rites of passage.[18]

Philpott's bench mark study of the implications of the mass rural lower-class movement of Montserratians to England contains the fullest account of the disbursement of remittances. First and foremost, remittances are intended for the support of island dependents and one of the primary reasons for emigrating is the need to fulfil the economic requirement of parenthood. As well as being employed to satisfy their daily subsistence needs, remittances are increasingly employed to send island children to secondary school.

Montserratian remittances are also the primary source of passage money enabling additional family members and close friends to travel to England. Paralleling the situation elsewhere in the region, money sent back to Montserrat is used for capital acquisition as well, particularly to purchase land. At least two idle estates were subdivided and put into subsistence production by peasant proprietors during the early years of this century.[19]

To sum up, West Indian remittances are spent primarily on food, clothing and shelter. They are also used to acquire household furnishings, agricultural land, small businesses, transportation vehicles, sailing vessels and livestock, as well as to finance education and additional overseas travel.

DEVELOPMENTAL IMPACT OF REMITTANCES

Do these remittances, and the areas in which they are expended, increase rural productivity? Do they have a positive impact on agricultural output? Are rural incomes and the general level of living enhanced?

Do rural resources, especially land, become more equitably distributed? Are new opportunities for productive investment developed? Are rural-urban income and life style disparities reduced?

It is generally acknowledged that one of the major constraints on rural West Indian economic development is the shortage of capital for productive and innovative investment. Given the widely held view that remittances are an important source of foreign exchange in financially troubled labor-exporting countries, it would seem reasonable to expect that the large inflow of "unearned" revenue would help overcome some of the monetary constraints on West Indian rural economic development.

The evidence from the literature, though brief and fragmentary, is not at all encouraging on these issues. On the contrary, rather than being a catalyst for development, remittances, and the entire system of return migration of which they are a part, may even be adding to the deterioration of the already problem-ridden rural economies of most West Indian societies. There are, to be sure, some exceptions to this gloomy prognosis.[20] Certainly, direct economic aid from overseas relations raises the standard of living and material quality of life of those left behind. But this is not the same as saying that rural economic development has taken place or that there has been an increase in local-level income generating activities, employment opportunities, or other types of internal economic expansion.

A better level of living for some families may mean relatively worse economic conditions for others. There is evidence, for example, that remittances tend to increase extant material disparities rendering those families receiving little or no external funding comparatively worse off than they were before. In Nevis, remittances from middle-class migrants who went to the United States during the first quarter of this century merely increased the prosperity of landowners, merchants, civil servants and other well-off persons. Since passage money and initial living expenses came from island profits and savings, the net effect may have been an outflow of cash from the island. The later migration of the upper segment of the Nevisian working class to Aruba, Curaçao, and Trinidad immediately after the Second World War permitted these 'Special People,' as they were locally called, to enhance the social position of their families at the expense of the agricultural wage-laboring portion of the working class. These 'Special People' sent back remittances which were used for family support and placed into savings later employed to purchase lands and shops. Increased cash resources also permitted the 'Special People' to send their children to secondary school enabling them to meet civil service requirements or to fill available commercial positions.[21] A rather similar economic strategy for status maintenance and enhancement is reported by Betley among the elite members of the community in St. Vincent.[22]

The results of expansion in educational opportunities in Montserrat also has had little overall developmental impact. With the attrition of the local middle class through migration to the United States (accompanied by the same outflow of cash as occurred in Nevis) during the early part of this century, lower class social mobility was made possible through secondary school or higher education. As a formal requirement for entry into the civil service and as a vehicle for attaining middle-class status, secondary school education, especially among country children, became increasingly financed through remittances. But the expansion of island educational opportunities and the increased potential for upward mobility led to an accelerated exodus of graduates rather than to local social and economic development. As more Montserratians qualified for middle-class occupational roles, the number of available positions soon became filled. With a secondary school curriculum oriented towards increasingly scarce civil service, commercial, and teaching positions, the educational system became a sort of 'anticipatory socialization' mechanism for migration --

something to be applied outside of Montserrat.[23]

In St. Vincent, dependence on remittances both to finance education and to acquire highly valued goods and services, particularly imported items, only intensifies the desire to migrate. The wish to leave is especially acute among younger rural people and produces a kind of 'migration mentality' in which removal from the island is viewed as the only means of achieving anything in life.[24]

Remittances to the region can exacerbate rural social disparities and encourage additional migration, especially when they are invested in education. Any positive balance of payments effect they might have had is largely negated by intensive purchasing of consumer items. Likewise, the use of remittances to finance such ceremonial celebrations as births, marriages and other rites of passage in Barbados, Carriacou, Montserrat and Andros Island seems of questionable developmental utility.[25]

Consumer disbursements, however, are more than matched by sums used to effect additional overseas emigration. Whether through the use of accumulated savings or on the basis of remittances from those who have gone before, the result is the export of scarce and much needed capital from such underdeveloped West Indian countries.[26]

Even the increased agricultural output on the part of peasant cultivators in Montserrat who acquired unused arable estate lands during the first decades of this century was a short-lived phenomenon.[27] Since the Second World War, emigration and remittances have had the contrary effect of reducing peasant production. Remittances from England to Montserrat are often sent so that the older people will be relieved of the burden of demanding agricultural tasks. As admirable as this may be from a social welfare point of view, it has naturally decreased agricultural subsistence production while raising dependence on (and, perhaps, the prices of) store-bought imported food. Not only older Montserratian cultivators have been influenced by outside funding. Overseas remittances made many cotton workers reluctant to accept the small wages offered during the 1950s and helped lead to the demise of estate cotton production by 1962. Land owning peasants were also affected in this way since when a family receives external financial aid, cotton production is dramatically reduced. Many potential small-scale cotton growers are also unable to plant as a result of the difficulty in securing labor because a combination of remittances and occasional nonfarm wage labor allows younger men to avoid onerous agricultural work.[28]

Even subsistence production in Montserrat has decreased dramatically since the migration to England and subsequent return flow of remittances began. Not only have these remittances resulted in a substitution of food imports for locally grown items, they have also been instrumental in the dramatic decline in labor exchange transactions between formerly economically interdependent households and a concomitant disappearance of the associated generalized reciprocity which was the main sanction against praedial larceny. In turn, the fear of theft of provision crops has prompted some former agriculturalists to cease working their gardens.

Real estate speculation has also affected Montserratian cultivation. In 1962, plantation lands on both sides of the island were subdivided and sold to buyers in Canada, the United States and Britain. Many of the lots are being held for investment purposes or in case their owners want to use them as building sites on their return to the island. In both cases the lands acquired in this way are not being cultivated.

An unexpected additional feature accompanied both the disappearance in estate cultivation and the sharp reduction in labor exchange groups in Montserrat. During the period prior to the mass migration to England, rural working-class solidarity based on a combination of collective subordination to the plantocracy and reciprocal peasant labor exchange ties contributed to social integration and esprit de corps. With the decline in both estate work and labor exchange groups (and in the absence of alternative local-level cohesive mechanisms) social conflict increased, particularly in the form of civil litigation. In turn, at least during the initial period of overseas removal, a considerable amount of 'discretionary' income from remittances was spent to hire lawyers and pay fines associated with such disputes, thereby diverting large sums of money from the rural sector.[29]

In St. Vincent, the overseas acquisition of house plots and agricultural land has also had an adverse effect on farm production. Land acquired by overseas residents is normally removed from productive cultivation or, if worked at all, tends to be much underutilized by the resident dependents of migrant owners.[30] Land fragmentation also results from foreign purchases and renders commercial cultivation on the one or two acre plots that are usually acquired by migrants uneconomical. Competition for available acreage, particularly plots destined for house sites, has likewise inflated land prices well beyond the reach of those landless resident agriculturalists eager to engage in intensive cultivation.

A similar situation has been reported for Nevis. Emigration to England and the United States Virgin Islands resulted in a 70 percent decrease in cotton acreage and a 50 percent reduction in sugar cane acreage between 1955 and 1962 because of an unwillingness to cultivate, in the face of the alternative sources of cash provided by remittances.[31] A general shortage of labor resulting from the chain migration to England made possible by the homeward flow of remittances only added to the underutilization of arable island land.

Carriacou has experienced a decline in the production of cash crops, especially cotton, because of migration and remittances. Also affected has been subsistence production. With a large portion of the adult male labor force gone most of the year, the traditional sexual division of labor has been upset and local food production has declined. Instead of contributing to the planting and harvesting of subsistence crops, these men send back money which is used to obtain store-bought rice and flour.[32]

Another West Indian 'remittance society,' Saba, has also experienced a decline in agriculture, fishing, and other traditional subsistence pursuits. With a history of over one hundred years of temporary and recurrent forms of migration, labor mobility has become a self-perpetuating activity and the Saban economy has grown increasingly monetarized and dependent on outside goods, all to the detriment of customary reciprocal and barter-exchange transactions.[33]

The other main outlet for remittances investment, shopkeeping, has been more successfully pursued, at least in the case of Nevis. Bypassing the town merchants who traditionally operated as wholesalers for country shop owners, small country retailers successfully compete with urban stores by directly importing their own goods through contacts made overseas. More typical, however, is the Carriacouan experience. Few of the island's 208 shops are viable profit making enterprises. At most they are 'social gathering places' symbolizing the already established economic position of the owner.[34]

The unprofitability of shops as well as another traditional West Indian investment avenue, transportation vehicles, is also evident in Montserrat. Island capital investment outlets are limited to these areas by both custom and the absence of alternative profit-making undertakings. But rum shop, bus, van and truck ventures contribute little to island productivity. Moreover, the supply for these services is now well in excess of the demand and business failures, particularly in regard to rum shops, is high.

CONCLUSION

The evidence presented so far, though brief, incomplete, in some cases perhaps dated, does not provide much by way of optimism that remittances as a feature of return migration are a source of economic development in the rural parts of the West Indies. The volume of funds sent home is very large in many cases. Given that capital is in short supply in most West

Indian societies, it was not unreasonable to expect that remittances might have a significant developmental impact. While a number of reasons have been offered to explain why this expectation was not met, the *determinants* of the disappointing productive role of remittances still remains to be shown.

That remittances were dispersed on the provision of subsistence for those remaining behind is as much a reflection of depressed regional economic conditions as it is of the 'return orientation.' Reviewing the flow of remittances to a sample of Caribbean islands Manners suggests that without remittances many West Indians would move from a relatively adequate economic position to a marginal one; others would move from bare subsistence to extreme poverty. In the case of Anguilla and Carriacou, for example, it has been argued that societal survival itself and the prevention of economic collapse, respectively, are contingent upon the continuity of remittances.[35]

The disposition of remittances on certain kinds of consumer items -- imported food, foreign-styled housing, modern furniture, electrical appliances, fashionable clothing, and so on -- is also a product of one of the main motives for migration as well as the scarcity of local-level investment opportunities. It is said, for example, that the aim of the lower-class Montserratian is to leave the island with the ambition of eventually returning a wealthier person. Consequently, there is an aversion to engaging in an activity such as agricultural labor which would be counterposed to the higher status generally accorded returned migrants. Having departed for personal reasons, most returnees can not be expected to have come back to improve their country or village. Moreover the scarcity of viable rural capital investment outlets together with the need to visibly display the increases in wealth expected to result from the migratory experience, results in the kind of conspicuous consumption so often reported in the literature. Large, modern dwellings, running water, flush toilets, indoor cooking facilities, refrigerators and other electrical appliances, radios, foreign-made household furnishings, fashionable clothing, imported foodstuff, and other indices of a higher standard of living and modernization -- all these things characterize the 'successful' West Indian returnee.[36] But modernization and economic development are not synonyms, and cosmetic life-style alterations and higher per capita incomes should not be confused with structural alteration or economic rejuvenation. Indeed, if the rural sector offered the kind of productive outlets that could be tapped through the investment of migrant remittances or savings, they would have been utilized to begin with -- hard won rural economic surpluses would hardly have been used to finance migration to other places save for the paucity of viable local investment opportunities in the first place.[37]

Most of the examples referred to by Swanson as 'superficial consumerism' in his review of the general literature on return migration contribute little to local economic development. Superficial or not, such consumption behavior is perfectly rational and consistent with extant rural investment outlets. Yet since most of these material acquisitions are in the form of imported consumer goods, they only serve to send badly needed and hard earned capital back to the countries from which it was originally obtained; and in the process the already heavy external dependence is aggravated along with a further enrichment of already highly developed countries.[38]

External economic dependence carries additional disadvantages for the sending society as more and more traditional West Indian labor-receiving countries both within the Caribbean and outside the region have closed their doors to potential migrants through restrictive immigration legislation. The flow of remittances is also slowing as overseas migrants develop new responsibilities. Continuing inflation also takes its toll.[39]

All of these observations point to the conclusion that remittances and the migratory wage-labor phenomenon of which they are a part must be viewed in historical and structural terms as features of much larger politico-economic processes if their implications for the rural sending unit are to be fully appreciated. To be sure, from a 'micro' perspective remittances have been the main means for radically altering the style of life of many individual migrant families. Here and there in the region they have produced a minor alteration in the land tenure system allowing formerly landless estate laborers to escape from low paying and undesirable estate wage work to become own-account peasant proprietors. In a few cases overall agricultural productivity increased where the land acquired consisted of idle estates.

From a 'macro' level perspective remittances and migration are not independent variables best studied in terms of their effects on the lives of individual migrants and their communities. Rather, they are themselves dependent factors, responding to external forces -- wealth and power imbalances within and between nations, neocolonialism, the spread of growth- and profit-dependent capitalism over which they have no control.[40] No more are the forces of colonialism more strongly felt than in the West Indies and the bulk of its migrants form a cheap and virtually inexhaustible reserve labor pool for industry and agri-business in developing countries.[41]

By competing for scarce unskilled jobs, West Indian workers unwittingly keep wages low and profits high -- and their 'micro-level' increased living standards help obscure overarching 'macro' forms of individual and collective economic exploitation as shown by Rhoades and Ward.[42] In the case of Carriacou, for example, Hill argues that the institutionalization of migration has resulted in the creation of a large, expendable unskilled labor force eager to work overseas in jobs offering mimimum wages. The net effect has been to perpetuate a stable socioeconomic system in which home society subsistence activities may be fallen back on when overseas migrants find themselves unemployed. As Gonzalez contends, remittances, in the end, turn out to be a conservative economic force and migratory wage-labor a means for gaining cash to maintain the status quo of societies with depressed economies. In other words, without migration and remittances such societies might be forced to change their productive techniques, alter their social structures, or enact other fundamental social and economic transformations in order to survive.[43]

A holistically-based dependency perspective therefore indicates that, at most, remittances and the entire migratory cycle of which they form a part, play a system-maintenance role in West Indian societies. Externally, they permit capitalism to flourish unfettered; internally, they perpetuate traditional systems with low economic productivity. This perspective also makes it clear why individuals may gain from remittances while their communities are net losers in the entire migratory process -- economically 'irrational' from a developmental point of view, remittance allocations are perfectly 'reasonable' from the perspective of individual migrants and their families.[44] Montserrat is a particularly telling example of this distinction. There an ever-deteriorating national economy is counterposed by a much increased overall standard of living. Estate cultivation continues to decline and half the arable land lies idle. But health, nutrition, housing, clothing and education are constantly improving.[45]

To sum up, an analysis of remittances as a component of West Indian migration shows the need to view latter-movement from two very different and perhaps antithetical perspectives: that of individual migrants as active decision makers trying to maximize their goals within systems of culturally acquired norms, values and expectations versus that of migration as a product of overarching national and transnational political and economic forces. While it may be difficult at present to integrate the two approaches to produce a truly holistic account of population movements, as far as rural West Indian economic development is concerned, a model based on historical-structural issues must take precedence over a model based on individualistic ones. Additional research is needed to fill in the many historical, ethnographic and statistical gaps in the literature. What seems clear at this point, however, is that remittances, and perhaps the entire migratory system as presently constituted, are detrimental to the long-term prospects for economic improvement in most of the regions' societies. In 'cost-benefit' terms, the real beneficiaries of migration lie outside the West Indies in the industrial-capitalist societies of the already developed world.

NOTES

[1] Stuart B. Philpott, *West Indian Migration: The Montserrat Case*. London School of Economics Monographs on Social Anthropology No. 47 (London: Athlone Press, 1973); and Hymie Rubenstein, "The Return Ideology in West Indian Migration." Ed. R. E. Rhoades, The Anthropology of Return Migration, *Papers in Anthropology* 20 (1979): 330-337.

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THE MAGNITUDE AND IMPACT OF REMITTANCES IN THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN: A RESEARCH NOTE

Rosemary Brana-Shute and Gary Brana-Shute[1]

REMITTANCES: DEFINITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS

Migration is an historical phenomenon in the Caribbean, and so too is the flow of remittances. Initially, remittances were those profits extracted from the colonies and exported to the metropole. From the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries, when wealth was understood to be possessed but not created, remittances from the New World were largely in the form of precious metals and gems. Perhaps the least subtle symbol of this extraction and remittance was Spain's silver fleet of cargo and warships that sailed yearly from Spain to the Caribbean rimlands. These ships unloaded trade goods and colonists and loaded silver and other similar forms of wealth which had been transported to these Caribbean ports from the far corners of its American empire. The ships reassembled fully laden in Havana, then moved in a slow, weighted and protected convoy back across the Atlantic with its remittances from the colonies to the Crown. Spain's silver fleet was an early and largely successful effort to protect the flow of remittances from New World colonies. In time, other nationalities would produce profits in the region, largely through the slave trade and plantation monoculture, which also were remitted to the various metropoles. More close to us in time are the kinds of remittances that result from operations of transnational corporations working in the Caribbean. A concession always sought by transnationals is the guarantee of being allowed to remit profits out of the area.

The direction of the flow of remittances has not always been out of the Caribbean Basin. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries people spoke of the "remittance man" in the colonies. The "remittance man" was a ne'er-do-well who, because of his propensity to create embarrassments for his family, was sent to the colonies to shape up and "make good"; the remittances in this case came from family and friends who sent money to maintain him in the colonies.[2]

Today, remittances have yet another definition. In this paper remittances are defined as transfers in cash or kind sent back to the Caribbean by individuals who have migrated out of the Caribbean to live, study, invest, or work for salary. In a sense, remittances are profits extracted from the metropoles by migrants and transferred to the ex-colonies. Remittances may be made once in a lifetime, or many times, regularly or irregularly, in large or small amounts.

A number of assumptions have been made about the impact of remittances on the home countries of the migrants. Most analysts assume that remittances are a positive gain for the families left behind,by and/or the migrants. The gain may be in cash, consumer items, capital goods. Remittances are acknowledged to have a favorable impact on the balance of payments and foreign exchange problems of developing countries.[3] Some see remittances as the potential for capital accumulation in capital-poor societies.[4]

In sum, remittances have been regarded as a positive contribution to the migrants' home societies, a compensation for labor's migration in the first place. In effect, this optimistic view implies that in time labor migration will remit sufficient funds (and skills) to allow the sending societies to become more economically self-sufficient and productive so that the migration of cheap labor will be less necessary. Remittances are the evidence that a redistribution of wealth is taking place -- from urban to rural areas, and from capital-rich to capital-poor countries. This is a view of an international market system approaching equilibrium, with the participating nations becoming more equal, that is, less asymetrically interdependent, through the redistribution of capital. In effect, it is the silver fleet in reverse, unloading its cargo in the Caribbean rather than in Spain. However, there is no guarantee that remittances ipso facto will produce such fine results.

In fact, in assessing the contributions of remittances to a developing economy, Ecevit and Zachariah note the tendency to treat remittances "in the same manner as foreign aid and direct foreign investment. Although the impact of these flows on the balance of payments is essentially the same, their respective contributions to capital outlays and economic growth are not identical."[5] Foreign aid is usually given for specific projects and investments, and foreign investment capital is generally ready for direct government investment. Remittances, however, are used for personal consumption and, perhaps, only secondarily on savings and investments. The same authors note further that "Funds are not necessarily channeled into productive investment in line with the country's investment priorities."[6] There is no guarantee that remittances will positively effect the local economy, that productivity will increase, that employment will increase, or that standards of living will rise. Ecevit and Zachariah conclude that the overall impact of remittances on the economy will be positive only if remittances are funneled into productive investments and if there is an increased demand for consumer goods that is satisfied "through existing productive capacity," and not through imports that cannot be paid for through increased domestic productivity.[7]

THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN

The Eastern Caribbean is divided between the Leeward and the Windward Islands. The literature on remittances reviewed here concentrates on the English-speaking Leeward Islands of Antigua, Montserrat, and St. Kitts-Nevis, and on the Windward Islands of Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent. Neither the several French islands which are Overseas Departments of France nor the three Dutch islands which are members of the Kingdom of the Netherlands are included here, except for one dramatic illustration from Saba. Barbados is geographically in the Eastern Caribbean area but not considered to be in either the Leewards or Windwards. However, it is included here because it shares with the other islands of the subregion a tradition of exporting labor and receiving remittances. On the other hand, Trinidad-Tobago located in the Eastern Caribbean, is not included in the discussion because until recently it has not been a large exporter of labor.

Certain characteristics are shared by the Eastern Caribbean states. They are all islands. They are all small geographically and demographically, ranging from Montserrat's population of 12,000 to Barbados' of a quarter of a million. In scale one could equate St. Vincent with Hialeah, Florida; Dominica with Charleston, South Carolina; and St. Lucia with Macon, Georgia. The island states of the Eastern Caribbean range in political sovereignty from Barbados, independent since 1966, to Montserrat's continuing status as a Crown Colony of Great Britain. Ironically, viable land in all these states is prized, expensive, and even reputedly unattainable in some areas, making potential investments of remittances in land for agriculture purposes less likely here than in countries where fertile land is available, accessible and affordable.

Since the end of slavery in the nineteenth century, all of these societies have suffered chronically high unemployment and underemployment. None of these societies has ever been able to provide sufficient employment and economic security to its citizens. In 1980, unemployment was officially estimated by local governments to range from 7 to 35 percent, not including underemployment, discouraged job seekers, and "economically inactive" housewives.[8]

All Eastern Caribbean countries have long accepted the emigration of its citizens, recognizing some immediate benefits for the sending society: families left behind received remittances; the migration of labor lowered the unemployment figures at home while simultaneously containing the size of the population; and remittances helped to off-set the cost of imports that have consistently exceeded exports.

Emigration figures are sketchy at best, with few governments keeping records of permanent, return, seasonal, and frequent cyclical migrations. The actual migration figures may be much higher than anyone surmises, if one example is illustrative of the problem. St. Vincent's population in 1980 was long estimated to be about 120,000 people. When the 1980 official census was actually taken and the provisional figures were presented to the government, the count was about 98,000, a difference of about 22,000 people. While the provisional figures were discounted by the government, census officials surmised that those 22,000 people had emigrated.

MEASURING REMITTANCES

Remittance transfers worldwide, from capital-rich countries to the developing world, were estimated in 1975 to approach $8.1 billion (U.S.). It is assumed that since that time the volume of remittances worldwide has increased considerably.[9] Such transfers have been carefully measured by studies in several parts of the world, particularly those from Europe to North Africa and the Middle East.[10]

Howard Green, formerly of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank in Atlanta, has estimated that, for the period 1968-1976, about two million migrants from the Caribbean Basin remitted about $2.5 billion (U.S.) back to the region. This is an estimate based on remittances *from only the United States alone* to an area defined as including the Antilles and the rimland countries such as Colombia, Venezuela, and Central America, excluding Mexico.[11]

There is, to our knowledge, no data that allows even a relatively reliable measure of remittances to the Eastern Caribbean, either nationally or regionally. This is even a problem for local level studies, such as done by anthropologist Julia Crane on the impact of remittances in Saba. She estimated that the one thousand resident Sabians received an average money order stipend of $3,000 (U.S.) per year per person in the period from the end of World War II to 1965. She noted that

> Even this does not reflect gifts shipped in other forms, gifts taken or sent with friends, support to family members visiting or living with workers in the southern islands, or remittances sent by check or registered mail as almost all of those from the U.S. and Bermuda are. Government reports and local informants agree that money orders probably make up less than half of the total value of remittances received.[12]

Several factors account for the lack of national and regional totals, particularly over time. The many forms in which remittances arrive is one such factor. In some cases governments of the Eastern Caribbean are understaffed and swamped with information awaiting compilation and analysis. Some governments are unable to afford the expense in time, personnel and money to even collect these figures.

In most cases only a certain type of remittance, such as postal money orders, is tabulated; the problem with using these figures is immediately evident from the following illustration. The Statistics Department of St. Lucia tabulates only postal money order remittances cashed at post offices; monies cashed at commercial banks are omitted. In 1979, these postal money orders totaled $3 million (E.C.).[13] In 1980, one year later, two prime ministers of St. Lucia estimated that total remittances from all sources totaled $20 million (E.C.), an apparent increase of $17 million (E.C.). No explanation for the increase was forthcoming (St. Lucia, April 6 and May 26, 1981).[14]

Problems with local estimates are not resolved when one tries to compare figures from a number of Eastern Caribbean countries, as the data bases vary. In addition, information on the amounts of remittances frequently are buried in categories such as "unrequited transfers," "commissions and exchanges," "income transfers," or embedded in balance of payment compilations from which it is not possible to tease out remittances.

Keeping in mind the questions raised about reliability, the published estimates of remittances can give clues as to the magnitude of remittances. A preliminary survey of government and banking statistics show that in 1978, total remittances to seven Eastern Caribbean states equalled $12,470,000 (U.S.), a regional average of about $18.61 (U.S.) per capita. We strongly suspect these figures are severe underestimates.

Through the 1960s and 1970s, total remittances increased yearly, although in small increments. This increase is face value, not allowing for the declining purchasing power of the E.C. dollar due to inflation. Nor is the rate of increase of remittances as great as the rate of increase in the value of imported goods. In some cases, the value of exports is increasing also but, like remittances, not increasing at the rate of imports. This means that the impact of remittances in redressing some exchange and balance of payments problems is proportionately lessening.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF REMITTANCES

Sociological and anthropological literature on the Eastern Caribbean has focused on the "community" as object and sample with the consequence that such field studies have added richly to our understanding of households, kinship systems, and social networks. An unintentional by-product of such methodology is a tendency toward evaluating all social behavior and strategies in a purely local context. Hence, we find in virtually all material on the Eastern Caribbean a reference, many times in passing, most often simply descriptive, to the role of remittances in the day-to-day lives of West Indians.

It was Rubenstein, however, who first attempted to empirically measure the extent of household dependency on remittances. Rubenstein reported that:

> In a random sample of 100 of the over 400 households [in a village in St. Vincent], the economic contribution of remittances was as follows: 26 households counted on remittances for at least 25 percent of their support; 38 households received less that 25 percent of their support in the form of remittances; and 36 households received no remittances. While 74 of the 100 households found the primary source of their support from the economic efforts of resident household members, only 31 of these received no remittances at all. In addition, although only four households were nearly entirely dependent on remittances, almost two-thirds of the households received some amount of cash from overseas. Finally nearly every ... household which does not now receive cash from outside the island has a history of remittance contributions from current or former members.[15]

Clearly, it is unwise to generalize these data to the rest of the Eastern Caribbean. However, Rubenstein's results, and indicators from other researchers, warrant more household surveys, particularly where they may be coupled with household histories that may indicate remittance patterns over time per sampled household.

Three expenditure categories by individuals and/or households emerge from the literature. Remittances are used for immediate consumption and expenses

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Three expenditure categories by individuals and/or households emerge from the literature. Remittances are used for immediate consumption and expenses involved in day-to-day maintenance;[16] for special events and luxuries which could be considered social investments;[17] and for expenditures that could be called involved in day-to-day maintenance;[16] for special events and luxuries which could be considered social investments;[17] and for expenditures that could be called economic investments[18] (see Appendix A).

A major problem with the sociological/anthropological literature is that, even though these expenditure patterns emerge, it is not yet possible to link these categories with other variables such as the magnitude of remittance, type of remittance, timetable of disbursal, or a socioeconomic profile of both the senders and the receivers. From the sociological/anthropological data it is not certain what proportion of remittances are spent on each category. The inference we draw is that, *on the average*, the bulk of remittances are expended on immediate necessities -- survival -- and special occasions or luxuries. It is also important to notice that the bulk of cash remittances may in fact go to pay for items that have to be imported. These may include a variety of materials such as canned food, electrical wire, pipe, cement, appliances, and motor vehicles. Remittances serve as a source of household income but again it is not clear if the remittance does little more than substitute for the loss of a working household member. Hence, we cannot say if a household's real standard of living has increased or if the money serves only to fill in the gap left behind by an individual who has emigrated.

More evasive, and perhaps more crucial when considering the potential use of remittances for financing development, is any reliable picture of how remittances vary over time, in amount, in receivers, in disposal.

For example, much of the literature relies on information gleaned about migrants who moved (permanently) to the United Kingdom in the 1950s. Can we assume that the migrants of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s will maintain a similar remittance pattern or will their strategies be different thus altering the nature and, perhaps, amount of remittance flow? If a measure of remittance predictability is to be achieved we will have to answer these questions as well as take notice of the fact that United Kingdom remitters are getting older, dying, or otherwise changing their commitment to "home."

Because neither the magnitude nor the actual uses of remittances have been the primary object of study, it is very difficult to assess the impact remittances have had in the region. Lowenthal[19] was the first to assert that remittance income resulted in the emergence of local stratification systems based on external sources of wealth. Philpott[20] and Frucht[21] also concluded that remittance flows resulted in relocations of social strata and status systems based on, what was, to them, artificial sources of cash and prestige.

Most researchers have not dealt directly with the issue of the impact of remittances, although there are three general areas in which authors suggest the consequences of remittances: social,[22] economic,[23] and agricultural[24] (see Appendix B). The context in which they discuss remittances and the specific examples they use allow for some tentative hypotheses which could be tested in research that specifically focuses on remittances. The overall picture tends to be disappointing, if one looks for capital accumulation and application that finances national development. It may be that remittances are paying for increasing imports rather than increased local productivity and import substitution. Remittances appear to finance activities that may even decrease productivity, such as in agriculture. How specific uses of remittances relate to changing national (in)dependence economically is still an unresolved issue.

Midgett captured the ambiguity of the local level consequences of remittances in an impoverished St. Lucian fishing village when he observed that

> ... it has the appearance of prosperity ... But the impression is illusory, for the new houses and bright paint are not the result of economic growth in the area, but of remittances from London-based villagers ... [25]

APPENDIX A

Uses of Remittances in the Eastern Caribbean

I. Immediate Consumption and Expenses

Expenditures	Sources
Day-to-day expenses (food, rent, fuel)	Hill; Midgett; Rubenstein, 1976
Personal maintenance	Dirks; Frucht; Hill; Midgett; Philpott, 1973; Rubenstein, 1976
Pay off bills and/or loans	Dirks; Frucht; Hill; Midgett; Philpott, 1973; Rubenstein, 1976

II. Social Investments (events and luxuries)

Hiring a domestic	Philpott, 1973
Celebrations(birthdays, first communions, weddings)	Midgett; Rubenstein, 1976
Gifts, passport photos, candy, sweets, rum, radios, tape decks, watches, etc.	McCoy and Wood, Nov. 1981; Rubenstein, 1976.

III. Economic Investments

House site, land for agriculture	Brana-Shute & Brana-Shute; Crane; Dirks; Four Country Questionnaire; Frucht; Hill; Lowenthal, 1972; Marshall; McCoy & Wood, Nov. 1981; Midgett; Philpott, 1973; Rubenstein, 1976, '77, '80; Michael G. Smith
Shops, transport vehicles, fishing gear, livestock	Brana-Shute & Brana-Shute; Crane; Dirks; Four Country Questionnaire; Frucht; Hill; Lowenthal, 1972; Marshall; McCoy & Wood, Nov. 1981 Midgett; Philpott, 1973; Rubenstein, 1976, '77, '80; Michael G. Smith; Sylvester

APPENDIX A (page 2)

Modern conveniences (plumbing, electricity, appliances), house repairs	Crane; Hill; McCoy and Wood, Nov. 1981; Midgett; Philpott, 1973, Romalis
Furnishings, sewing machine, taxi	Crane; Hill; McCoy and Wood, Nov. 1981; Midgett; Philpott, 1973; Romalis
Education, typing lessons, emigration of others	Davison; Hill; Lowenthal, 1972; Marshall; Philpott, 1973; Rubenstein, 1976, '77, '80
Health (teeth, surgery)	Crane, Hill; Rubenstein, 1976
Hotel, restaurant, tourist operation	Crane; Philpott, 1973; Sylvester
Savings	Crane; *Four Country Questionnaire*; Hill; Midgett

APPENDIX B

Consequences of Remittances in the Eastern Caribbean

I. Social Consequences

	Sources
Removes progressive, ambitious people from the community	Lowenthal, 1972
Undermines village relationships, gender roles, traditional reciprocal labor arrangements	Davison; Lowenthal, 1972; Rubenstein, 1976
Fosters social stratification based not on local efforts but external sources of wealth	Davison; Frucht; Hill; Lowenthal, 1972
Underwrites expenses for entire social system	Frucht; Hill; Midget
"Migration mentality" develops	Brana-Shute & Brana-Shute; Crane; Lowenthal, 1972; Marshall; Philpott, 1973

II. Economic Consequences

Living standards increase for individuals and households	de Albuquerque & McElroy Crane; Davison; Dirks, Hill; Lowenthal, 1972; McCoy & Wood, Nov. 1981; Midgett; Philpott, 1973; Rubenstein 1976; Thomas-Hope
General community standards may decrease	Lowenthal, 1972
Recipients may avoid low-status labor such as farming	Crane; Lowenthal, 1972 O'Loughlin; Philpott, 1973
May provide labor for local artisans and craftsmen	Rubenstein, 1976
Part-time labor used to supplement remittances, rather than vice versa	Lowenthal, 1972

APPENDIX B (page 2)

Dependency on imported food	Lowenthal, 1972
Boom/bust economy as remittances increase/ decrease because of external variables	de Albuquerque & McElroy; Lowenthal, 1972

III. Agricultural Consequences

Land removed from production	Hill; Lowenthal, 1972; Midgett; Philpott, 1973; Rubenstein, 1976
Half-hearted work efforts by those left behind as laborers or overseers	Hill; Lowenthal, 1972; Midgett; Philpott, 1973; Rubenstein, 1976
Land speculation for housing rather than agricultural sites	Hill; Lowenthal, 1972; Midgett; Philpott, 1973; Rubenstein, 1976
Decline in agricultural activity and productivity	Hill; Lowenthal, 1972; Midgett; Philpott, 1973; Rubenstein, 1976
Imported canned goods purchased instead of fresh, local produce	Davison; Lowenthal, 1972; Midgett; Rubenstein, 1976

NOTES

[1] Rosemary Brana-Shute is a Research Associate in the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Florida in Gainesville. Gary Brana-Shute is Associate Professor of Anthropology at the College of Charleston in South Carolina. Senior authorship has been assigned by the flip of a coin.

[2] We are indebted to Mr. Kenneth Ingram, formerly Head Director of the University of the West Indies Library System and currently Fulbright-Hayes consultant with the Latin American Collection of the University of Florida Libraries, who first told us of this type of remittance. See also Oxford-English Dictionary, Vol. VIII, p. 430.

[3] Arnand G. Chandavarkar, "Use of Migrant's Remittances in Labor-Exporting Countries," *Finance and Development* 17:2 (June 1980): 36-39; Zafer Ecevit and K. C. Zachariah, "International Labor Migration," *Finance and Development* 15:4 (December 1978): 32-37; and Howard W. Green, "Basin Migration and Dollar Flows," *Caribbean Basin Economic Survey* 5:2 (1979): 12-15.

[4] A. S. Oberai and H. K. M. Singh, "Migration, Remittances and Rural Development: Findings of a Case Study of the Rural Punjab," *International Labour Review* 119:2 (1980): 229-241; and Alan Rufus Waters, "Migration, Remittances and the Cash Constraint in African Smallholder Economic Development," *Oxford Economic Papers* (New Series) 25:3 (1973): 435-454. Cash and in-kind remittances cause no controversy but what about including skills in the definition of remittances? There are intimations that skills may be learned by a migrant overseas, and then remitted on his or her return home (R. B. Davison, *West Indian Migrants: Social and Economic Facts of the West Indies*, London: Oxford University Press, 1962, page xiv in Foreword by A. D. Knox.) In this case one could hypothesize that skills learned in the metropole are remitted to societies that are considered skill poor. Thus, the knowledge, perhaps of new technology and management skills, will accompany the return migrant, to be invested in the Caribbean, perhaps with working capital, resulting in increased productivity, a higher standard of living for the society as a whole, and greater employment. The fact that the skill is remitted with the migrant should not be problematic; some migrants return home and only years later begin to receive their own remittances to themselves in the form of social security and pension checks. The unease felt in including skills within the definition of remittances is caused essentially by the intangibi-

lity of skills and therefore means difficulties in measuring quantity, quality, and impact that results specifically from expertise received abroad. If skills are considered remittances then students who return to their home societies are remittors if they put their new body of skills to work locally. After all, if we may speak of a brain-drain we should be able to speak as readily about (the potential) brain-return or a reverse brain-drain.

[5] Ecevit and Zachariah, p. 36.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid., p. 36-37.

[8] Gary Brana-Shute and Rosemary Brana-Shute, *The Unemployed of the Eastern Caribbean: Attitudes and Aspirations* (Washington, D.C.: USAID, 1980).

[9] Ecevit and Zachariah, p. 36.

[10] Chandavarkar; Oberai and Singh; Henry Rempel and Richard A Lobdell, "The Role of Urban-to-Rural Remittances in Rural Development," *The Journal of Development Studies* 14:3 (1978): 324-341; Oded Stark, "On the Role of Urban-to-Rural Remittances in Rural Development," *The Journal of Development Studies* 6:3 (1980): 369-374; and Waters.

[11] Howard W Green, "Basin Migration and Dollar FLows," *Caribbean Basin Economic Survey* 5:2 (1979): 12-15.

[12] Julia Crane, *Educated to Emigrate: The Social Organization of Saba* (Assen, Netherlands: van Gorcum, 1971).

[13] St. Lucia, Department of Statistics, *St. Lucia Statistical Digest* (Castries, 1979).

[14] St. Lucia, Ministry of Finance, *Budget Address* (Allan F. G. Louisy, Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, April 6, 1981; and Winston F. Cenac, Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, May 26, 1981). (Castries, 1981).

[15] Hymie Rubenstein, "Black Adaptive Strategies: Coping with Poverty in an Eastern Caribbean Village." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toronto, 1976, p. 32.

[16] Robert Dirks, "Networks, Groups, and Adaptation in an Afro-Caribbean Community," *Man* 17:4 (1972): 555-585; Richard Frucht, "Emigration, Remittances, and Social Change: Aspects of the Social Field of Nevis, West Indies," *Anthropologica* 10:2 (1968): 193-208; Donald

Hill, *The Impact of Migration on the Metropolitan and Folk Society of Carriacou, Grenada* Vol. 54, Part 2, Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History, New York, 1977; Douglas K. Midgett, "West Indian Migration and Adaptation in St. Lucia and London." Ph.D. dissertation, Urbana: University of Illinois, 1977; Stuart Philpott, *West Indian Migration: The Montserrat Case* (London: Athlone Press, 1973); and Rubenstein (1976).

[17] Terry L. McCoy and Charles H. Wood, "Caribbean Workers in the Florida Sugar Cane Industry." Paper presented at NICHD Grantee Workshop on Implications on International Migration for the United States at Bethesda, Maryland, November 15-17, 1981; Midgett; Philpott (1973); and Rubenstein (1976).

[18] Brana-Shute and Brana-Shute; Crane; R. B. Davison, *West Indian Migrants: Social and Economic Facts of the West Indies* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962); Dirks; *Four Country Questionnaire Survey, 1980: Preliminary Report*, UNESCO/UNFPA/ISER Man and the Biosphere Project. Studies on Population Development and the Environment in the Eastern Caribbean (Cave Hill, Barbados: ISER, University of the West Indies, 1981; Frucht, Hill; David Lowenthal, *West Indian Societies* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972); Dawn I. Marshall, "Caribbean Migration: An Historical Perspective." Paper presented at the conference on Caribbean Migration and Cultural Identity, University of Florida, Gainesville, October 10-13, 1981; McCoy and Wood (November 1981); Midgett; Philpott (1973); Rubenstein (1976), also "The Return Ideology in West Indian Migration," *Ethnology 13* (September 1977): 162-181, and "Return Migration to the English-Speaking Caribbean: Review and Commentary." Paper presented at the Fifth Annual Caribbean Studies Association Meeting, Curacao, May 26-29, 1980; Michael G. Smith, *Kinship and Community in Carriacou* (New Haven: Yale University, 1962); and Patrick Sylvester, "Small Scale Entrepreneurship in the Commonwealth Caribbean: A Case Study of St. Lucia." Ph.D. dissertation, Bryn Mawr, 1972.

[19] Lowenthal (1972).

[20] Philpott (1973).

[21] Frucht (1968).

[22] Brana-Shute and Brana-Shute; Crane; Davison, Frucht; Hill; Lowenthal (1972); Marshall; Midgett; Philpott (1973); and Rubenstein (1976).

[23] Klaus de Albuquerque and Jerome McElroy, "West Indian Migration to the United States Virgin Islands: Demographic Impacts and Socio-Economic Consequences." Paper presented at the Sixth Annual Caribbean Studies Association Meeting, St. Thomas U.S.V.I., May 27-30, 1981; Crane; Davison; Dirks; Hill; Lowenthal (1972); McCoy and Wood (November 1981); Midgett; O'Loughlin; Philpott (1973); Rubenstein (1976); and Elizabeth Thomas-Hope, "The Establishment of Migration Tradition: British West Indian Movements to the Hispanic Caribbean after Emancipation," in *Caribbean Social Relations*, ed. Colin Clarke (University of Liverpool: Center for Latin American Studies, 1978).

[24] Davison; Hill; Lowenthal (1972); Midgett; Philpott (1973); and Rubenstein (1976).

[25] Midgett.

MIGRATION, REMITTANCES AND DEVELOPMENT: PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF A STUDY OF CARIBBEAN CANE CUTTERS IN FLORIDA

Charles H. Wood

A central concern in the study of transnational labor migration is the impact of remittances both on the welfare of migrant workers, and on the socioeconomic structure of sending societies. This paper is an examination of the consequences in the Caribbean of the transfer to the islands of wages earned by West Indian laborers from the English-speaking Caribbean who seasonally come to southern Florida to harvest sugar cane. Section I of the paper provides a description of the offshore labor program. Section II summarizes the main elements of two competing perspectives on the international mobility of labor. Specific hypotheses derived from these alternative theoretical traditions are then subjected to empirical test. The results, presented in Section III, suggest that seasonal employment in the United States does not significantly contribute to the accumulation of productive assets among migrant workers. The implications of these findings are explored in Section IV.

I. THE OFFSHORE LABOR PROGRAM

Every year since 1943 thousands of workers from the English-speaking Caribbean have legally entered the United States to work as agricultural laborers. With the termination of the Mexican bracero program in the mid-1960s, and the concomitant emergence of large-scale sugar cultivation in the Lake Okeechobee region of southern Florida, West Indian contract laborers have become the largest contingent of legal aliens in this country. As currently constituted, the Immigration and Naturalization Service grants from 8,000 to 10,000 temporary work visas (H-2) per year to residents of the Caribbean in order to harvest the cane crop in South Florida.

To import foreign laborers the sugar growers must demonstrate, and the Department of Labor must certify, that there is insufficient supply of domestic workers available to cut cane at an agreed upon wage. Once this shortage is certified, grower associations work closely with British West Indies Central Labour Organization (BWICLO) to recruit the needed manpower. Upon arrival in the United States, each contracted worker is assigned to one of the seven large sugar estates where he works and resides during the harvest, which normally runs from November to March. At the close of the season, the cane cutters return en masse by prearranged transportation to the Caribbean. The cycle is then repeated the following fall.

Through industry agreements with area governments, recruitment is currently limited to Jamaica, Barbados, St. Vincent, St. Lucia and Dominica. Even though all of the aforementioned islands are associated with the WICLO, Jamaica is heavily over-represented in the H-2 labor force. In 1980-81, over 80 percent of the 8,460 workers were residents of that island.

In Jamaica the pool of eligible workers is generated through an elaborate patronage system whereby Members of Parliament distribute "cards" through their local organizational committees. This document, in effect, gives the individual nothing more than a place in the queue of prospective applicants. In the other islands, the ministry of labor manages the recruitment procedure. In both instances, the demand to participate in the migration program far exceeds the number of workers requested by the employers. Final selections are made by industry agents who personally interview all candidates. While the growers would prefer to rehire their best cutters every year, the current arrangement allows them to fill only 60 percent of the annual quota with "requested workers."

During the harvest season, the grower is responsible for providing transportation and lodging. The cost of three hot meals ($5 per day last season) is deducted from the worker's biweekly paycheck. In addition, 23 percent of the individual's earnings is automatically withheld and sent back to the Caribbean. There it is deposited in an interest-free government account until the worker returns to his home island, where he is reimbursed in local currency. The required work week is six days, although most choose to work on Sundays. Each worker is expected to cut at least eight tons of cane per day, for which he receives a minimum wage ($4.09 per hour in 1981-82). Those who harvest an amount over and above that minimum are paid an additional salary on a piece-rate basis. Last season, the average total gross pay per worker was about $4,000.

Despite the fact that the seasonal presence of West Indians has become a permanent feature of the state's agricultural labor force, virtually nothing is known about the individuals involved, or about the possible impact of the H-2 program on the sending societies. This research project was thus designed to administer a questionnaire to a random sample of 250 workers during their stay in this country. The survey instrument, applied in March of 1981, elicited information on the respondent, and on all other members of his household at the place of origin. In addition to collecting data on basic sociodemographic variables, questionnaire items also provided information on the individual's spending patterns and investment strategies, both here in the United States and upon his return home.

At a descriptive level, the data are the basis for constructing a profile of the population of offshore workers in the year of the survey.[1] The survey information also provides a rare opportunity to assess the relationship between international migration and the accumulation of assets among the individuals who participate in the program. A summary of the two competing perspectives on labor migration serves to situate the central research question in the context of major theoretical issues relevant to the study of migration and development.

II. PERSPECTIVES ON MIGRATION

The Equilibrium Model of Migration

In the neoclassical economic framework, population movement is conceptualized as the geographical mobility of workers who are responding to imbalances in the spatial distribution of land, labor, capital and natural resources. The skewed geographic location of the factors of production determines the unequal returns to each factor. This, in turn, influences the direction and the magnitude of migratory streams. Labor moves from places where capital is scarce and where labor is plentiful (hence remuneration to the worker is low) to areas where capital is abundant and where labor is scarce (hence remuneration is high). By conquering the "tyranny of space," and by redistributing human capital from places of low productivity to places of high productivity, migration is considered a "development fostering" process that operates to correct rural-urban, inter-urban and interregional imbalances in factor returns.[2]

To achieve an equilibrium in the distribution of the factors of production, and hence a more efficient allocation of a country's resources, presupposes that workers seek out those employment opportunities that give them the greatest return. In a formal sense, the aggregate process of labor mobility can therefore be interpreted as a special case of the microeconomic theory of consumer choice.[3]

The temporary migration of workers from less to more developed countries is also presumed to foster development. The remittances of migrant laborers are viewed as instrumental in restoring a balance of payments, and in stimulating savings and investment at the place of origin. Upon their return, repatriates serve as agents of change by applying the ideas and skills acquired abroad to establish farms, businesses and other enterprises conducive to increased production. According to the equilibrium model, the international movement of labor thus leads to a gradual convergence in the levels of economic growth and social well-being.

The Historical-Structural Perspective

The microeconomic approach is in striking contrast to the historical-structural view. The latter, formulated primarily by social scientists in Latin America and Africa, was developed in response to the limitations of the microeconomic model when applied to developing countries. This alternative perspective assumes that population movement can only be examined in the context of a historical analysis of the broader structural transformations underway in a particular social formation.[4]

Because the perspective is broad in scope, historical-structural approaches to the study of migration have stressed a wide range of phenomena. These include: the emergence and expansion of the capitalist mode of production,[5] the style of development that is pursued,[6] a country's role in the international division of labor,[7] the unequal development within and between countries,[8] the articulation of capitalist and non-capitalist formations as it affects the distribution of the maintenance and reproduction cost of labor,[9] and the cost-lowering, anti-cyclical functions of a migrant labor force.[10] In its broadest form the historical-structural view, in contrast to the equilibrium model, sees migration as a factor that exacerbates regional imbalances, and that reproduces in less developed areas the very structures that created a surplus of labor to begin with.

III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF MIGRATION

Conventional perspectives on the consequences of migration typically interpret the role of remittances from the standpoint of the assumptions that underlie the equilibrium model of labor mobility. These premises are reflected in the views held by industry representatives. Interviews with key informants leave one with the impression that cane cutters earn high salaries, and that this money provides them with the resources to start or expand small businesses, or to buy land and increase agricultural output. There is little doubt that this description accurately fits some of the West Indian workers. The central question, however, is the degree to which this phenomenon typifies the H-2 labor force as a whole.

An analysis of the survey data provides preliminary answers to the question posed above. At the outset, it is important to note that the wages received from cutting cane in the United States substantially exceed the general wage in the Caribbean. In Barbados and Jamaica, the per capita income in 1980 was $2,685 and $1,406, respectively. As noted in the first section, the average gross income for the H-2 workers was about $4,000 last season. After deductions, our estimates indicate an average net income of about $3,000, an amount that substantially exceeds the annual per capita figures, especially in Jamaica.

But do these resources enable the worker to accumulate sufficient productive assets so as to improve his income-generating capacity, as the equilibrium model would suggest? A complete answer to this question would require a comparative analysis with a control group of individuals who had never participated in the program, a series of measures that directly estimate the consequences of having had the experience of cutting cane in Florida, and longitudinal data on accumulation of net overtime. Our data meet none of those requirements. Nonetheless, a comparative analysis *within* the sample of workers provides a preliminary indication of the effects of the program. More specifically, workers who have returned more than three seasons ("oldtimers") can be compared with those who are "newcomers." With the appropriate controls for age and other variables, we would expect the oldtimers to have accumulated more assets relative to the newcomers, if the H-2 program has the predicted effect.

Capital Accumulation

A comparison of the workers who have returned to the United States to harvest cane for four or more seasons with the rest of the labor force reveals few differences between the two groups in terms of capital accumulation. Consider, for example, the number of acres that the worker tills back home. As shown in column 2 of Table 1, the mansize of farms for the sample as a whole is 2.3 acres. Using Multiple Classification Analysis it is possible to disaggregate the effects of other variables. Of particular interest is the impact of previous work experience. Specifically, do oldtimers own larger plots of land compared to newcomers?

The figures shown in column 5 represent the deviation from the grand mean (2.3) that is associated with the number of previous seasons worked. Newcomers have access to an average of 2.16 acres (2.3 - 0.14= 2.16); oldtimers own 2.44 acres (2.3 + 0.14=2.44). We can conclude that the differences between the two groups is relatively small, about .3 acres. The deviations from the mean associated with island of residence are given in the lower portion of panel A, and can be interpreted in the same way.

The conclusion given above, however, may be premature. The figures in column 5 are unadjusted estimates. That is, they do not account for the effects of other variables that could influence the number of acres owned. The geophysical differences between the islands is one such factor. Other variables include age and education. It is, therefore, necessary to estimate the deviations from the grand mean after removing the possible effects of other independent variables (island of origin) and covariates (age and education). These findings are presented in column 6. Comparing the adjusted (column 6) to the unadjusted (column 5) deviations from mean reveals very little change after controlling for other key variables. We can thus conclude that newcomers and oldtimers have access to about the same amount of land. Repeated participation in the H-2 program does not, therefore, appear to lead to the accumultion of agricultural resources (as measured by land ownership).

Similar analyses were carried out for a number of other factors that can be assumed to reflect the individual's assets. These included home ownership, and the number of goats, cows and mules that were owned by the worker. In all cases, the results were the same: few if any differences were detected between the newcomers and oldtimers.

Productivity

If repeated participation in the H-2 labor program does not lead to capital accumulation by the individual worker, the same cannot be said for the industry. Analysis of other variables, for example, indicate that previous experience is associated with greater worker productivity. This is revealed most clearly by an analysis of earnings in the fortnight prior to the interview, presented in panel B of Table 1. As shown in column 5, newcomers earned about $22 below the grand mean, whereas oldtimers earned about $21 above it. This discrepancy widens after introducing statistical controls for island of residence, age and education. Interpreting the adjusted deviations from the mean, presented in column 6, we can conclude that, net of controls, newcomers earned an average of $225 and old-timers about $280, a difference of $55.

Analysis of other variables suggest the same conclusion. For examples, more experienced workers are less prone to injury and lose fewer days on the job as a result of illness. Taken together, these findings indicate that those workers with extensive previous experience are more skilled, less subject to accidents and sickness, and, of central importance, are substantially more productive compared to novices.

IV. IMPLICATIONS

To argue that participation in the H-2 program fails to enable individuals to accumulate productive assets is not to say that the opportunity to work in the United States is unimportant to them. To the contrary, 100 percent of those interviewed expressed the desire to return the following season. The reason is not hard to find. Evidence from the survey demonstrates the importance of stateside employment in the lives of individuals, and in terms of the household and the extended kin networks of which they are a part. During the 1980-81 season, workers spent an average of $538 on consumer goods that were taken or sent back to the islands. Clothing was the most frequent item (100 percent of the sample), followed by electronic entertainment equipment and other household effects.

Money is also remitted to the islands via the forced savings plan, and voluntarily through the mail. A mean of $66 was sent an average of 7.1 times during the season. The primary recipients were wives (53 percent), girlfriends (23.4 percent) and mothers (15.5 percent). Sons and daughters, siblings, and other more distant associates assumed importance as the second and third recipients of mailed funds. A rough estimate indicates that each worker remitted to the island about $518 through the postal service.

These data, and indeed the statements by the workers themselves, clearly support the contention that the opportunity to work in the United States provides critically needed resources to those who are fortunate enough to enter the H-2 labor force. However, the findings presented in the previous section indicate that even individuals who regularly return do not necessarily accumulate productive assets as the equilibrium model of migration would suggest. Together with the data on expenditures, these findings suggest that, rather than serving as a source of investment capital, the wages earned harvesting Florida cane is primarily devoted to the maintenance and reproduction of the worker and his household. This implies, among other things, that, even after several seasons in the labor force, the individual is nonetheless compelled to re-enlist in the H-2 program.

For the industry, this has important consequences. As noted in section III, oldtimers are substantially more productive and less costly to maintain. The system of migrant labor that has evolved is sufficiently attractive to enlist manpower of the highest quality. At the same time, despite repeated participation in the H-2 program, these preliminary results indicate that the resources earned do not enable the individual to work himself out of the system using the accumulation of productive assets at the place of his origin. What he cannot accumulate in assets, he gains in skill and stamina. The employers of Caribbean labor are thus guaranteed not only a continued supply of manpower, but the continued availability of increasingly productive labor.

TABLE 1

MULTIPLE CLASSIFICATION ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF WORK EXPERIENCE ON LAND OWNERSHIP AND EARNINGS

	Dependent Variable (1)	Grand Mean (2)	Independent Variables (3)	N (4)	Deviation from Mean Unadjusted (5)	Adjusted[1] (6)
A.	Acres	2.3	SEASONS[2]			
			Newcomers	95	- 0.14	- 0.15
			Oldtimers	96	- 0.14	0.14
			ISLANDS			
			Barbados	5	- 1.50	- 1.50
			Jamaica	159	- 0.03	- 0.04
			Small[3]	27	0.40	0.50
B.	Pay[4]	253.4	SEASONS			
			Newcomers	105	-21.7	-28.5
			Oldtimers	110	20.6	27.0
			ISLANDS			
			Barbados	13	21.6	10.0
			Jamaica	174	- 0.5	- 0.1
			Small	28	- 6.4	- 4.3

[1] Controlling for independent variables (SEASONS, ISLANDS) and covariates (age of respondent, level of primary education).

[2] Newcomers: those who have worked three seasons or less
Oldtimers: those who have worked more than three seasons

[3] Includes: St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Dominica

[4] Net pay for the fortnight prior to the interview

NOTES

[1] T. McCoy and C. Wood. "Seasonal Migration and Household Sustenance Strategies: A Preliminary Profile of BWI Cane Cutters in Florida." Paper presented at the Sixth Annual Meeting of the Caribbean Studies Association, St. Thomas, May 27-30, 1981.

[2] J. J. Spengler and G. Myers, "Migration and Socioeconomic Development: Today and Yesterday," in *International Migration: A Comparative Perspective*, eds. A. A. Brown and E. Neuberger (New York: Academic Press, 1977). pp. 11-35.

[3] Paul Shaw, *Migration Theory and Fact: A Review and Bibliography of Current Literature* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Regional Science Research Institute, 1975).

[4] C. H. Wood, "Equilibrium and Historical-Structural Perspectives on Migration: A Comparative Critique with Implications for Future Research," *International Migration Review*, Forthcoming 1982.

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[6] Juarez Rubens Brandao Lopez, "Desenvolvimento e Migracoes: uma Abordagem Historico-Estrutrual," *Estudos CEBRAP* 6 (1973): 125-142; and Alejandro Portes, "International Labor Migration and National Development." Paper prepared for Immigration and Refugee Workshop, Wingspread, Wisconsin, August 17-20, 1981.

[7] Saskia Sassen-Koob, "The Internationalization of the Labor Force," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 15:4 (1980): 3-25.

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[9] Michael Buroway, "The Functions and Reproduction of Migrant Labor: Comparative Material from Southern Africa and the United States," *American Journal of Sociology* 81:5 (1976): 1050-1087; and H. Wolpe, "The Theory of Internal Colonialism: The South African Case," in *Beyond the Sociology of Development:*

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[10] Manuel Castells, "Immigrant Workers and Class Struggles in Advanced Capitalism: The Western European Experience," *Politics and Society* 5:1 (1975): 33-66; Alejandro Portes, "Migration and Underdevelopment," *Politics and Society* 8:1 (1978): 1-48; and Saskia Sassen-Koob, "The International Circulation of Resources and Development: The Case of Migrant Labor," *Development and Change* 9 (1978): 509-545.

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